Related pages: The 14 June 2005 Tsunami Warning: Concerns about Response of Local Governments in Lincoln County, Oregon
"Is It Wise to Build the Newport Event Center in an Earthquake and Tsunami Hazard Area?"
[Cover letter to the Mayor and Councilors]
1) The City of Newport Needs to Put Up More Readable Tsunami Signs in Useful Locations
2) Create a Plan for Traffic and People Control Before and After Tsunami Waves
3) Prepare Fire and Police Departments by Determining Relevant Sources of Emergency Tsunami Information Because This Will Be an Ongoing Issue
4) Create a Plan for Evacuation of People with Limited Mobility
5) Re-examine Methods of Verifying a Tsunami to Determine Need for Notifying People to Evacuate
6) Re-examine the Tsunami Warning Notification Policy to Allow Evacuation of Tsunami Inundation Zones Before the First Wave Arrives
7) Re-examine Policy for Not Notifying Docks if There May Be a 5 ft Tsunami Wave
8) Encourage Local Radio Stations to Continuously Broadcast Tsunami Warning Information
9) Distribute Newport and South Beach Evacuation Maps to Residents
10) Educate Visitors to Newport and South Beach Tsunami Areas
11) Update Newport's Comprehensive Plan to Include Tsunami and Earthquake Hazards to Meet Public Safety Concerns
APPENDIX A. Response to questions about tsunamis by Oregon coastal residents in 1998 and Washington coastal residents and visitors to the Washington coast in 2001
APPENDIX B. 1 July 2005 email from Tyree Wilde (Warning Coordination Meteorologist, NOAA's National Weather Service, Portland, OR) to Range Bayer.
APPENDIX C. The tsunami warning issued by the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska for the 14 June 2005 earthquake off northern California.
APPENDIX D. The only tsunami bulletin issued by the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii for the 14 June 2005 earthquake off northern California.
APPENDIX E. Email response to my letter to KNPT-AM radio about the lack of tsunami warning information on their radio station during the June 14 tsunami warning.
APPENDIX F. The portion of Senate Bill 557 as introduced to the 2005 Legislature about posting tsunami information in lodging facilities.
References
From: Range (Richard) Bayer, rbayer@orednet.org, P.O. Box 1467, Newport, OR 97365
Date: 19 July 2005
To: Mayor Mark Jones and City Councilors Bill Bain, Mike Schulz, John Rehfuss, Peggy Sabanskas, Jeff Bertuleit, Larry Henson
169 SW Coast Hwy
Newport, OR 97365
Dear Mayor and Councilors:
Re: June 14 tsunami warning response in Newport.
This event reveals several issues of concern in the preparation, responses, and public education outreach for tsunamis by the City of Newport. The Mayor, the City Council, and the City Manager could provide much more leadership and motivation to better prepare Newport for tsunamis. Until you make tsunami preparation a higher priority, the City of Newport will continue to lag most other cities along the Oregon Coast in planning for a tsunami.
The purpose of this letter is to focus on potential solutions for several tsunami issues that have not received much attention. Accordingly, I do not discuss sirens, reverse 9-1-1, or other warning systems that have been and often continue to be debated.
Although tsunami warnings are rare here (the two previous ones were in May 1986 and October 1994) and the previous significant tsunami was in 1964 that killed four children at Beverly Beach, Newport's lack of tsunami preparation also raises the question of how prepared Newport is for other potential disasters. While some types of preparation for a tsunami would not apply to other disasters, some could also apply to flooding, severe storms, or other emergencies.
Thank you for your time and consideration of public safety issues.
Yours,
Range Bayer
cc: Acting City Manager Nancy Boyer, Fire Chief Rick Crook, Police Chief Mark J. Miranda, Gail Kimberling, Newport News-Times; and to the two citizens who expressed tsunami concerns at the June 20 Newport City Council meeting and for whom I could find mailing addresses: Paul Haggerty (Manager, Embarcadero Resort, Hotel & Marina) and Alice Warner.
P.S. For your convenience, I will also put this letter at http://www.orednet.org/~rbayer/tsunami [all lower case letters] by July 22, so that you can more readily find material cited in this letter.
The City of Newport's inadequate promotion of tsunami safety is most apparent in the lack of tsunami hazard or evacuation route signs (see black and white images below of blue and white signs) in many areas of South Beach and along the Newport Bayfront, both of which are in tsunami inundation zones (see Newport evacuation map at Lincoln County Emergency Management's http://www.lincolncoemergencyservices.us/home.cfm?dir_cat=34589 [scroll down the page] or in Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries 2005). For example, I did not see any tsunami hazard zone or tsunami evacuation route signs (see below) along Bay Boulevard (Newport Bayfront) except evacuation route signs visible to west- and eastbound traffic at the intersection of Hatfield Drive and Bay Boulevard on July 16. The same day, the only tsunami signs for roads and streets between Highway 101 the South Beach Marina, Oregon Coast Aquarium, and OSU Hatfield Science Center in South Beach were at the Hatfield Marine Science Center. There are two "Entering Tsunami Hazard Zone" signs (not shown below) along Highway 101 in South Beach; one visible to northbound traffic 1.9 miles south of the traffic light at the intersection of Highway 101 and SE 32nd Street, and the other visible to southbound traffic just south of the Yaquina Bay Bridge. The lack of tsunami signs in South Beach is the same as I reported in my written testimony to the Newport Planning Commission for the 25 October 2004 Public Hearing.
The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) "manufactures the signs and makes them available to local governments at cost" (State of Oregon 2002:T-8). Perhaps the federal Department of Homeland Security can pay for the costs of these signs.
Ideally, the hazard zone and evacuation route signs could be put on the same post. Then viewers can quickly understand that they are in an area that needs to be evacuated during a tsunami warning and also where to go. This is not apparent for either sign alone. For example, Rockaway Beach has installed these signs together with an arrow (see above photo in State of Oregon 2002:T-11), so it is reasonable and prudent for the City of Newport to do likewise.
Some tsunami signs that have been installed in Newport are too small to be easily visible. I measured a standard tsunami hazard sign and found that it had a total surface area of 416 square inches (18.5 X 22.5 inches) with 1.75 inch high lettering; some are even larger (24 X 30 inches, Darienzo 2003:2). However, I have measured the signs that Newport has put up along southbound routes to the Newport Bayfront at SW Fall Street about a half block north of Bay Boulevard and at SE John Moore Road just north of the intersection with SE 5th Street. Each of these two signs only had 1.0 inch high lettering and had less than half the surface area, 194 square inches (12.5 X 15.5 inches) of the standard sign. These signs and particularly the lettering are too small to be useful; for example, on the same post as the tsunami hazard sign on SW Fall is a Public Parking sign in which the smallest lettering is 3.0 inches high.
With the exception of the two tsunami evacuation route signs at the intersection of Hatfield Drive and Bay Boulevard, Newport has placed several evacuation route signs where they are not visible to people on Bay Boulevard and are probably above the tsunami inundation zone. For example, one sign at the intersection of Naterlin Drive, SW 13th Street, and SW Bay Boulevard near the Coast Guard is a block up the hill from Bay Boulevard and is partially covered by blackberry canes, another at SW Fall is about a half block up the hill from Bay Boulevard, and a third at SE Fogarty Street is also up the hill and about a block from the intersection with Bay Boulevard. To be useful during a tsunami warning, there should be tsunami evacuation route signs along Bay Boulevard with arrows pointing up the hill along these streets, so that people in the tsunami inundation zone along the Bayfront can see the signs and know where to go. Having evacuation route signs only at or near the destination does not help people find an evacuation route.
An example of a tsunami sign that has been placed where it is misleading is in South Beach. Northbound Highway 101 traffic turning onto SE Pacific Way just before the Yaquina Bay Bridge to go to the South Beach Marina, Oregon Coast Aquarium, and OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center see a "Leaving Tsunami Hazard Zone" sign about 0.1 mile before they turn. Thus, these travelers can be misled into believing that they leaving a tsunami hazard rather than entering one. I pointed out this problem in my 25 October 2004 written testimony for a Newport Planning Commission Public Hearing. The City could rectify the problem by moving the sign closer to the Bridge along Highway 101, and/or adding a tsunami hazard zone sign along SE Pacific Way on the street leading to the Marina.
Newport could also help educate citizens and visitors about what areas are or are not in a tsunami inundation zone by following the example of Lincoln City and Waldport. The tsunami evacuation maps for these communities indicate that they have marked their street signs for tsunami safety: a yellow band near the top of a street sign indicates the site is in a tsunami hazard zone, while a green band indicates that the site is not (see tsunami evacuation maps by scrolling down Lincoln County Emergency Management's http://www.lincolncoemergencyservices.us/home.cfm?dir_cat=34589 or at Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries' [2005] http://www.oregongeology.com/earthquakes/Coastal/Tsubrochures.htm). With such street sign markings or just putting a yellow band near the top of street signs in a tsunami inundation zone (which would be more feasible in Newport where most streets are above the tsunami inundation zone), residents and visitors could instantly know if they need to evacuate or not.
There are two types of situations where traffic and people control are crucial for tsunamis. First, if there is several hours of warning for a distant tsunami, it is predictable that people will to come to the coastline to see the tsunami, even though this is not wise, because people in the Pacific Northwest have done so in the past (Tomlinson 1993, Bacon 1994, Preuss 1997:37, 40, 41; Anonymous 2001a, Hamner 2004). Vehicles driving towards the coastline coupled with the departure of people evacuating can be expected to lead to traffic jams.
Second, traffic and people control is crucial after the first tsunami wave arrives. A tsunami is not a single wave but usually includes several waves occurring intermittently during several hours with the first wave often not being the largest as was demonstrated in Oregon bays during the 1964 tsunami from the Alaskan earthquake (Schatz et al. 1964). At Yaquina Bay in 1964, George Priest of DOGAMI noted that the fifth wave was the largest, and it occurred two hours after the first tsunami wave (Anonymous 2003). The four children that were killed at Beverly Beach awakened after the first wave but died after a later wave (Teal 1964). At eight other Oregon Coast bays in 1964, tsunami waves continued to arrive 3-4 hours after the first wave, with different sequences and chronologies at each bay (Schatz et al. 1964). The Center for Coastal & Land-Margin Research (1996) says waves of large magnitude may arrive in Oregon "more than 6-8 hours after the earthquake." Consequently, there is also a high risk of sightseers or evacuees going into a tsunami inundation zone too soon because of curiosity, to inspect property, or to recover belongings because they have done so in the past (Weller 1972:223, 224, 226; Lander et al. 1993, Dudley and Lee 1998:265, 271-272; Bryant 2001:286). In Crescent City in 1964, the tsunami warning was received and people evacuated, but some people and business owners were allowed to return because the first two waves seemed inconsequential--most people were then killed by the fourth wave (Lander et al. 1993:102-103).
Unfortunately, in 1998, 22% of Oregon coastal residents believed that it was safe to return after the first wave, and only 31% knew that it was safe to return only after receiving approval from local authorities (Appendix A). It is to be expected that even a smaller percentage of visitors would know when it is safe to go into tsunami areas. Accordingly, the initial tsunami evacuation may be successful, but it is predictable that many people may lose their lives after the first or second wave when they go into a tsunami inundation zone.
The night of the June 14 tsunami warning, there may not have been any traffic control in Newport. The Newport Police Chief was not notified by LinCom (Lincoln County Communications Agency), and the Police Department reportedly did not have an emergency plan (Card 2005a, 2005b). Further, there were traffic blockages along Highway 101 during the tsunami warning that could have had tragic consequences if there had been a tsunami. During the tsunami warning, construction workers on the Yaquina Bay Bridge stopped traffic, which caused delays (Card 2005a; John Hagan, pers. comm.), and construction workers in South Beach stopped traffic in the tsunami inundation zone along Highway 101 (Susan Cain, pers. comm.; a friend who wishes to remain anonymous, pers. comm.).
Possible Solutions. If it does not already have such a plan, the Newport Police Department could work with the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department on a cooperative plan for traffic and people control for when people are driving to the coastline to see a tsunami and also to try to keep sightseers, residents, and property owners from going into tsunami inundation zones until an official "All Clear" has been issued. State Parks staff (Hamner 2004) and fire departments can evacuate people, but law enforcement agencies have the authority to try to manage traffic and people.
Unfortunately, it must be recognized that the Newport Police Department and the Sheriff's Department would probably not have enough staff to keep people out of tsunami inundation zones in Newport and South Beach because they are too large of an area. So it would be important to prioritize areas and to also enlist the help of other community staff to help as Waldport has proposed (Anonymous 2001f).
The night of June 14, LinCom, the Newport Fire Department and many other emergency responders in Lincoln County received tsunami bulletins from NOAA's Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii (http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc) and NOAA's West Coast & Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska (http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/message.shtml) via various emergency channels (Appendix B). Many of these channels would have been federal, but some also include Oregon Emergency Management (Appendix B). The federal government's emergency responsibility includes all states and territories in the Pacific Basin, not just Oregon, so it is predictable that they will send out emergency messages that may not be relevant to a particular state in the Basin. It is the responsibility of receivers of their messages to know if a message is relevant or not for their specific area. It is possible to prepare by determining which tsunami warning centers are relevant to Oregon by looking at the web sites for these warning centers. After doing this preparation, it is clear that the West Coast is only included within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska.
The night of June 14, an earthquake that was first estimated to be Magnitude 7.4 occurred about 90 miles northwest of Eureka, California at 1951 PDT (7:51 PM PDT, which is 0251 UTC [Z])(Appendix C). Five minutes later (0256 UTC), the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska issued a tsunami warning for coastal areas from the California-Mexico border north to north tip of Vancouver Island (Appendix C)--this would include Oregon. Three minutes later at 0259Z [0259 UTC] or 7:59 PM PDT, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii issued a Tsunami Information Bulletin that there was no tsunami warning for their area of responsibility (Appendix D). But Oregon is not in their area, which is clear from their web site; this was also stated at the top of their message (Appendix D):
"THIS BULLETIN IS FOR ALL AREAS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN EXCEPT ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA."
Unfortunately, those who read this message and thought there was no warning for Oregon overlooked the crucial word "except." They also did not read the end of the message, which said:
"THE WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER WILL ISSUE BULLETINS FOR ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA."
Lincoln County Emergency Management Director Jim Hawley, LinCom, and perhaps other emergency staff in Lincoln County received these messages indirectly (e.g., via Oregon Emergency Management) or directly and became confused whether there was a tsunami warning or not (Card 2005a, Casteel 2005, Choy 2005b, Dillman 2005b, Eberly 2005, Kimberling 2005a, 2005b, 2005d; Ross 2005; Jim Hawley, June 20 email). Depending upon the number of emergency communication channels they had, they may have received the same original message from each warning center more than once (Appendix B), which may have added to their confusion while reading the messages.
LinCom communicated this confusion by calling local communities and telling emergency responders that there was confusion about whether there was a tsunami warning or not at 8:06 PM in Yachats (Eberly 2005). At 8:14 PM, 23 minutes after the earthquake and 18 minutes after the tsunami warning was issued, LinCom called emergency responders in Yachats and perhaps elsewhere that there was indeed a tsunami warning (Eberly 2005).
Valuable time that could have been spent for evacuation was lost in this confusion. Perhaps more importantly, the spreading confusion cast a shadow of doubt on whether evacuation was needed, so that it was not done in some areas or was delayed too long.
Possible Solutions. LinCom and the Newport Fire and Police Departments can prepare for future tsunami warnings by recognizing that it is very predictable that they will probably also indirectly or directly receive emergency tsunami messages from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii in the future (see Appendix B). NOAA's responsibility for sending out such emergency messages is not limited to only sending out messages directly relevant to Oregon, and emergency managers may have several emergency channels, at least one of which will include messages from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (see Appendix B). Oregon Emergency Management may also again relay on Pacific Tsunami Warning Center messages as they did for the June 14 message (Ross 2005; Jim Hawley, June 20 email).
It would be useful for the Newport Fire and Police Departments to have a prepared written protocol for receiving tsunami messages that includes warning staff and those they notify that messages from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii may be received but that they are not relevant and that action is required only for messages from the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska. Written protocols and drills are important because tsunami warnings seldom happen here (the most recent tsunami warnings for Oregon were in May 1986 and October 1994), and emergencies at night (like on June 14) or staff changes may result in staff unfamiliar with these warning centers becoming confused.
Fatalities from a tsunami are proportionately greatest for people unable to move quickly because they may not be able to evacuate in time (e.g., Dudley and Lee 1998:255-256, Bryant 2001:166, Lander et al. 2003:27). Preuss (1988:139) notes that evacuating retirement and nursing homes in a tsunami inundation area is difficult because:
Occupants often have limited mobility and therefore, require heavy manpower commitment for evacuation. For a local event, evacuation may not be possible.
The grimness of the situation for people who are not able-bodied is candidly stated in tsunami evacuation maps for Lincoln City, Salishan/Kernville/Gleneden Beach/Lincoln Beach, Waldport, and Yachats by Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries (2005) [boldface added]:
If you need help evacuating, tie something WHITE (sheet or towel) to the front door knob. Make it large enough to be visible from the street. If the emergency is a distant tsunami, then help may arrive. In the event of a local earthquake and tsunami, it is unlikely that anyone will help you, so make a plan and be prepared!
In addition, the American Planning Association's Schwab (2004) writes:
The more troublesome aspect of evacuation usually involves more vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and disabled, which local authorities must be trained to identify and move safely.
In a tsunami after the predicted major Cascadia subduction zone earthquake off the Oregon coast, people with little mobility who live in a tsunami inundation zone will have little chance of survival. Along the Lincoln County Coast, the first tsunami wave is expected to arrive at Newport about 15-20 minutes later (see Newport tsunami evacuation map in Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries 2005; Gallob 2005a). It is doubtful that all residents of nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and retirement centers in Lincoln County tsunami inundation zones could be evacuated in time. For example, after a daylight, distant tsunami warning in 1994, it took approximately 120 minutes to evacuate about 70 nursing home residents in Washington (Preuss 1997). Evacuation could be expected to take much longer after a major Cascadia subduction zone earthquake that makes roads and bridges impassable (Roddey 2004, Wood and Good 2004:258) or at night, when fewer staff or emergency responders would be available. If the tsunami originates further away, there may or may not be enough time to evacuate them. It is predictable that many caregivers of people unable to evacuate would be reluctant to abandon them, so able-bodied caregivers may be lost also.
In Newport, at least Spencer House (a senior assisted-living facility in South Beach) (Anonymous 2001c) is in a tsunami inundation zone. There may also be people with limited mobility living outside of special centers in Newport and South Beach tsunami inundation zones. For example, at a Depoe Bay City Council meeting, a Councilor expressed concern for evacuating "the elderly, the handicapped, the hearing impaired" before a tsunami, and it was suggested that neighbors or Neighborhood Watch programs help with their evacuation (Anonymous 2001e).
In Newport in 2001, the policy of the Fire Department is to telephone Spencer House about a tsunami warning, and it is Spencer House's responsibility to evacuate themselves (Anonymous 2001c). On June 17, I talked to Newport Fire Chief Rick Crook, and he said that their policy is that if they believed that there was a tsunami threat that they would notify Spencer House, but it is Spencer House's responsibility to evacuate themselves because the Fire Department does not have enough personnel to do so. Since the Fire Department is not going to help, they could have promptly notified Spencer House on June 14 to give them the option of evacuating before the wave would have arrived at about 9:05 PM in Newport (section 5). On July 7, I talked to Susan Cain of Spencer House (which she said has about 35 residents), and she said that no one notified Spencer House about the tsunami warning the night of June 14; a resident happened to see the warning on a TV station and used her pushcord to alert the staff, and that she first heard about it at about 9 PM. Since the warning, Cain had talked to Chief Rick Crook, and he told her that it was up to Spencer House to have their own evacuation plan and that it was Fire Department policy to not help. Cain said that she and other Spencer House staff had not been aware of this previously. Cain also asked the Chief if Spencer House residents be put on a priority list for receiving oxygen bottles and medications needed by residents in the aftermath of a tsunami, but the Chief said that was not possible. Consequently, Cain and other Spencer House staff are exploring options of getting help from the South Beach neighborhood to evacuate and care for Spencer House residents.
Possible Solutions. The Newport Fire Department could promptly notify Spencer House and any other facilities with people with limited mobility, so they can start their evacuation plan as soon as possible and complete it before the predicted arrival of the first tsunami wave.
Newport could also work with Lincoln County to ensure that Spencer House and any other facilities with vulnerable people have a better chance of being evacuated. For example, in Gold Beach on June 14, the Gold Beach Police Department, Gold Beach Volunteer Fire Department, Curry County Sheriff's Office, and local residents teamed together to evacuate an assisted-living community in less than 30 minutes (Walker 2005). Why can't Newport be as caring for people with limited mobility in tsunami inundation zones as Gold Beach?
The Fire Department notified only people on beaches on June 14 because they believed that there might not be a tsunami or that it would only have a height of 5 ft or less (Card 2005b). In my June 17 visit with the Fire Department Chief, he said that they were monitoring water levels at ocean buoys on the Internet to determine if there was a tsunami the night of June 14. It could seem that monitoring buoy and tide gauge data for California and Oregon available on the Internet would be a good way to determine if there was a tsunami or not. However, one has to research the methods of buoy and tide gauge measurement to determine if they are appropriate for verifying a tsunami. There are buoys close to the epicenter of the June 14 earthquake, but although their online web pages may appear at first glance as if these buoys continuously monitor wave height, they only do so for 20 minutes every 30 minutes at Buoys 46212 and 46213 or for 20 minutes every hour at Buoys 46022 and 46027, and they update information only every 30 minutes or hour, respectively (National Data Buoy Center 2005c). Consequently, these buoys could have easily missed recording a tsunami wave. Further, if there had been a tsunami and if, by chance, these buoys had recorded it, another 30 or 60 minutes would have elapsed before this would have been reported online. By that time, there would have been little or no time to evacuate as the first tsunami wave was predicted in Newport at 9:05 PM (which can be calculated by using the predicted time of the first tsunami wave in Charleston and Seaside [second page of Appendix C] and interpolating the time for Newport based on straight line distances between Newport, Charleston, and Seaside).
It takes special buoys to monitor water height continuously and accurately determine a tsunami, and there are only two such DART (Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis) buoys along the California and Oregon coasts (National Data Buoy Center 2005d, Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory [2005]). Unfortunately, the tsunami from the June 14 earthquake would not have reached the first DART buoy (DART Buoy 46405, which is west of Coos Bay [National Data Buoy Center 2005b, 2005d; Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory [2005]) until 48 minutes after the June 14 earthquake (8:39 PM), according to geophysicist Bruce Turner (Director of the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center)(Ross 2005). Thus, by the time the DART buoy could have verified a tsunami, there would have been little time to do an evacuation by the predicted 9:05 PM arrival of the tsunami in Newport.
Tide gauges at Crescent City, Port Orford, and other locations have online graphs that could also be mistakenly interpreted as continuous monitoring of water height. But they only measure water height every 6 minutes (National Ocean Service 2005), so they could have missed a tsunami, if they were not recording at the time a tsunami wave passed. Further, the recordings are not posted instantaneously online, so online viewers could not be sure if there was a tsunami or not. For example on July 18, the online graph shown for Crescent City at 2:54 PM indicated that the graph was from the 1:42 PM reading (National Ocean Service 2005), so it took more than an hour for the graph to be updated. Further, the morning of July 19 at 11:04 AM, the online graph for Crescent City showed that it was last updated at 8:48 PM on July 18 (National Ocean Service 2005), so it can sometimes be many hours before the online graph is updated.
Lincoln County Emergency Management Director Jim Hawley reportedly said that local officials had reasonable assurance that there would be no tsunami when Crescent City was not hit at 8:29 PM (Casteel 2005). I asked Hawley for his source of information that there was no wave striking at 8:29 PM, and he replied in his June 29 email that the National Warning System would have alerted them, if there had been a wave. Perhaps, but with all the other communication glitches that night, it is also very possible that there could have been a tsunami wave, but that for some reason that there would have been a delay in reporting it. I asked Hawley in a July 2 email if he had received word that specifically said there was no tsunami wave, and I have not yet received a response. The lack of a National Warning System call about a tsunami could mean either there was no tsunami or that they had not received a report of one. Since there are often multiple tsunami waves and the first is often not the largest (section 2), I asked Hawley in my June 27 email how he could be sure there would be no later, large tsunami wave, if none was reported at 8:29 PM in Crescent City, but he has not responded. Further, the predicted times were only that--predictions based on models that haven't been tested very often with real events. It is possible that the first tsunami wave could have arrived before or after the predicted times.
Possible Solution. The Newport Fire Department could check their sources of information for determining if a there is a tsunami wave to be sure that they only include DART buoys. Otherwise a predicted tsunami wave may be missed and the lag in reporting buoy or tide gauge data online may also lead to a false conclusion that there was no tsunami or result in losing time that could have been used for evacuation. It is also needs to be recognized that DART buoy data may not be helpful, if like on June 14, the tsunami wave would not arrive at the closest DART buoy until a half hour or less before the tsunami is predicted to arrive at Newport.
The night of June 14, the tsunami warning was issued by the West Coast & Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska at 7:59 PM, when they also gave predicted arrival times in Oregon for Charleston, Seaside, and Astoria (second page of Appendix C). Jay Wilson (Earthquake and Tsunami Program Coordinator at Oregon Emergency Management) said that the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center made the "right call" by sending out the warning because there is such a short time frame for evacuating Oregon's coastline after a strong off-shore earthquake and that waiting any longer for updated seismic information could have cost valuable time that could have been used for evacuation (Roddey 2005). Wilson noted that "warnings for this type of event are prudent." Oregon State University geologist Jason Chaytor agreed that it was important for the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center to send out the June 14 tsunami warning because it would have taken more time to determine the exact location and type of earthquake and subsequently its potential for creating a tsunami (Stauth 2005). Chaytor also said that the warning "should be taken seriously." If the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center had waited a half hour or more to send out a tsunami warning, Newport officials would have justifiably complained that they would not have had enough time to do an evacuation.
On June 14, LinCom notified the emergency responders in at least Yachats at 8:06 PM that there was confusion about whether there was a tsunami warning or not and confirmed the tsunami warning at 8:14 PM (Eberly 2005). The first wave could be calculated as arriving in Newport at about 9:05 PM (section 5). In Newport as in other Lincoln County communities (Casteel 2005), the Fire Department is responsible for notification of tsunami warnings or evacuation in its area.
Newport chose to do a partial tsunami warning notification, and Fire Department personnel together with staff from the Oregon Parks and Recreation Department notified people along the beaches in South Beach State Park that it was advisable to evacuate (Card 2005b, Kimberling 2005c). In my June 17 meeting with Newport Fire Chief Rick Crook, he said that if a tsunami had landed at Crescent City (where the predicted arrival time was 8:29 PM) or at a buoy, then they would have notified various groups such as Spencer House, the Hatfield Marine Science Center, and Oregon Coast Aquarium, but it was up to those facilities to do their own evacuation as it was Newport Fire Department policy to not help (also see Anonymous 2001c). However, even if the Fire Department instantaneously knew if a tsunami hit Crescent City (which seems unlikely), it took the Fire Chief 15 minutes to make his telephone notifications in 2001 during the daytime (Anonymous 2001c), so it could be expected that not all facilities would have even been notified by 8:44 PM at night when making contacts is not as easy as during "business" hours. It is doubtful that these facilities (especially Spencer House) could have completed evacuation by the time the first tsunami wave arrived at about 9:05 PM. Further, people living in the South Beach tsunami inundation zone or on the Newport Bayfront in the tsunami inundation zone that were not on the Chief's list would not have had any warning from local government at all.
Possible Solutions. In my June 17 meeting with the Fire Chief, he explained that Fire Department policy is to minimize unnecessary evacuations ("false alarms") because an unnecessary evacuation could result in accidents or injury, so that is why they had a measured response in notifying only people on the beach. His concern about "false alarms" is reasonable; 75% of tsunami warnings since 1950 have been false alarms that may cause millions of dollars of damage in lost business from evacuation; these "false" alarms also weaken the credibility of the warning system (Dudley and Lee 1998:254, 276; Bryant 2001:279-280, Oregon Emergency Management and Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries 2001:10).
Certainly, the current Fire Department policy is well-intentioned and would work best for tsunamis with "several" or four hours or more warning as the Fire Department and other Oregon tsunami emergency responders have been led to believe would be the case for distant tsunamis (Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries' Roddey 2004, Newport tsunami evacuation map in Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries 2005). However, there was only about an hour or less of warning until the first tsunami wave was predicted to arrive at Newport at about 9:05 PM for the June 14 event (section 5). There was enough time for the Chief to give out notifications after the tsunami was supposed to strike Crescent City, but it is questionable that there would have then been enough time to complete the evacuation by the time of the first wave in Newport, especially at Spencer House. Since the Fire Department policy is to not help with evacuations, it could promptly notify facilities in tsunami inundation zones, so that they could make their own decision on whether to evacuate or not and to start their own evacuation plans. By delaying evacuation notifications, it is more likely that an evacuation will be more panicky and lead to accidents because of the little time before the first wave.
It might be advisable for the Newport Fire Department policy to change to follow the lead of the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska and give notifications to people and facilities in tsunami inundation zones when the Center gives a tsunami warning and cancel it when the Center cancels their warning. The Center has the staff to keep up with the technology of predicting and measuring tsunamis as well as the most up-to-date analysis of buoy and tide gauge data. In terms of liability, it might be better to follow the Center's lead rather than risk miscalculations from buoy and tide gauge data that may be harder to interpret than it appears during an emergency.
Jim Hawley was also reported as saying that if there had been a tsunami wave on June 14 that it would have only been about 5 ft high (Casteel 2005). In my June 27 email, I asked for his source of the 5 ft tsunami information, but he has not responded. I have been researching the response of emergency staff to the June 14 tsunami warning along the entire Oregon Coast, and so far the only sources I have found who thought that night that the wave may be 5 ft or less high is the Newport Fire Department (Card 2005b) and Jim Hawley (Casteel 2005).
The tsunami warning by the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska did not predict a tsunami height (Appendix C), and such a prediction is not possible until the tsunami reaches a DART buoy or strikes land. Even after a tsunami wave is recorded at a buoy, it is not accurate to predict that a tsunami wave will have the same height when it hits shore. The height of a tsunami wave at sea may only be a few inches but be many feet when it comes onshore, since tsunami wave height increases as it goes into shallow water (Dudley and Lee 1998:90-91, 326; International Tsunami Information Center 2005:4, 11). Accordingly, if there is enough warning for a tsunami, the Coast Guard moves its ships offshore to avoid damage (e.g., Card 2005c). Further, it is difficult to accurately predict the wave height for different locations along the coast based on the height at one location because tsunami height is affected by local bathymetry, reefs, slope of beach, and other geographical features (Dudley and Lee 1998:91, 326; International Tsunami Information Center 2005:5, 9) as was also demonstrated in Oregon during the 1964 tsunami (Schatz et al. 1964).
On June 14, the Newport Fire Department did not notify the Newport Bayfront, reportedly because "a five-foot wave would not pose a threat to that area" (Card 2005b). However, a 5 ft wave (and perhaps even a 2-3 ft wave) could injure or sweep away people walking on docks, so a warning would be appropriate to people along the docks at the Newport Bayfront, South Beach Marina, Embarcadero, Sawyer's Landing, and other docks in Yaquina Bay. Further, as a friend pointed out to me, a 5 foot tsunami wave could cause considerable damage to unprepared fishing boats, charter boats, Undersea Gardens (which is effectively a floating barge), and pleasure boats. While a 5 ft wave may or may not require evacuation, boat, barge, and dock owners could have used the time to better secure their boats or barges to withstand the tsunami wave or to remove valuables before the first tsunami wave was predicted to arrive.
Possible Solution. The Newport Fire Department could change its policy and notify people on the docks and other boat or dock stakeholders of a tsunami waves even for waves of 5 ft or less in height. The Fire Department could meet with the Port of Newport, Embarcadero, Undersea Gardens, fishermen, boaters, barge owners, and dock owners to determine the heights of tsunami wave for which stakeholders would like notification for evacuation or notification only for securing their property or to remove valuables. The Fire Department may then want to adjust its policy and notify people on the dock or Bayfront stakeholders to not only consider the tsunami height capable of causing injury but also of causing monetary damage that could be reduced by timely action.
Many, perhaps most, people in coastal Lincoln County did not hear about the tsunami warning from county or city officials or local radio stations. Most people in Lincoln City seemed to have learned of the tsunami warning from Portland TV stations or telephone calls from friends who were watching TV (Sheridan Jones in Choy 2005b). The same appears to be true in Newport based on my conversations.
Jim Hawley and other emergency responders have said that people need to listen to local radio stations and not call 911 (e.g., Casteel 2005, Kimberling 2005c, 2005e). The night of June 14, friends told me that they were listening to KSHL and KPPT and that those stations did not start broadcasting information about the tsunami warning until about 9 PM (which would have been too late for many to evacuate before the first wave). Other stations in Lincoln County were not broadcasting tsunami information or were not broadcasting information continuously (Lincoln City Manager in Kimberling 2005e, Fuller 2005, Henke and Rooney 2005, Kimberling 2005c; friends and my personal experience).
I wrote KNPT, KSHL, and KPPT on June 19 about this issue. I received a response only from Dave Miller, who owns KNPT-AM, KYTE-FM, KNCU-FM, KCRF-FM, and KBCH-AM (Appendix E). He responded (Appendix E):
We did have information about the tsunami warning on all of them, but the most extensive coverage was on the designated emergency station, 102.7 FM, KYTE.
Note that he did not say that they had continuous coverage on any of them--only that the most extensive coverage was on KYTE. The problem is that people searching for emergency information are not going to listen for possibly intermittent information on a station that is broadcasting its normal programming. People are going to try tuning to other stations or, quite predictably, call 911 for information, if they believe it is an emergency.
The problem with local radio stations not promptly or continuously broadcasting emergency information in Lincoln County is not new. For example, this controversy also arose in 2004, when KPPT did not receive information about whether an earthquake felt locally had caused a tsunami until 45 minutes later (Gallob 2004b), and Dave Miller said that emergency information had been broadcast on his stations, even though some people may not have heard it (Gallob 2004a, 2004b)--if it was broadcast only once, it is predictable that many people would not have heard it unless they were attentively listening at the time of the single broadcast.
For local radio stations to be useful during an emergency, they must have official information that is confidently reported. That does not appear to have been the case for the night of June 14. Dave Miller notes that his stations were not informed (Appendix E):
... no official warning was generated by local officials for us to receive. The information we did have on the air, therefore could not be official. We were only able to announce the quake and that we understood a tsunami warning had been generated, but that we did not have any official information.
Possible Solutions. The City of Newport could also encourage Newport radio stations to not only broadcast emergency information promptly but also continuously. Radio stations elsewhere do so, so why not in Newport? For example, Chris Sargent (2005), who is director of programming for Clear Channel Radio in Eugene-Springfield, writes about their broadcasting the tsunami warning during the night of June 14:
There was concern that alerts and warning were not aired. I can speak for Clear Channel Radio stations in Eugene and licensed to Florence. The Emergency Alert System activated properly on the radio stations within minutes of the alert. We followed with continuous announcements and news coverage on KPNW, KODZ, KFLY and KDUK until the warning was dropped. Most of our stations can be heard on the Oregon Coast. We felt it was necessary to have immediate coverage and have several policies in place in our organization to guarantee that we take these issues very seriously and respond very quickly. I hope other operators see this as a serious issue have similar policies in place. A single alert announcement from the automated EAS is not enough, especially in a case like this. As for other broadcasters, if a station did not air the initial warning from the EAS or cover the story, that would be a fineable offense from the Federal Communications Commission. The problem is that in some cases the warning would only air once and a station would meet its legal obligation. I choose to read that definition differently. We are here to serve the community and broadcast such warnings repeatedly.
With jamming of phone lines of 911 and other emergency services during the June 14 event, it is clear that many residents are not aware of what they need to do. It is also probable that many residents who were safely above tsunami inundation zones did not know that they did not have to evacuate. Some people in Newport unnecessarily evacuated all the way to Toledo (e.g., Dillman 2005a, Henke and Rooney 2005), which could cause traffic congestion as well as increase the risk of accidents.
There is a color, 2-page tsunami evacuation map brochure for Newport (e.g., scroll down Lincoln County Emergency Management's http://www.lincolncoemergencyservices.us/home.cfm?dir_cat=34589 and Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries 2005). This brochure contains a remarkable amount of essential information in a compact form and specifically shows what areas need or do NOT need to be evacuated and where to evacuate to. Unfortunately, many residents do not know that these maps exist or have not printed them out beforehand and become familiar with them.
Possible Solutions. Because the original Newport evacuation map brochure is in color and color reproduction is expensive, cost would be a deterrent to its distribution. However, black and white copies show details adequately and would be more economical to distribute. It would be very helpful if the City of Newport widely distributed a black and white, 2-sided, 8.5 x 11 inch copy of the Newport evacuation map brochure. For example, it could be sent out with the water bill, though this method of distribution would not reach people who do not receive water bills (e.g., those living in apartments). Or it could be printed in the Newport News-Times, which printed the Lincoln City evacuation maps on p. A2 of the 29 December 2004 paper.
Previous and current public education about tsunamis is mostly directed to coastal residents, and Lincoln County's Emergency Services Department Manager Jim Hawley reportedly said that earthquake and tsunami education efforts have been successful with locals, but visitors are often unaware of potential dangers (Richins 2004). This has been documented in Washington, where only 24-26% of residents had not seen tsunami hazard maps or heard or received information for preparing for a tsunami compared to 76-80% of visitors (Appendix A). Further, no visitors had received tsunami information from federal, state, or local governments (Appendix A).
Visitors are often more numerous than residents, so, if they are not educated about tsunamis, most casualties could be of visitors. For example, it has been reported that "Lincoln County has a population of 43,000, but eight months out of the year that number increases to 100,000 because of vacationers who head to motels, campgrounds and beach houses" (Geist 2004).
Possible Solutions. Since Newport encourages tourism, then Newport also has a responsibility for the safety of its guests. Education could be done in a way to not scare visitors--simply inform them that there is a very small risk of a tsunami, but if there is one, then give them information about what to do.
One method to educate visitors about tsunamis is to put up more tsunami hazard and evacuation route signs that are readable, easily visible, and are at useful locations (section 1). With more signs, visitors would be more likely to know what to do and less anxious. Fear and panic is more likely among people who do not what to do and who are not prepared.
Another option is to encourage motels, hotels, and tourist facilities in tsunami inundation zones to have signs posted or evacuation maps available to all--not just to those visitors who request information because only the already educated visitor would know to ask for information. The Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (2003) has put out information "Tsunami preparedness guide for Oregon lodging facilities" that would be helpful. Choy (2005a) reported that Carole Barkhurst, manager of the Depoe Bay Chamber of Commerce visitor center, favors education of tourists as well as residents:
Barkhurst said she believes it's valuable to try to make tsunami information readily available for residences and motels. She would eventually like to see every single residence and motel in town have tsunami warning information, she said.
And Gallob (2005b) also reported the need for education of visitors:
Oregon Coastal Zone Management Association director Onno Husing suggests we "need to create a 'culture of preparedness.'" Since there will be so little time to warn people (locals and visitors), we need to have tsunami preparedness bred into our thinking," he believes. Visitors must know in advance, Husing argues, what to do and not to do. For that to happen, the information must be widely known and accepted - a part of the culture. One way of getting information to tourists is to place tent-cards in every hotel and motel room, Husing said, telling visitors that while tsunamis come only every several hundred years, they need to know certain information, just in case.
Vittek (2005) also reported about liability issues:
Hotels are required to post fire evacuation routes and warnings but nothing about tsunamis. ... "Hotels might become liable civilly if some guests didn't get out," [Sandy] Pfaff [of the Lincoln City Visitor and Convention Bureau] said.
Some lodging facilities in Lincoln City have voluntarily put out tsunami information. For example, Barker (2005) reported:
[Hotel manager Kevin] Winters' hotel, the D-Sands, sits right on the beach. He voluntarily posted signs in every room that warn guests what to do in case of a tsunami. "Guests want to know what we are doing, so putting something up like this should put our guests at ease," he says, however signs are not required in every hotel room.
Further, Robert Eaton, who formerly was the manager of the Inn at Spanish Head in Lincoln City, had been a strong advocate of putting out information for his guests (Ross 2003, Vittek 2005), and the press release for Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries (2003) indicates that he helped in its preparation. Matt Foley has replaced Robert Eaton, who recently retired (Stanfill 2005). Stanfill (2005) wrote:
One of Eaton's passions was tsunami preparedness, and Foley said he plans to continue Eaton's "visionary" work. "I am personally vested," Foley said. "We could have 200 guests. I am responsible for these people's safety. That's part of the innkeepers' code." Each room in the oceanfront inn has a tsunami evacuation map as well as a two-sided, bright yellow piece of paper detailing what to do in case of a tsunami. The sheet suggests visitors head to high ground, and lists several local emergency assembly areas as well as a series of questions and answers. ... "People trust their safety with us," he said.
Visitors to Newport trust their safety to the City of Newport, too. The City could do its part to educate visitors without alarming them. It is possible.
The third option is for Newport to pass an ordinance requiring lodgings in the Newport and South Beach tsunami inundation zones to require that tsunami information is made available because some lodging facilities have resisted tsunami information efforts, since they are afraid it might hurt their business. A Bill in the 2003 Oregon Senate to require coastal lodgings in tsunami inundation zones to display tsunami warnings and evacuation routes failed because of concern from the coastal tourism industry (Ross 2003, Welch 2005). After the Bill was re-introduced in 2005, the Bill was amended to meaninglessness and appears unlikely of passing (Appendix F). The original text of the Bill introduced in 2005 (Appendix F) could serve as a template for a Newport ordinance that applies only to lodgings in tsunami inundation zones.
The City of Newport has not included the 1995 tsunami inundation maps (Priest 1995a, 1995b) nor earthquake hazard maps (Madin and Wang 1999) for Newport and South Beach in the City's Comprehensive Plan. At the 25 October 2004 Newport Planning Commission Public Hearing, the City of Newport's representative Dennis Bartoldus stated that the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development had not requested the City of Newport to revise its Comprehensive Plan to include earthquake and tsunami hazards, so the City had not done so (see p. 5 of Haney 2004). The tsunami and earthquake hazards maps are available, so it would be prudent for the City of Newport to include this information for public safety, instead of waiting until it is mandated. By doing so, the City would also meet revised Statewide Planning Goal 7 and its amendments that became effective on 1 June 2002 (Oregon Dept. of Land Conservation and Development 2002), which state, in part:
A. NATURAL HAZARD PLANNING
1. Local governments shall adopt comprehensive plans (inventories, policies and implementing measures) to reduce risk to people and property from natural hazards.
2. Natural hazards for purposes of this goal are: floods (coastal and riverine), landslides, earthquakes and related hazards, tsunamis, coastal erosion, and wildfires. Local governments may identify and plan for other natural hazards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oregon Washington__
Resi- Resi- Visi-
dents dents tors
(%) (%) (%)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Did not know that tsunami is large amount of water 20 - -
Had not seen tsunami hazard maps - 26 76
Had not heard or received information about preparing for
tsunami - 24 80
Received tsunami information from federal, state, or local
government - 64 0
If tsunami warning, do not know how long they have to
respond - 26 28
If tsunami warning, do not know to listen to radio for
official advice - 27 87
If tsunami warning, do not know to go at least 1/2 mile
inland or 100 feet above sea level - 17 26
If earthquake, do not know that must respond within
30 minutes 69 55 52
Believe it is safe to return to low areas after first
tsunami wave 22 - -
Know that is safe to return to low areas only after
approval from local authorities 31 - -
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2005 14:52:16 -0700
Range
Sorry it's taken awhile to get back to you, but I've been out of the office most of the week. Anyway, here's some answers to your questions.
I agree that the two bulletins from the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (ATWC) and Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) caused confusion. As you know, ATWC is responsible for issuing Tsunami Watches and warnings for the west coast of the US, BC, and AK. The PTWC has responsibility for the rest of the Pacific Basin, to include Hawaii, US territories, and
other islands/countries in the Pacific. It is important when one center issues a warning for their area , that the other center issues an information bulletin to let people in their area (or elsewhere) know what's going on. Many people like and have requested to get bulletins from both centers so they're aware of any Tsunami activity. This is especially true since the Indonesian Tsunami since PTWC has been issuing info information bulletins for quakes in that area. People are very
interested in this phenomena.
However, since these two bulletins did create confusion (as people didn't read the bulletin carefully, which can be justified in the heat of the moment), our agency has taken an action item to improve the format of these bulletins so they are clear and complement one another. For example, if the same scenario were to happen again, the ATWC would issue the warning, but PTWC could clearly state in their bulletin for their AOR that "A Tsunami Warning is in effect for the West Coast of the US", but no Tsunami Warning is in effect for the rest of the Pacific Basin. Vice versa if PTWC issued a tsunami warning for Hawaii, the ATWC could issue a info bulletin to let people on the west coast know what going on in the other part of the Pacific.
As for the notification, the ATWC issued the Tsunami Warning at 7:56 pm PDT on June 14 via various communication methods. Some examples (not inclusive) are the National Warning Alert System (NAWAS), NOAA Weather Wire, NWS communication circuits, FAA comm circuits, US Coast Guard comm circuits, internet, email, EMWIN, etc. Immediately after the message was transmitted the ATWC used NAWAS (basically a telephone hotline) to contact each state warning point (AK, WA, OR, CA) and BC to verbally relay the warning. In Oregon, the state warning point is the Oregon Emergency Response (OERS) facility at Oregon Emergency Management in Salem. Once the NAWAS call between ATWC and the state warning pts occurred, the OERS folks contacted the county warning pts via NAWAS on the coast (usually a County Sheriff's office or County 911 center). The county warning points then notified county and community officials (EMs, police, fire, community officials) within their county using several dissemination methods each county uses. The Tsunami Warning was also disseminated on the Oregon Law Enforcement Dissemination System (LEDS), which is an automated feed from the NOAA Weather Wire downlink in Salem. These messages via LEDS goes to several communities/agencies. So, the ATWC bulletin may have been received at different times--depending on how an individual or agency received it. It may have been 1 minute after to a few minutes after. Also, several people/agencies received the bulletin several methods. We also transmitted the warning over our NOAA Weather Radio transmitters at 8:11 pm PDT with an EAS activation.
The PTWC bulletin was issued at 7:59 pm PDT. It was disseminated over the LEDS network just like the ATWC bulletin. Many people/agencies (including media markets) also received this bulletin via email, subscriber services, internet, etc.
[The part of his message answering my specific questions is not included because they are effectively answered above.]
I hope I have answered your questions. Please feel free to contact me if you need additional information. It would probably be better to discuss via phone since it's hard to capture the entire dissemination process via email.
Tyree Wilde
I have boldfaced critical words or sentences that were missed by readers who thought this message said there was no tsunami warning or watch for Oregon.
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2005 12:03:38 -0700
Mr. Bayer, in your letter you did not indicate which one of our stations you attempted to listen to. We did have information about the tsunami warning on all of them, but the most extensive coverage was on the designated emergency station, 102.7FM, KYTE. The biggest problem with the entire event was that National Weather Service failed to initiate a tsunami warning in Lincoln County. Their transmitter did not work which is one of four sources that we monitor for EAS emergencies. Two of the others are the state relay network from radio station KWAX in Eugene and the commercial relay network from radio station KKNU in Eugene. NWS programmed the tsunami warning that those stations received and transmitted as only a Lane county event, therefore our receiver was not triggered to receive it. NWS now understands that problem and they are working on the failure of their equipment in Lincoln County. They also failed in Clatsop and Coos Counties. The fourth source we monitor is county emergency services, but no official warning was generated by local officials for us to receive.
The information we did have on the air, therefore could not be official. We were only able to announce the quake and that we understood a tsunami warning had been generated, but that we did not have any official information. I hope this proves helpful for your understanding. I believe all officials know what needs to happen next time.
djm
=== On July 2, I emailed Dave Miller and asked: "Did KNPT and your other stations other than KYTE have warning announcements and then resume normal broadcasting?" because his email above suggests this. As of July 19, I have not received a reply.
As of 11 July 2005, even the amended Bill is still in a Senate committee (search for "Senate Bill 557" at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/searchmeas.html), and it seems doubtful that it will be passed.
A BILL FOR AN ACT
(2) A transient lodging facility that is located in a tsunami inundation zone shall post tsunami warning information and evacuation plans developed under subsection (3) of this section.
(3) The Office of Emergency Management, in consultation with the State Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, shall develop and adopt by rule tsunami warning information and evacuation plans required to be posted under subsection (2) of this section.
(4) A transient lodging facility that is located in a tsunami inundation zone and is:
Anonymous. 2001a. County gets tsunami watch for Peru quake. June 27 newspaper article in Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/06/27/general/news-05.txt
Anonymous. 2001b. Local bridge top priority for seismic repairs. In June 22 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/06/22/general/news-01.txt
Anonymous. 2001c. Quake offers real-time test of disaster response. March 3 article in Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/03/03/general/news-02.txt
Anonymous. 2001d. Residents advised to heed 'wake-up call.' March 3 article in Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/03/03/general/news-29.txt
Anonymous. 2001e. Depoe Bay receives tsunami evacuation route map. July 6 article in Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/07/06/general/news-05.txt
Anonymous. 2001f. Waldport to seek approval for proposed tsunami evacuation plan. July 11 article in Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/07/11/general/news-07.txt
Anonymous. 2003. Offshore quake could spawn several tidal waves. April 9 newspaper article in Newport News-Times. This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2003/04/09/general/news-01.txt
Bacon, L. 1994. Tsunami advisory shakes up the coast. P. 1D and 3D in Oct. 5 Eugene Register-Guard (newspaper).
Barker, B. 2005. Tsunami threat looms in Lincoln City. February 8, 2005 news story on KATU-TV, Portland, Oregon. This is at http://www.katu.com/team2/story.asp?ID=74638
Bryant, E. 2001. Tsunami: the underrated hazard. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, England.
Card, S. 2005a. LinCom inundated with calls during tsunami warning. P. A1 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/news/news02.txt
Card, S. 2005b. Tsunami response mixed in Newport. P. A1 and A3 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/news/news03.txt
Card, S. 2005c. Coast Guard heads to sea during tsunami threat. P. A8 and A9 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/news/news19.txt
Casteel, E. 2005. County responds to warning. P. A10 June 22 article in News Guard (Lincoln City) that is available on July 13 at http://www.thenewsguard.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=2662
Center for Coastal & Land-Margin Research. 1996. Science for society: impact of tsunamis on Oregon coastal communities. Center for Coastal & Land-Margin Research, Oregon Health and Science University. This is at http://www.ccalmr.ogi.edu/tsunami/images/minutes
Choy, B. 2005a. Depoe Bay officials glad to see residents evacuated. P. A11 article in June 22 News Guard (Lincoln City) that is available on July 13 at http://www.thenewsguard.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=2663
Choy, B. 2005b. Tsunami warning prompts look at local alert systems: Lincoln City officials diagnose problems. P. A1 and A10 article in June 22 News Guard (Lincoln City) that is available on July 13 at http://www.thenewsguard.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=2660
Darienzo, M. 2003. Tsunami sign placement guidelines. Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries Open-File Report OFR-03-06. This is at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/earthquakes/Coastal/OFR0306Signs.pdf
Dillman, T. 2005a. Local reactions to tsunami warning vary. P. A8 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/news/news18.txt
Dillman, T. 2005b. Council ponders Lincoln City's tsunami readiness. P. A1 and A2 article in July 1 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/07/01/news/news04.txt
Dudley, W. C. and M. Lee. 1998. Tsunami! Second edition. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, Hawaii. (This is GC222.H3 D84 at Oregon State University Libraries.)
Eberly, L. 2005. Yachats evacuation a success. P. A1 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/news/news04.txt
Fuller, E. 2005. Reader's open forum: Elks, not Lincoln City, had it together. P. A4 and A5 in June 22 News Guard (Lincoln City). It is no longer available online.
Gallob, J. 2004a. County discusses quake, tsunami preparedness and response capabilities. July 16 article in Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2004/07/16/news/news04.txt
Gallob, J. 2004b. Issues aired over tsunami warning radio system. July 30 article in Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2004/07/30/news/news08.txt
Gallob, J. 2005a. Hooley gathers ideas for federal tsunami response. P. A3 in Jan. 19 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/01/19/news/news09.txt
Gallob, J. 2005b. Tsunami preparations: can we do more? P. A1 and A6 article in Jan. 12 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/01/12/news/news03.txt
Geist, W. 2004. Earthquakes, tsunamis not unusual occurrences in the Pacific Northwest. In December 28 article in Corvallis Gazette-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.gazettetimes.com/articles/2004/12/28/news/community/tue03.txt
Hamner, E. 2004. Parks staff ready to respond. In Dec. 30 Coos Bay The World (newspaper) online; available for a fee at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives
Haney, W. 2004. Minutes: City of Newport Planning Commission Regular Session, Monday, October 25, 2004. Newport Community Development (Planning) Department, W.
Haney, Administrative Secretary. Copy available from Community Development Department, Newport City Hall, 169 SW Coast HWY, Newport, OR 97365.
Henke, S. and J. F. Rooney. 2005. Letters in editor's mailbag: Where was radio information? June 26 article in Register-Guard (Eugene) and is available for a fee at http://www.registerguard.com/news/wwwsearch.html
International Tsunami Information Center. 2005. Tsunami: the great waves. International Tsunami Information Center with support by U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service; UNESCO, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; and Laboratoire de Geophysique, France. This is at http://www.prh.noaa.gov/itic/library/pubs/great_waves/tsunami_great_waves.html
Johnston, D., D. Paton, B. Houghton, J. Becker, and G. Crumbie. 2002. Results of the August-September 2001 Washington State Tsunami Survey. Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Science Report 2002/17. This is at http://www.dnr.wa.gov/geology/pdf/gns_sr2002-17.pdf
Kimberling, G. 2005a. Tsunami warning a 'good shake-up,' fire chief says. P. A8 and A9 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/news/news17.txt
Kimberling, G. 2005b. Tsunami warning brings flood of lessons. P. A10 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/opinion/opinions01.txt
Kimberling, G. 2005c. Tsunami warning is real-life exercise. P. A1 and A2 article in June 17 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/06/17/news/news01.txt
Kimberling, G. 2005d. 'Glitches' mar county's tsunami response, Commissioner Hall says. P. A4 article in July 1 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/07/01/news/news13.txt
Kimberling, G. 2005e. Experts examine tsunami warning reaction in Lincoln City. P. A1 and A6 article in July 8 Newport News-Times (newspaper). This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/07/08/news/news01.txt
Lander, J. F., P. A. Lockridge, and M. J. Kozuch. 1993. Tsunamis affecting the West Coast of the United States, 1806-1992. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service, National Geophysical Data Center. Boulder, Colorado. NGDC Key to Geophysical Records Documentation No. 29. (This is at GC222.U6 L36 1993 at Oregon State University Libraries.)
Lander, J. F., L. S. Whiteside, and P. A. Lockridge. 2003. Two decades of global tsunamis--1982-2002. Science of Tsunami Hazards, the International Journal of the Tsunami Society 21(1). This is at http://www.sthjournal.org/211/decades.pdf
Madin, I. P. and Z. Wang. 1999. Relative earthquake hazard maps for selected urban areas in western Oregon: Newport. Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) Interpretive Map Series No. 10 (IMS-10). The maps and explanatory text for the maps are at http://nwdata.geol.pdx.edu/DOGAMI/IMS-10. This 1999 report is also described in a DOGAMI press release "Earthquake Hazard Maps Released for Coastal Oregon at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news&events/archives/18-cstlmaps.htm
National Data Buoy Center. 2002. How are spectral wave data derived from buoy motion measurements? National Data Buoy Center, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/wave.shtml. Select the "wave acquisition time" link to see that the "Duration of Wave Acquisition Time" is 20 minutes each hour for Buoys 46022 (off Eureka) and 46027 (off Crescent City) at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/waves.txt; also see National Data Buoy Center (2005c).
National Data Buoy Center. 2005a. Measurement descriptions and units. National Data Buoy Center, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/measdes.shtml. This indicates that wave heights are measured during 20-minute long sampling period, not continuously; select the "Wave Measurements" link to go to National Data Buoy Center (2002) for more information about length of the sampling period.
National Data Buoy Center. 2005b. Northwest USA recent marine data. National Data Buoy Center, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Maps/Northwest.shtml. This shows that the closest DART (Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis, http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Dart/dart.shtml) offshore buoy to the epicenter of the June 14 earthquake is 46405 (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Dart/dart_map.shtml), which would, based on the description of the location of Buoy 46002, would be west or northwest of Coos Bay.
National Data Buoy Center. 2005c. West Coast marine data. National Data Buoy Center, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Maps/WestCoast_inset.shtml. This shows that there are four buoys that are not DART (Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis, http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Dart/dart_map.shtml) buoys near northwest California:
National Data Buoy Center. 2005d. Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART). National Data Buoy Center, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Dart/dart.shtml. Also see Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory [2005].
National Ocean Service. 2005. NOS water level observation network. Center for Operational Oceanographic Products and Services (CO-OPS), National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. These tide gauge data are at http://tidesonline.nos.noaa.gov/geographic.html. [Select California, then Crescent City (9419750), and then "Click Here for Data Listing" to see that tide gauge date there are recorded every 6 minutes. Select Oregon, then Port Orford (9431647), and then "Click Here for Data Listing" to see that tide gauge date there are recorded every 6 minutes. However, these readings are not instantaneously updated; for example on July 18, the online graph shown for Crescent City at 2:54 PM PDT was the 1:42 PM PDT reading and it took over 30 minutes for packets of the individual readings to be updated.]
Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI). 1998. Oregonians need more information about tsunamis to save lives. April 21, 1998 press release. This is at http://www.oregongeology.com/news&events/archives/9808-REL.htm
Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI). 2003. Tsunami preparedness guide for Oregon lodging facilities. Open File Report O-03-04, Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries. This is available on a CD at the OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center and http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news%26events/TsunamiGuide10.17.03.pdf indicates that over 500 copies were to be "mailed free of charge to all lodging facilities at the Oregon coast."
Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI). [2005]. Tsunami evacuation maps for some Oregon coastal communities. The 18 maps are not dated and are available on 4 April 2005 at http://www.oregongeology.com/earthquakes/Coastal/Tsubrochures.htm
Oregon Dept. of Land Conservation and Development. 2002. Oregon's statewide planning goals and guidelines. Goal 7: areas subject to natural hazards. Effective June 1, 2002. This is at http://egov.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal7.pdf
Oregon Emergency Management and Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries. 2001. Tsunami warning systems and procedures: guidance for local officials. Prepared for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program by Oregon Emergency Management and Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries. Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral Industries Special Paper 35. This is at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami-hazard/SP35FORWEB.PDF and http://egov.oregon.gov/OOHS/OEM/docs/earth_tsunami/tsunami_warning-systems.pdf
Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory. [2005.] Background: Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis [DART]. Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. This is at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/Dart/dart_pb1.html. Also see National Data Buoy Center (2005d).
Preuss, J. (project manager). 1988. Planning for risk: comprehensive planning for tsunami hazard areas. Prepared by Urban Regional Research for the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.
Preuss, J. 1997. Local responses to the October 4, 1994 tsunami warning: Washington, Oregon, California. P. 35-45 in G. Hebenstreit (ed.), Perspectives on Tsunami Hazard Reduction. Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research Vol. 9. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands.
Priest, G. R. 1995a. Tsunami hazard map of the Newport North Quadrangle, Lincoln County, Oregon. Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) Open File Report O-95-28. This is at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/earthquakes/Coastal/Tsumapsbycity.HTM and the DOGAMI press release describing these maps and the source information is at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news&events/archives/9611-rel.htm
Priest, G. R. 1995b. Tsunami hazard map of the Newport South Quadrangle, Lincoln County, Oregon. Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) Open File Report O-95-29. This is at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/earthquakes/Coastal/Tsumapsbycity.HTM and the DOGAMI press release describing these maps and the source information is at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news&events/archives/9611-rel.htm
Richins, C. 2004. Tsunami ready? In August 25 Lincoln City News Guard (newspaper). This is available at http://www.thenewsguard.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=1600
Roddey, J. 2004. DOGAMI News Release for immediate release: could a large tsunami strike the Oregon Coast? December 29. Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries. This is at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news%26events/TsunamiPR.pdf
Roddey, J. 2005. Tsunami warning a good test of Oregon's response. June 15 Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries News Release at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news%26events/Tsunam6.15.05.doc
Ross, W. 2003. Living within tsunami hazard zones. In December 8 Eugene Register-Guard (newspaper). This is at http://www.registerguard.com/news/2003/12/08/a1.tsunami.1208.html
Ross, W. 2005. Tsunami scare holds lessons for coast. P. A1 and A11 article in June 16 Register-Guard (Eugene) and is available for a fee at http://www.registerguard.com/news/wwwsearch.html
Sargent, C. 2005. Letters in the editor's mailbag: Some stations broadcast alerts. P. A12 article in July 4 Register-Guard (Eugene) and is available for a fee at http://www.registerguard.com/news/wwwsearch.html
Schatz, C. E., H. Curl, Jr., and W. V. Burt. 1964. Tsunamis on the Oregon coast. Ore Bin 26:231-232. (The publication "Ore Bin" has been continued by "Oregon Geology. "Also see Schatz, C. E. 1965. Source and characteristics of the tsunami observed along the coast of the Pacific Northwest on March 28, 1964. Master of Science thesis, Oregon State University.)
Schwab, J. 2004. Planning lessons from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. American Planning Association. This is at http://www.planning.org/features/2004/tsunami.htm
Stanfill, L. 2005. Foley plans to continue his predecessors' work at inn. P. A8 article in June 22 News Guard (Lincoln City). It is no longer available online.
State of Oregon. 2002. Tsunami chapter. P. T1-T19 in Part III of State of Oregon Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan, Emergency Management Plan. See "Tsunami" chapter at http://csc.uoregon.edu/pdr_website/projects/state/snhmp_web/part-3/part3_fullpage.htm
Stauth, D. 2005. Earthquakes on Gorda Plate a common event. June 15 Oregon State University News Release at http://oregonstate.edu/dept/ncs/newsarch/2005/Jun05/earthquake.htm
Teal, M. 1964. Tidal wave victims lose entire family during past seven months. P. 1 and 2 in March 30 Corvallis Gazette-Times (newspaper).
Tomlinson, S. 1993. Cannon Beach prepared for quakes, tsunamis. P. R6 article in July 7 Portland Oregonian (newspaper).
Vittek, K. 2005. Those in the know talk about tsunami awareness. In March 9 Lincoln City News Guard (newspaper). This is at http://www.thenewsguard.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=1831
Walker, M. 2005. City holds workshop on tsunami alert. Article between June 24 and July 1 in Curry County Reporter (Gold Beach) that was at http://www.currycountyreporter.com
Welch, B. 2005. Out of sight, out of mind is poor policy for tsunamis. In Jan. 20 Eugene Register-Guard. This is at http://www.registerguard.com/news/2005/01/20/b1.cr.welch.0120.html
Weller, J. M. 1972. Human response to tsunami warnings. P. 222-228 in The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964, Vol. 6: Oceanography and Coastal Engineering. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C
Wood. N. J. and J. W. Good. 2004. Vulnerability of port and harbor communities to earthquake and tsunami hazards: the use of GIS in community hazard planning. Coastal Management 32:243-269.
Related pages: The 14 June 2005 Tsunami Warning: Concerns about Response of Local Governments in Lincoln County, Oregon
From: Tyree Wilde
To: Range Bayer
Subject: Re: June 14 Tsunami Warning Along the Oregon Coast
Warning Coordination Meteorologist
NOAA's National Weather Service, Portland, OR
email: tyree.wilde@noaa.gov voice: 503/326-2340 x223 fax: 503/326-2598 web: www.wrh.noaa.gov/portland
address: 5241 NE 122nd Ave, Portland, OR 97230-1089
APPENDIX C. The tsunami warning issued by the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska for the 14 June 2005 earthquake off northern California. I downloaded this message from http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/old_msg.txt on 18 June 2005. As new messages are added, older messages are removed, so this message may no longer be available. The message below is in the same format as it was on their web site and is in a format appropriate for teletypes.
WEPA41 PAAQ 150256
TSUWCA
TO - TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS IN
ALASKA/BRITISH COLUMBIA/WASHINGTON/OREGON/CALIFORNIA
FROM - WEST COAST AND ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER/NOAA/NWS
SUBJECT - TSUNAMI WARNING BULLETIN - INITIAL
BULLETIN NUMBER 1
ISSUED 06/15/2005 AT 0256 UTC
...A TSUNAMI WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE COASTAL AREAS
FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO BORDER TO THE NORTH TIP OF
VANCOUVER I.-BC. INCLUSIVE...
...A TSUNAMI WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR THE COASTAL AREAS FROM
THE NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER I.-BC. TO SITKA-AK...
...AT THIS TIME THIS BULLETIN IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY FOR
OTHER AREAS OF ALASKA...
EARTHQUAKE DATA
PRELIMINARY MAGNITUDE - 7.4
LOCATION - 41.3N 125.7W - 90 MILES NW OF EUREKA-CA.
300 MILES NW OF SAN FRANCISCO-CA.
TIME - 1851 ADT 06/14/2005
1951 PDT 06/14/2005
0251 UTC 06/15/2005
EVALUATION
IT IS NOT KNOWN - REPEAT NOT KNOWN - IF A TSUNAMI EXISTS BUT A
TSUNAMI MAY HAVE BEEN GENERATED. THEREFORE PERSONS IN LOW
LYING COASTAL AREAS SHOULD BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR
LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. PERSONS ON THE BEACH SHOULD MOVE TO
HIGHER GROUND IF IN A WARNED AREA. TSUNAMIS MAY BE A SERIES OF
WAVES WHICH COULD BE DANGEROUS FOR SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE
INITIAL WAVE ARRIVAL.
$$
PZZ130-131-133-134-132-135-150-153-156-110-250-210-255-350-
353-356-450-455-550-530-535-555-670-673-650-655-750-WAZ001-
002-005-006-007-008-009-010-011-013-014-015-016-021-ORZ001-
002-021-022-CAZ001-002-005-007-006-075-074-009-034-035-039-
040-046-041-042-043-150456-
COASTAL AREAS FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO BORDER TO THE
NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER I.-BC. INCLUSIVE.
...A TSUNAMI WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE COASTAL AREAS
FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO BORDER TO THE NORTH TIP OF
VANCOUVER I.-BC. INCLUSIVE...
ESTIMATED TIMES OF INITIAL WAVE ARRIVAL
CRESCENT CITY-CA 2029 PDT JUN 14 ASTORIA-OR 2154 PDT JUN 14
CHARLESTON-OR 2044 PDT JUN 14 TOFINO-BC 2157 PDT JUN 14
SAN FRANCISCO-CA 2123 PDT JUN 14 SAN PEDRO-CA 2200 PDT JUN 14
SEASIDE-OR 2126 PDT JUN 14 LA JOLLA-CA 2214 PDT JUN 14
NEAH BAY-WA 2148 PDT JUN 14
$$
PKZ032-031-042-034-033-035-041-036-AKZ023-024-025-026-028-
029-027-150456-
COASTAL AREAS FROM THE NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER I.-BC. TO
SITKA-AK.
...A TSUNAMI WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR THE COASTAL AREAS FROM
THE NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER I.-BC. TO SITKA-AK...
ESTIMATED TIMES OF INITIAL WAVE ARRIVAL
LANGARA-BC 2244 PDT JUN 14 KETCHIKAN-AK 2257 ADT JUN 14
SITKA-AK 2227 ADT JUN 14
$$
PKZ176-175-172-170-171-155-150-132-136-138-137-130-141-140-
120-121-129-127-125-126-128-052-051-053-022-012-043-013-
011-021-AKZ191-185-181-171-145-111-101-121-125-131-135-017-
020-018-019-021-022-150456-
COASTAL AREAS FROM SITKA-AK. TO ATTU-AK.
...TSUNAMI INFORMATION STATEMENT...
NO - REPEAT NO - TSUNAMI WATCH OR WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR
THE COASTAL AREAS FROM SITKA-AK. TO ATTU-AK.
FOR INFORMATION ONLY - ESTIMATED TIMES OF INITIAL WAVE ARRIVAL
YAKUTAT-AK 2317 ADT JUN 14 CORDOVA-AK 0007 ADT JUN 15
KODIAK-AK 2332 ADT JUN 14 DUTCH HARBOR-AK 0013 ADT JUN 15
JUNEAU-AK 2334 ADT JUN 14 COLD BAY-AK 0034 ADT JUN 15
SEWARD-AK 2339 ADT JUN 14 ADAK-AK 0038 ADT JUN 15
VALDEZ-AK 2357 ADT JUN 14 HOMER-AK 0044 ADT JUN 15
SAND PT.-AK 2358 ADT JUN 14 SHEMYA-AK 0119 ADT JUN 15
$$
THE PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER AT EWA BEACH HAWAII WILL
ISSUE BULLETINS FOR OTHER AREAS OF THE PACIFIC.
BULLETINS WILL BE ISSUED HOURLY OR SOONER IF CONDITIONS
WARRANT. THE TSUNAMI WATCH/WARNING WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT
UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE
WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE INFORMATION AND ETA SITES.
APPENDIX D. The only tsunami bulletin issued by the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii for the 14 June 2005 earthquake off northern California. I downloaded this message from http://www.prh.noaa.gov/pr/ptwc/olderwmsg on 18 June 2005. As new messages are added, older messages are removed, so this message may no longer be available. The message below is in the same format as it was on their web site and is in a format appropriate for teletypes.
TSUNAMI BULLETIN NUMBER 001
PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER/NOAA/NWS
ISSUED AT 0259Z 15 JUN 2005
THIS BULLETIN IS FOR ALL AREAS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN EXCEPT
ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.
... TSUNAMI INFORMATION BULLETIN ...
THIS MESSAGE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. THERE IS NO TSUNAMI WARNING
OR WATCH IN EFFECT.
AN EARTHQUAKE HAS OCCURRED WITH THESE PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS
ORIGIN TIME - 0251Z 15 JUN 2005
COORDINATES - 41.3 NORTH 125.7 WEST
LOCATION - OFF COAST OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
MAGNITUDE - 7.4
EVALUATION
NO DESTRUCTIVE PACIFIC-WIDE TSUNAMI THREAT EXISTS BASED ON
HISTORICAL EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI DATA.
HOWEVER - EARTHQUAKES OF THIS SIZE SOMETIMES GENERATE LOCAL
TSUNAMIS THAT CAN BE DESTRUCTIVE ALONG COASTS LOCATED WITHIN
A HUNDRED KILOMETERS OF THE EARTHQUAKE EPICENTER. AUTHORITIES
IN THE REGION OF THE EPICENTER SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS
POSSIBILITY AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION.
THIS WILL BE THE ONLY BULLETIN ISSUED FOR THIS EVENT UNLESS
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.
THE WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER WILL ISSUE BULLETINS
FOR ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.
APPENDIX E. Email response to my letter to KNPT-AM radio about the lack of tsunami warning information on their radio station during the June 14 tsunami warning. I have added boldface to items of particular interest.
From: Yaquina Bay Communications
To: rbayer@orednet.org
Subject: letter
David Miller
Owner/General Manager
KNPT (AM) Radio, knptam.com
KYTE (FM) Radio, kytefm.com
KNCU (FM) Radio, u92fm.com
KCRF (FM) Radio, kcrffm.com
KBCH (AM) Radio, kbcham.com
APPENDIX F. The portion of Senate Bill 557 as introduced to the 2005 Legislature about posting information. This is from http://www.leg.state.or.us/05reg/measures/sb0500.dir/sb0557.intro.html. The Bill was amended severely in committee to change the mandatory requirement (see A-Engrossed version at http://www.leg.state.or.us/05reg/measures/sb0500.dir/sb0557.a.html), so that Oregon Emergency Management could only "Facilitate and encourage broad distribution of the tsunami warning information and evacuation plans to transient lodging facilities and other locations within tsunami inundation zones frequented by visitors to the area."
Relating to tsunami warning system; and declaring an emergency. Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
SECTION 1. { + (1) As used in this section:
(a) 'Transient lodging facility' means a hotel, motel, inn, condominium, any other dwelling unit or a public or private park that is made available for transient occupancy or vacation occupancy as those terms are defined in ORS 90.100.
(b) 'Tsunami inundation zone' means an area of expected tsunami inundation, based on scientific evidence that may include geologic field data and tsunami modeling, determined by the governing board of the State Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, by rule, as required by ORS 455.446 (1)(b) and (c).
(a) A hotel, motel, inn, condominium or other similar facility shall post the tsunami warning information and evacuation plans in each guest room.
(b) A single-family dwelling unit shall post the tsunami warning information and evacuation plans in at least one prominent location in the dwelling unit.
(c) A public or private park shall post the tsunami warning information and evacuation plans in at least one prominent location, such as the office, the pay station or another central location in the park at which park information is distributed to park users. + }
References
1) Station 46027 - ST GEORGES - 8NM West Northwest of Crescent City, CA. This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/station_page.php?station=46027. Select "Description of Measurements" to see National Data Buoy Center (2005a) that wave heights were measured during 20 minute intervals and reported every 60 minutes.
2) Station 46022 - EEL RIVER - 17NM West-Southwest of Eureka, CA. This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/station_page.php?station=46022. Select "Description of Measurements" to see National Data Buoy Center (2005a) that wave heights were measured during 20 minute intervals and reported every 60 minutes.
3) Station 46212 - Humboldt Bay South Spit, CA (128). This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/station_page.php?station=46212. Select "Description of Measurements" to see National Data Buoy Center (2005a) that wave heights were measured during 20 minute intervals; the Station 46212 web page shows that wave heights were reported every 30 minutes.
4) Station 46213 - Cape Mendocino, CA (094). This is at http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/station_page.php?station=46213. Select "Description of Measurements" to see National Data Buoy Center (2005a) that wave heights were measured during 20 minute intervals; the Station 46213 web page shows that wave heights were reported every 30 minutes.
Email comments to
Range Bayer,
Home Page, P. O. Box 1467,
Newport, Oregon 97365 USA.
"Is It Wise to Build the Newport Event Center in an Earthquake and Tsunami Hazard Area?"
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