Introductory Materials
Introduction
Coos Bay Meetings about Shipbreaking/Ship Recycling
Has the Port Commission of Coos Bay Handled Shipbreaking, Their Land Deal for the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminal, and Other Issues with Due Diligence?
23 May 2006 Letter to U.S. Rep. Peter DeFazio with Copies to U.S. Senators Ron Wyden and Gordon Smith about the Possible Shipbreaking Facility at Coos Bay, Inadequate Funding of U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) and Navy Ship Disposal Programs, and Congress' and MARAD's Continuing Efforts to Export Obsolete Government Vessels to Be Scrapped (June 12 Addenda)
8 May 2006 Letter to Oregon International Port of Coos Bay about the Economics of Ship Recycling at Coos Bay (June 17 Addenda)
** Is "Ship Recycling" Different than "Shipbreaking," "Ship Scrapping," or "Ship Salvaging"? Or Is Its Exclusive Use Euphemistic?
West Coast Sites Considered for Shipbreaking of U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Ships
What Is Environmental Recycling Systems' Plan for Proposed Drydock Shipbreaking at Coos Bay?
Shipbreaking or Recycling of U.S. Navy Ships
Port of Newport Turned Down Bay Bridge's Proposal for Shipbreaking at Yaquina Bay on Jan. 24, 2006
** Some Other Web Pages about Shipbreaking/Ship Recycling
Advantages to Doing Shipbreaking in Drydocks
Why Is It Preferable to Do Shipbreaking in Drydocks?
General Sources of Information About U.S. Shipbreaking (Ship Recycling)
Is There A Pulitzer Prize Winning Series about the U.S. Shipbreaking Industry?
Are There U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. GAO Reports about U.S. Shipbreaking?
Does the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have a "Guide for Ship Scrappers"?
Photos of In-water U.S. Shipbreaking Sites
Bay Bridge Enterprises (BBE) in Chesapeake, Virginia on the Elizabeth River
Photos of U.S. In-Water Shipbreaking Sites Other Than in Virginia
U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Ships to Dismantle Along the West Coast
What is the Source of Vessels That West Coast Shipbreakers Will Scrap?
Photos of Ships in Suisun Bay Fleet, East of San Francisco.
How Long Are MARAD Ships to Scrap at Suisun Bay?
Stability of the U.S. Ship Salvaging Industry
Has U.S. Ship Recycling Been a Stable Industry Without Environmental and Safety Violations?
Do Scrap Material Prices Affect the Stability of a Shipbreaking Company?
Can Inadequate Funding by the U.S. Government Destabilize the U.S. Shipbreaking Industry?
Does An Irregular Supply of Ships to Salvage Affect the U.S. Shipbreaking Industry?
Does the Possibility of Exporting MARAD Ships Affect the U.S. Shipbreaking Industry?
Is There Competition and Potential Competition to Scrap U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Ships at Suisun Bay Near San Francisco, California?
Will a West Coast Shipbreaking Facility Be Sustainable for 5 Years or "for Generations"?
Background of Some U.S. Shipbreaking Companies
Brief and Unstable History of Adani's Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC (Limited Liability Company) that Has a Chain of Ownership
Does the City of Chesapeake Like the Bay Bridge Enterprises In-Water Shipbreaking Facility in Virginia?
Environmental Recycling Systems
International Shipbreaking Limited, LLC
Esco Marine
Does a Shipbreaking Company Have Any Connection to Overseas Shipbreaking?
Potential Shipbreaking Jobs on the West Coast
Will a Shipbreaking Company Bring Steady, Family Wage Jobs with Benefits?
Are Periodic Layoffs and Losses of Trained Workers Likely at Shipbreaking Companies?
How Many Jobs Are Ship Scrapping Companies Suggesting They May Bring to the West Coast?
What Wages Are West Coast Ship Salvage Companies Proposing to Pay Workers?
Are Shipbreaking Jobs Likely to Be Union or Nonunion?
Is There a Concern that the Proposed Bay Bridge Facility in Newport May Cause a Loss of Jobs or Reduce Property Values?
Job Safety Concerns
What Are Work Conditions during Ship Salvaging?
How Safe Are Shipbreaking Jobs?
Are Community Fire Departments Prepared for Fires Onboard Ships to Be Scrapped?
Taxpayer Concerns about Shipbreaking Facilities
Was There Enough Time for Adequate Public Input After the Proposed Bay Bridge Lease Was Announced for Newport?
Will There Be Opportunity for Public Input about the Two Proposed Shipbreaking Facilities at Coos Bay?
May Taxpayers Pay for Attracting a Shipbreaking Company?
Setting Priorities: Did the Port of Newport Consider How Its Handling of the Proposed Bay Bridge Lease May Affect Its Proposed Bond Issue?
Dredging
Will the Arrival of A Shipbreaking Company Guarantee Federal Dredging Funds?
General Environmental Concerns about Shipbreaking
Does the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have a "Guide for Ship Scrappers"?
Are Toxic Materials Encountered During Shipbreaking?
How Much Environmental Experience Do Shipbreaking Companies Have with Shipbreaking?
Are Any Shipbreaking Companies "Green Certified"?
Do U.S. Shipbreaking Companies Have Any Environmental Violations?
Environmental Concerns about Proposed Shipbreaking in Oregon or Washington
May Accidents Happen While Vessels Are Towed from Suisun Bay to the Shipbreaking Facility?
May Invasive Species Be Introduced into Oregon or Washington Estuaries by Scrapping MARAD's Ships?
Will Bay Bridge Do Much of Its Shipbreaking While a Vessel Is in Water at an Open, Exposed Aquatic Site in the Pacific Northwest?
Do MARAD Ships Leak Oil While Moored or Do They Contain Oil When They Are Brought to a Shipbreaking Site?
Could Booms for Containing Oil and Oily Water During In-Water Shipbreaking Be Compromised by Winds, Waves, and Tides in the Pacific Northwest?
Could Ship Paint Chips Drop Into the Water and Cause Contamination at a Shipbreaking Site?
Could Rainfall during Shipbreaking Create Contaminated Bilgewater?
Could Water Used to Put Out a Shipbreaking Fire Create Contaminated Bilgewater?
Do In-Water Shipbreaking Companies Ever Remove Parts of A Ship's Hull and Bow While It Is Still in Water?
Could Metal Slag or Particulates Produced While Cutting a Ship's Superstructure or Hull Fall Into the Water?
Could Tracked Vehicles Operating in Water during In-water Shipbreaking Create Contamination?
Do Some Shipbreaking Companies Have Onshore Scrapping Operations on Unpaved Surfaces?
Will Toxic Materials Be Stored at a Shipbreaking Site?
May Any Birds Be Affected by a Shipbreaking Facility?
Maps of Proposed Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC Site at Yaquina Bay, Oregon
Monitoring Safety and Environmental Concerns about Shipbreaking
Introduction to Concerns about Safety & Environmental Monitoring of Shipbreaking
How Objective is MARAD?
How Often Has MARAD Inspected Shipbreaking Companies in Virginia and Texas?
How Often Has OSHA Inspected Shipbreaking Companies in Virginia and Texas?
How Often Has the EPA Inspected Shipbreaking Companies in Virginia and Texas?
How Often Did the Virginia DEQ Do Reconnaissance Inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia?
Has Any Agency Tested Water or Sediments in Bay Bridge's Shipbreaking Slips for Contamination?
Is Self-monitoring by a Shipbreaking Company Adequate to Prevent Contamination?
Can the Oregon DEQ Prevent Contamination by Ship Recyclers?
Are Anonymous Tips Adequate for Monitoring Ship Dismantling Companies?
May Monitoring of Shipbreakers by Citizen Groups Be Adequate?
Liability Concerns
How Much Liability Insurance Does Bay Bridge Obtain For Each Vessel?
Why Are Contamination Cleanups of Shipyards at Yaquina & Coos Bays Relevant to an In-water Shipbreaking Facility?
Recreational Fishing and Crabbing Concerns
May Recreational Fishing and Crabbing Be Affected by the Proposed Shipbreaking Site at Yaquina Bay?
Aesthetic Concerns
Are There Aesthetic (including Noise) Concerns about Shipbreaking?
Photos of Ships in Suisun Bay Fleet, East of San Francisco.
When Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC's proposal to construct a shipbreaking facility primarily for U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) at Newport (Yaquina Bay) was first announced on Nov. 18 (1), I was somewhat in favor of it because the newspaper report indicated that it would bring many family wage jobs without degrading the environment. But after researching Bay Bridge Enterprises' history, ownership, operations, and statements, I have great concerns about their doing shipbreaking in the Pacific Northwest. Their lure of 125 jobs is enticing but appears to be a mirage. In my opinion, some government officials, newspaper reporters, and citizens have accepted Bay Bridge's claims too unquestioningly.
Shipbreaking of MARAD ships is necessary, but it needs to be done right to prevent environmental contamination. There are, to my knowledge, no man-made slips in Oregon estuaries like used by Bay Bridge in Virginia or like the Brownsville channel used by four Brownsville firms for MARAD shipbreaking. Shipbreaking in slips makes it more possible to somewhat monitor and control accidental spills of hazardous materials that result from shipbreaking, but spills in slips can still leak out into the main channel. In my opinion, shipbreaking needs to be done where a ship being scrapped can be fully contained and all liquids could be captured and properly disposed of such as in a drydock.
However, at Yaquina Bay, Bay Bridge proposed to do shipbreaking adjacent to the Yaquina channel and in a small unprotected cove. The proposed site is very exposed to storm winds and waves. It is also exposed to debris such as root wads that float down the channel during floods. These conditions compromise the effectiveness of booms or absorbent materials placed around vessels to contain oil spills during inclement weather when accidental spills are more likely to occur.
This web site was originally about Bay Bridge's shipbreaking proposal for Yaquina Bay. After the Port of Newport withdrew consideration of the Yaquina Bay site because Bay Bridge wanted the Port and taxpayers to spend too much money to prepare the site for Bay Bridge, I started expanding this web site to Bay Bridge and other companies considering shipbreaking sites in the Pacific Northwest because I am very concerned about exaggerated, unrealistic claims that may be made by Bay Bridge or perhaps other shipbreaking companies.
With the Feb. 17 Coos Bay World article that two shipbreaking firms, Environmental Recycling Systems and an unnamed firm, are considering shipbreaking in Coos Bay, I am trying to make this web site about shipbreaking of MARAD ships in the Pacific Northwest. MARAD's shipbreaking program is for governmental merchant-type vessels of 1,500 gross tons or more; the Navy's shipbreaking program is for combat vessels (p. 4 and 6 in 73, p. 2 of 187).
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On 9 March 2006 at the Oregon Institute of Marine Biology (OIMB) in Charleston at the southwest end of Coos Bay, James Carlton of Williams College (who has studied exotic species in Coos Bay) gave a presentation about invasive species that could be brought in on ships (161, 165).
An article in the March 13 Coos Bay World about a March 8 Port of Coos Bay press release indicates that the Port in partnership with South Slough National Estuarine Research Reserve was planning to hold three meetings in an information series over a three-month period (164).
The first public forum, with 2 days notice in the Coos Bay World, was on April 6 (183). It was to be about environmental concerns and regulations to protect the environment and workers (183), and "almost 100 people" attended (184).
The April 7 Coos Bay World reported that the Port of Coos Bay is "planning another forum in early May to further talk about the risks and opportunities, particularly on the business side of ship recycling" (184). During the second week in May, the Port's Martin Callery said this meeting has been postponed.
According to the April 7 Coos Bay World, the Port of Coos Bay's Martin Callery indicated that "written comments, questions and answers, and documentation are to be posted soon on the port's Web site" (184), but this information was not posted as of 11 June 2006. Their web site is http://www.portofcoosbay.com/
The Coos Bay shipbreaking facility appears to have been abandoned by October 2006.
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Language and word selection can be used to shape opinion.
"Shipbreaking," "ship scrapping," "ship salvaging," and "ship recycling" all refer to taking apart ships, selling whatever is possible to recycle or reuse, and disposing of the rest. "Recycling" obsolete ships is not new. Companies make money by the amount of scrap material they can recycle by selling. Fluctuations in the price of recyclable steel can make or break a company that salvages ships.
"Shipbreaking" is used in the name of International Shipbreaking Ltd. of Brownsville (Texas) and "ship recycling" in the name of North American Ship Recycling of Baltimore (Maryland); both companies salvage MARAD ships (section XI of 23, 155). In 1998, the GAO mostly used "ship scrapping" (147), and "ship scrapping" was part of the title of a hearing in the U.S. Congress (156). In 2000, the EPA titled their regulatory guide as being for "ship scrappers" (22). In 2004 and 2005, OSHA used "shipbreaking" (23, 105). In 2005, a GAO report about MARAD generally used "ship scrapping," though forms of "dismantle" and "recycle" were also used (66). In 2005, MARAD primarily used ship or vessel "disposal," and, in reference to the process of scrapping ships, MARAD used forms of "dismantle" or "recycling" (41, 48, 50, 149, 152). "Disposal" refers to all methods of getting rid of ships including sales, sinking in Navy exercises or for reefs, as well as scrapping ships. In 2006, the Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor generally used "shipbreaking" to refer to the process with forms of "scrap" also often used, and forms of "dismantle," "recycle," or "salvage" were also sometimes included (92, 95).
Based on analyses of root words (scrap, salvage, shipbreak, dismantle, and recycle) and their variants, the Fact Sheet for Bay Bridge Enterprises at the start of the debate about their proposed shipbreaking facility in Newport most used "salvage"; "recycle" was used second most, but they also used the other words, too (Word Table). In a sample of articles, the Newport newspaper most often used "salvage" or "shipbreak," and the Portland Oregonian newspaper tended to use "scrap," though they also used the other words (Word Table).
In contrast, a sample of Coos Bay newspaper articles and editorials indicates that they often did not use "scrap" or "salvage," and, prior to the Port of Coos Bay's statement about the interest of two shipbreaking companies in Coos Bay at the Port's Feb. 16 meeting (163), did not mostly use "recycle" (Word Table). However, the Port of Coos Bay's statement used "ship recycling" 12 times and "ship breaking" only once (163, Word Table). The Coos Bay newspaper's report by Elise Hamner of the Port's Feb. 16 meeting and statement followed the Port's direction by amost exclusively using forms of "recycle," though Hamner's articles prior to the Port's statement and meeting did not generally use "recycle" (Word Table). If a particular word is often used during a meeting, it could also be frequently used by a reporter of the meeting. The newspaper's March 13 article concerning the Port's news release announcing future informational meetings on unknown dates about shipbreaking only used the term "ship recycling" (164, Word Table).
The Port's Martin Callery continued this shift to "ship recycling" in his May 10 email, with his use only of "ship recycling." The choice of words by two different Port of Coos Bay staff is telling, given the variety of terms used by others such as OSHA and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). If the Port's choice of words was not very important to them, they would be expected to use a variety of words because using the exact same words over and over again is unnecessarily repetitious when there are alternatives.
After Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC was turned down by the Port of Newport, the Northwest Environmental Defense Center's Mark Riskedahl (169) pointed out that proponents of ship scrapping "will certainly try to reframe ship-scrapping in less offensive terms, such as shipbreaking or recycling." After the negative publicity about shipbreaking, ship scrapping, and ship salvaging at the Port of Newport in previous months, ship recycling sounds like it might be different, and referring to the process as ship recycling may reduce environmental objections. However, it can be expected that the same amount of materials will be recycled whether the process is called "ship scrapping," "ship salvaging," "shipbreaking," or "ship recycling" as long as it is profitable to do so.
On April 8, the Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner wrote about the choice of words to describe the process (185).
"Shipbreaking or ship recycling. Are they the same or does one represent public relations verbiage? The first term refers to the business of taking obsolete ships to port facilities to tear them apart. Hazardous materials are removed and carted away for disposal to meet federal environmental standards. The metals and other items with value are sold. The second and newer term - ship recycling - refers to the exact same thing. The obvious emphasis is on the product rather than the process. Some people question whether the terminology is a sneaky ploy. Others say that's precisely where the discussion needs to go locally, nationally and around the world."She stated that Denny Vaughan is "adamant" about recycling being the focus of the Coos Bay facility that Vaughan's Environmental Recycling Systems would like to have and that Vaughan stated that it is "almost sinful to not reuse these ships" (185). But Vaughan's idea of recycling MARAD ships is not new. U.S. shipbreaking companies already have recycled many MARAD ships (e.g., see p. 4 of 149) and want more ships to recycle. Some of MARAD's ships in their California fleet have already been recycled in Brownsville. But Environmental Recycling Systems is not listed as a shipbreaking company by OSHA for MARAD or Navy ships (section XI in 23) nor have I found any evidence that Environmental Recycling Systems has ever recycled any MARAD ships. During 2004-2005, Environmental Recycling Systems was negotiating to export all obsolete ships in MARAD's California, Texas, and Virginia fleets to recycle in Mexico and Turkey.
So is the term "ship recycling" being used euphemistically about Coos Bay shipbreaking?
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WORD TABLE. Words or variants of words used in a small sample of written materials about proposed shipbreaking (ship recycling) operations in Oregon. Variants of words are included; for example, recycle, recycler, recycling, and recyclable are included with "Recycle." No.=footnote number.
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Root Word_________________________
Sal- Ship- Dis-
No. Source or Author Scrap vage break mantle Recycle
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NEWPORT PUBLICATIONS
46 Bay Bridge Fact Sheet Dec. 1 3 9 4 3 6
1 Gail Kimberling Nov. 18 0 10 1 2 2
2 Joel Gallob Nov. 25 1 5 0 0 0
35 Gail Kimberling Dec. 2 4 11 4 0 4
* Joel Gallob Dec. 9 0 1 22 0 1
PORTLAND OREGONIAN
42 Peter Sleeth Dec. 4 10 5 4 3 2
117 editorial Dec. 22 3 3 2 2 1
104 Peter Sleeth Jan. 8 11 4 6 0 2
COOS BAY PUBLICATIONS
80 Elise Hamner Dec. 17 0 0 5 1 2
** Elise Hamner Dec. 20 6 1 4 2 2
140 editorial Dec. 22 0 0 1 3 1
141 Carl Mickelson Jan. 11 0 0 10 0 0
144 editorial Feb. 11 0 0 3 1 1
163 Port of Coos Bay's
Jeffrey Bishop Feb. 16 0 0 1 0 12
131 Elise Hamner Feb. 17 0 0 2 0 11
164 Report about a Port of
Coos Bay Press Release Mar. 13 0 0 0 0 6
- Port of Coos Bay's
Martin Callery email May 10 0 0 0 0 11
*=nine articles by Gallob on Dec. 9: 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 87, 88, 89.
** two articles by Hamner on Dec. 20: 81, 82.
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Only three estuaries in Oregon are designated for deep-water shipping that would also be appropriate for scrapping U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD): Columbia River, Yaquina Bay, and Coos Bay.
Elise Hamner of the Coos Bay World reported on Dec. 20 that Bay Bridge Enterprises' President and CEO Mike Dunavant said that his company could do shipbreaking in California except for labor costs and regulations, so that is why they were looking for sites in Oregon and Washington (82).
In a Dec. 22 editorial, the Coos Bay World objected to shipbreaking along the Oregon Coast (140):
"Those ships [mothballed U.S. military ships] shouldn't be towed up the Pacific Ocean into any of Oregon's bays. Yes, that's turning away jobs. But the risk for an accident or invasive species just isn't worth it. The ships under discussion are in the San Francisco Bay Area and that's where they should be dealt with. ... If the United States government has to pay more to do the work under California's stricter environmental laws and higher labor costs, so be it."
On Jan. 8, the Oregonian's Peter Sleeth wrote (104):
"Shipbreakers eyeing a mothballed fleet in Suisun Bay, Calif., have for at least a year been quietly prospecting along Oregon from Coos Bay to Astoria. They seek the right mix of land and politics that would let them come aboard, according to private companies and landowners who have met with the companies."and (104):
"Bottom line: Oregon is the cheapest place for shipbreakers to set up shop on the West Coast. Labor costs are lower here, as is the cost of space in which to cut massive vessels apart and clear them of toxic loads."and (104):
"Bay Bridge's McPherson said the costs of shipbreaking in California -- labor, waste disposal and land -- are too high."
However, the Jan. 28 Oregonian editorial points out that in-water shipbreakers such as Bay Bridge want to locate in Oregon because of looser environmental regulations in Oregon (136):
"Bay Bridge told Newport leaders the work can't be done profitably in California because of higher labor and real estate costs there. That was a smokescreen. The huge expense of towing ships to Oregon would gobble up most of any savings on labor and land. What Bay Bridge really seeks to escape is tighter environmental regulation. California officials say that state's regulators would be highly unlikely to allow any company to break up old ships -- permeated with hazardous materials -- in the manner Bay Bridge proposes doing in Oregon, with vessels still sitting in the water for much of the dismantling. California would almost certainly insist the work be done in dry-dock, or something close to that higher level of environmental safety. In Oregon, the rules are looser. A Department of Environmental Quality spokesman said the state's foremost requirement for the Bay Bridge operation will be a stormwater runoff permit, and the company should have no trouble getting one."
The Feb. 11 Oregonian editorial wrote (143):
"Officials in the California Environmental Protection Agency say it's extremely unlikely regulators in that state would permit Bay Bridge to dismantle ships that way [in water] in San Francisco. Hence the idea of towing vessels 500-plus miles to Oregon, where environmental rules on shipbreaking are more relaxed, if not virtually absent."
Astoria (Columbia). Bay Bridge Enterprises had narrowed their choices for a site to Astoria and Newport in October 2005 (135). A Dec. 5 Daily Astorian article wrote that Bay Bridge had looked at Astoria and that "other firms have considered similar operations at North Tongue Point in prior years, raising significant environmental concerns" (132). According to the Jan. 26 Oregonian, Bay Bridge Enterprises had looked at a location in the previous 30 days at Astoria (94).
Coos Bay. According to the Port of Coos Bay's Martin Callery, a group of investors about a decade ago wanted to do shipbreaking of 800 ft or longer ships at Coos Bay, but the idea failed (142). Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner reported that Bay Bridge Enterprises toured a few Coos Bay sites in September 2005 (142). In early Jan. 2006, Robin Stevenot, owner of 216 acres of waterfront property and a dock that goes into deep water, told the Oregonian (84) that she was negotiating the sale of her property to Bay Bridge Enterprises and told the Newport News-Times (138) that she was negotiating with Bay Bridge's parent company, the Adani Group. However, Bay Bridge and Adani denied such negotiations (139, 141), and Stevenot told Coos Bay World's Carl Mickelson (141) that she was not negotiating with Bay Bridge but as Mickelson worded it, "with companies that do the same type of work as Bay Bridge."
According to the Jan. 26 Oregonian, Bay Bridge Enterprises had looked at a location in the previous 30 days at Coos Bay (94).
On Feb. 11, just prior to the Port of Coos Bay's Feb. 16 meeting, the Coos Bay World's editorial wrote that it was essential that Coos County agencies and decision-makers include the general public in decision making processes about industrial development (144).
The Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner wrote that the Port of Coos Bay announced at their Feb. 16 meeting that two shipbreaking companies had proposed to operate in Coos Bay (131). One company was identified as Environmental Recycling Systems, and the other was not named (131). On Feb. 22, Elise Hamner of the Coos Bay World indicated in email that she was unable to confirm the name of the second company seeking to do shipbreaking at Coos Bay. Environmental Recycling Systems has proposed to take all U.S. Maritime (MARAD) ships from MARAD's Virginia, Texas, and California fleets and scrap them at Environmental Recycling Systems' facilities in Turkey and Mexico. See Environmental Recycling Systems' description of their plan for Coos Bay.
In a written statement for the Port's Feb. 16 meeting, the Port's Executive Director used "ship breaking" only once and used "ship recycling" 12 times (163) to refer to what had been termed "shipbreaking" at Newport. The Port's predominate use of "recycling" appears euphemistic.
The director of the University of Oregon's Oregon Institute of Marine Biology (OIMB) at Charleston has expressed concerns about Bay Bridge's proposed in-water shipbreaking at Coos Bay because of water contamination and invasive species issues (84, 124). A Dec. 22 editorial in the Coos Bay World indicated that the ships should not be towed "into any of Oregon's Bays" because of risks of accidents and invasive species (140).
The Port of Coos Bay is holding public forums about ship recycling prior to deciding whether to negotiate with a shipbreaking company for a facility at Coos Bay.
Linnton (Columbia). According to the Jan. 26 Oregonian, Bay Bridge Enterprises had looked at a location in the previous 30 days in Linnton on the Willamette River (94). On Jan. 31, the Portland Tribune reported that Linnton community leaders were outraged that the Portland Development Commission had not contacted them about negotiations with Bay Bridge (137).
Newport (Yaquina Bay). The Port of Newport turned down Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC's proposal on Jan. 24.
Portland (Columbia). According to the Jan. 28 Oregonian (136), Bay Bridge Enterprises was "seriously" considering "sites" in Portland's harbor. According to the Jan. 26 Oregonian, Bay Bridge Enterprises had looked at a former ship repair site below the St. Johns Bridge (94).
St. Helens (Columbia). According to the Jan. 26 Oregonian, Bay Bridge Enterprises had looked at a location in the previous 30 days in St. Helens on the Columbia River (94).
See discussion about proposed shipbreaking in Oregon that may also apply to Washington.
Grays Harbor. The Port of Grays Harbor's deputy executive director Leonard Barnes said that the Port was to meet with Bay Bridge Enterprises on Jan. 27 (133).
Puget Sound. A Jan. 26 article in Aberdeen's The Daily World indicated that Leonard Barnes (the Port of Grays Harbor's deputy executive director) "understands that the company [Bay Bridge Enterprises] is also looking at Puget Sound sites" (133).
Vancouver (Columbia). According to the Jan. 26 Oregonian, Bay Bridge Enterprises had looked at two sites in the previous 30 days at Vancouver (94). The Feb. 5 Vancover Columbian indicated that Bay Bridge's contact with the Port of Vancouver had resulted in "nothing substantive" and that the Columbia Business Center that is owned by Portland's Schnitzer Investment Group had told Bay Bridge that the Center did not have room and wasn't interested in ship scrapping (134).
"Washington." According to the Jan. 28 Oregonian (136), Bay Bridge Enterprises was "scouting locations" in Washington state on Jan. 27.
California has stricter environmental regulations and higher land and labor costs than Oregon, which is why shipbreaking firms such as Bay Bridge Enterprises wants to scrap MARAD ships in Oregon. A Coos Bay World editorial recommended that shipbreaking of MARAD ships in the San Francisco Bay area should be done in the San Francisco Bay area because of concerns about accidents and invasive species from transporting the ships to Oregon (140).
There are two sites in the San Francisco Bay area with drydocks that have been mentioned as possible shipbreaking sites for MARAD vessels at Suisun Bay.
Mare Island. Former Navy commander Gary Whitney of Allied Defense Recycling LLC worked in 2004 and 2005 to get a lease to open the former Naval shipyard and drydocks at Mare Island near Suisun Bay to salvage MARAD ships from Suisun Bay. The major problem appears to be to find funding to dredge the channel so that the large ships could be brought in. However, the nearby community may recall the 1997-1999 abandonment of a partially scrapped aircraft carrier (USS Oriskany) after the shipbreaker company defaulted, and their memory may also dampen future shipbreaking efforts there (see Mare Island).
Hunter's Point. This was a former naval shipyard that was considered in 1994 for shipbreaking (115). The cost to re-open it to scrap ships would be "huge" according to Alan Sprott of Cascade General, a shipyard in Portland (145).
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On Feb. 16, the Oregon International Port of Coos Bay announced at their meeting that two shipbreaker firms were interested in Coos Bay (131). One firm was not named in the article by Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner, but the other was Environmental Recycling Systems, represented by G. Dennis Vaughan, of Environmental Recycling Systems (131). Hamner wrote (131):
"Vaughan, who's based in Seattle, isn't ready to discuss his idea in great detail. At this point, he and investors are proposing to build two graving docks large enough to take in tankers or ships up to 900 feet long. The operation would start small, with maybe 100 employees. But it's the graving dock technology Vaughan wants to develop. It would be self-contained, he explained, kind of like sailing a vessel into a lock at the Panama Canal. All water around the vessel or that falls from the sky into the specialized lock would be filtered. The environmentally conscientious Norwegians come close, he said, with their eco-dock concept. 'We want to be 100-percent self-contained. Once a ship goes in those doors close behind it,' he explained.
"Vaughan's familiar with the shipping industry on several fronts. He grew up in Coos Bay. He graduated from Marshfield High School, moved on to Oregon State University and eventually found a career with the U.S. Navy. The retired rear admiral said Thursday that he entered into the ship recycling business two years ago. And ironically it seems, his enterprise is steering him back to Coos Bay."
I have not found any information about Environmental Recycling Systems's history or experience with shipbreaking in the United States, but that is important information to know because some shipbreaking firms have gone bankrupt or closed or have had environmental or safety violations. Environmental Recycling Systems is not listed as one of the "active" shipbreaking companies by OSHA for MARAD or Navy ships (section XI in 23), and it was also not invited by MARAD to bid for ships to scrap in December 2005 (159, 160).
In 2004-2005, Environmental Recycling Systems was negotiating to scrap MARAD's ships in MARAD's Virginia, Texas, and California fleets at Environmental Recycling Systems' facilities in Turkey and Mexico. So perhaps they have overseas experience with scrapping ships.
Sources of ships for Environmental Recycling Systems to recycle at Coos Bay include "former U.S. military vessels" and "the potentially thousands of other privately owned ships, tankers and barges that are and will become obsolete" (131). However, the Toxic Substances Control Act does not prohibit private vessels from being sent overseas to be scrapped like it does for government-owned ships (p. 11 in 73), and scrapping ships overseas is more economical because of lower labor costs and higher demand for scrap (130). Cascade General in Portland has drydocks and has scrapped two private fishing boats but is not interested in doing more (85). So it is unclear if scrapping private ships would be able to sustain a shipbreaking company.
Using drydocks is the preferable way to scrap ships, but Environmental Recycling Systems would have competition and potential competition for scrapping MARAD ships from Suisun Bay. Cascade General in Portland already has graving drydocks but is not interested in doing shipbreaking for MARAD because it is too risky financially, and they cannot compete with the lower wages offered by Brownsville shipbreakers (85, 90, 91), so one may wonder about the financial viability of Environmental Recycling Systems if it will have the additional cost of constructing graving drydocks. Alan Jones of Cascade General estimated that it would cost "$30 or $40 million, minimum" to build a graving drydock at Newport (108). Environmental Recycling Systems proposed Coos Bay facility was said to be comparable to an Ecodock (131), and the cost of two Ecodock facilities in Europe has been estimated to be $72-79 million (208, 209). That is a lot of money considering that Bay Bridge Enterprises (an in-water ship recycling company in Virginia) was sold for less than $10 million in June 2005 (92), MARAD was appropriated $16.1 million in Fiscal Year 2004 and $21.6 million in 2005 for their entire ship disposal program (p. 21 of 66), and the president of Esco Marine (a ship recycling company in Brownsville, Texas) was worried that their recent $1 million expansion would be wasted (28). How much of the money will come from local and state taxpayers?
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MARAD and the U.S. Navy both have ship disposal programs, with two companies (International Shipbreaking Limited and Esco Marine of Brownsville, Texas) participating in both programs (p. 4 and 15 of 149, 196). Both programs are linked and included in MARAD's reports to the U.S. Congress (e.g., 149, 152, 187, 188). For example, in Fiscal Year 2001, the U.S. Congress only allocated $10 million for both programs, and the Navy transferred their portion to MARAD because MARAD's ships were a greater environmental hazard (p. 1 in 188).
MARAD's shipbreaking program is for governmental merchant-type vessels of 1,500 gross tons or more; the Navy's shipbreaking program is for combat vessels (p. 4 and 6 in 73). In October 2005, MARAD had a total of 113 vessels in their California, Virginia, and Texas fleets, and the Navy had 54 vessels available for disposal (p. 2 and 16 of 149).
In 1999, Cascade General shipyards in Portland bid to recycle a Navy frigate, but International Shipbreaking's bid was much lower and won the contract (189). So recycling of Navy ships in the Pacific Northwest has been seriously considered.
MARAD ships were proposed to be recycled by Bay Bridge Enterprises' at Newport in November 2005. In February 2006, the Port of Coos Bay reported that ship recycling companies were interested in Coos Bay and mentioned MARAD ships but did not state if shipbreaking would also include Navy vessels (163). Some Coos Bay World articles mention the U.S. Navy in connection with ship recycling, though it is not clear in these articles if ship recyclers are proposing to salvage Navy ships at Coos Bay (e.g., 183, 185). Further, initial plans may be to scrap MARAD vessels, but a company may decide to also recycle Navy ships after it starts operations, as does International Shipbreaking and Esco Marine
This web site will concentrate on MARAD's ship recycling but will include the Navy's ship recycling program where feasible. It appears that many of the same concerns are applicable to both programs.
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At the Port of Newport's Meeting on Jan. 24, the Port Commissioners voted to not have shipbreaking at Yaquina Bay because of financial investments to prepare the site that neither the Port nor Bay Bridge Enterprises were willing to make (202, 203). Port Manager Don Mann said that environmental concerns were not a factor (202, 203).
I attended the Jan. 24 meeting, and the way the Port stated their objections, it seemed that if money to pay for the site preparation costs became available that the Port Commission might be in favor of further negotiations. However, I doubt if they would do so because there is a very large opposition to shipbreaking in Newport that seemed to grow as citizens learned more about Bay Bridge's proposal.
In an Opinion letter to the Oregonian, Bay Bridge President & CEO Mike Dunavant said the Port "apparently" turned down Bay Bridge's proposal (99).
On Feb. 10 and April 3, it was reported that Gov. Kulongoski indicated that shipbreaking should be done in Oregon to the environmental standards of drydocks or better. Accordingly, Bay Bridge's in-water ship recycling seems doubtful not only for Newport but also elsewhere in Oregon.
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There are many web pages about this subject. The following are some that may be the most relevant.
In Oregon in General
* South Slough National Estuarine Research Reserve's Resource Library: Recycling Ships in Oregon
* Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition's
1) "Oregon Shores' Statement on Port of Newport's Ship-breaking Proposal."
2) "Port of Newport Considering Shipbreaking Proposal." [Includes photos showing that proposed site was near Yaquina channel.]
* Association of Northwest Steelheaders' Wet Shipbreaking in Oregon Action Center Web Page. (Includes links to news articles about Oregon shipbreaking, people to contact, and supporting information.)
* Surfrider Foundation Comments in Opposition to the Proposed Ship Salvage Facility in Newport.
* Scroll down the page for Northwestern Environmental Defense Center's Oregon Ship-scrapping Proposal
* Lincolncounty@hotmail.com's Shipbreaking plan STOPPED in Newport!
* By 17 February 2007, Oregon State University Hatfield Marine Science Center's (HMSC) "Response to Proposed Shipbreaking in Yaquina Bay" has been removed from their Internet site.
* Friends of Yaquina Bay (http://www.foyb.info/). (Information about Friends of Yaquina Bay, which was organized to oppose the proposed shipbuilding facility at Newport. On 17 Feb. 2007, little information remained about shipbreaking.)
* Save Our Bay Committee's No Shipbreaking in Yaquina Bay! (This organization split from Friends of Yaquina Bay.)
* SeaLionRecords.com's Don't Gamble with Yaquina Bay
Web Pages With Concerns about Shipbreaking Elsewhere
* Project: The Mothball Fleet in Suisun Bay, Toward Job Development & Preventing Future Bay Contamination
by Arc Ecology. (The U.S. Maritime Administration [MARAD] ships that Bay Bridge Enterprises proposes to scrap on the West Coast would come from Suisun Bay in California.)
* The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's "The Big Break: Resources." (This page includes information about U.S. "Ghost" fleets.)
* Basel Action Network (BAN) is an international network of activists seeking to prevent the globalization of the toxic chemical crisis under the Basel Convention.
* Greenpeace International--Shipbreaking.
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Also see Oregon Senate Bill 432: Shipbreaking Only in Dry Dock Without Introduction of Hazardous Materials or Fouling Organisms (Invasive Species) (Feb. 2007)
There are two types of drydocks: graving and floating (108; Wikipedia). A graving drydock is excavated in the ground, walled in concrete, and separated from water by a watertight gate; in operation: it is filled with water, a ship is floated in, the gate is closed, and the water is then pumped out. A floating drydock is constructed of floodable buoyancy chambers; in operation: it rests in water, the chambers are filled with water, the dock sinks, the ship is moved in, and then the water is pumped out.
Baltimore Marine Industries (which after bankruptcy became North American Ship Recycling [32, 190]) in Baltimore, Maryland, and Metro Machine in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania have scrapped MARAD or Navy ships in drydocks (186, p. 20 of 200). Ship Dismantlement and Recycling Joint Venture also scrapped Navy ships at a drydock in the Hunters Point drydock near San Francisco until late 2001, when it announced that it would shut down because of the high cost of maintaining a drydock with no work under contract and insufficient projected contracts (p. 10 of 188). So scrapping MARAD or Navy ships in a drydock in Oregon would not set a precedent.
In 2004, the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote about the Bay Bridge ship dismantling in Virginia (6):
"Much of the work is being done while the ships sit in the water, a fact that bothers some environmentalists. They fear that wastes might fall into the Elizabeth River, and say dry docks would be safer. Dunavant scoffs at the criticism, saying that, if done correctly, there is little difference between wet and dry shipbreaking."
Alan Jones with Cascade General, a shipbuilding yard in Portland that also has done shipbreaking in a drydock and is a potential competitor with Bay Bridge (85, 91), stated in December 2005 about shipbreaking (108):
"You need a 100 percent contained environment or else paint and metal goes into the water or soil. You have to have a dry dock."
Peter Sleeth's Oregonian article on Feb. 10 reported that Gov. Kulongoski indicated that shipbreaking should be done in Oregon drydocks because of environmental concerns (107). The Governor was reported to have ordered state job recruiters to withdraw the welcome to Bay Bridge Enterprises that proposed to do shipbreaking in water (107). The article stated that:
" 'He's not interested in having this company come if it is (working) in the water,' said Anna Richter Taylor, a spokeswoman for the governor. 'The federal government is the one who benefits from this. If Bay Bridge wants to work with the federal government to locate a dry-dock in Oregon, then let's talk.' "
I was unable to find a press release for the Governor about this, but, on 3 April 2006, the Oregon DEQ wrote (182):
"Concerns were raised earlier this year when a ship breaking facility was proposed for the Port of Newport. After several environmental issues were raised, Governor Kulongoski stated that any ship breaking operations locating in Oregon would have to ensure the level of environmental protection offered by a dry dock operation. DEQ will examine any proposed operation to ensure that it would offer equal or better environmental protection than a dry dock."
Perhaps, the next Governor will change this executive directive, but, for the present, this applies.
The Oregonian reports that California environmental regulations require shipbreaking to be done in drydocks (117), and Gary Whitney of Allied Defense Recycling LLC proposes to scrap MARAD ships in drydocks at the former Naval base at Mare Island near Suisun Bay.
The Coos Bay World's Elise Hamer reported on Feb. 17 that G. Denny Vaughan of Environmental Recycling Systems proposes to construct two graving drydocks to recycle (scrap) ships up to 900 ft long at Coos Bay.
Shipbreaking in drydocks is preferable to reduce environmental risks for the following reasons:
Shipbreaking is necessary, and groups such as Basel Action Network (p. 5 in 109) and Greenpeace (110) recommend that shipbreaking be done in drydocks for the safety of workers and to protect from environmental contamination.
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The Baltimore Sun won the Pulitzer Prize for an investigative report series by Will Englund and Gary Cohn about the U.S. shipbreaking industry in 1998. An index with links to the articles is at the Pulitzer web site, http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1998/investigative-reporting/works/).
Two of the 13 articles in the series are:
Englund, Will and Gary Cohn. 1997. Scrapping Ships, Sacrificing Men. Dec. 7, Baltimore Sun.
Cohn, Gary and Will Englund. 1997. The Curious Captains of a Reckless Industry. Dec. 8, Baltimore Sun.
The Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote an article in March 2005 about the Brownsville shipbreakers (28) that serves as a partial followup.
Please note that the U.S. shipbreaking industry is different than the foreign one, so it is important to focus on the U. S. shipbreaking industry when considering a shipbreaking facility in the Pacific Northwest.
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In October 1998, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) issued "Federal Surplus Ships: Government Efforts To Address the Growing Backlog of Ships Awaiting Disposal" about problems that the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the U.S. Navy were having in getting rid of ships (147).
MARAD is part of the U.S. Department of Transportation. In May 2000, the U.S. Department of Transportation released a report "Maritime Administration: Limited Progress In Disposing of Obsolete Vessels" that indicated that MARAD was not disposing of obsolete ships fast enough and discussed alternative methods to dispose of ships other than by scrapping (73).
In March 2005, the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report "Maritime Administration: Improved Program Management Needed to Address Timely Disposal of Obsolete Ships" that was critical of the way that MARAD had been disposing of its obsolete ships (66). The GAO report addresses issues about shipbreaking and explores alternatives so that MARAD can more quickly dispose of ships (p. 26-31 in 66). Many of these alternatives were also discussed in the GAO's 1998 report (147) and in the Department of Transportation 2000 report (73).
Bay Bridge Enterprises (BBE) in Chesapeake, Virginia on the Elizabeth River
Photos of U.S. In-Water Shipbreaking Sites Other Than in Virginia
On Dec. 2, the News-Times' Gail Kimberling reported (35) that "vessels being considered for the proposed Newport salvage site would come from a ghost fleet located in Suisan [Suisun] Bay, at Bernicia, Calif." Suisun Bay is east of San Francisco.
The Bay Bridge "Fact Sheet" for the Port of Newport (46) states:
"* Bay Bridge West, as it will be called for its west coast location in Newport, will salvage and recycle decommissioned U. S. vessels that are owned by the federal government, through the Maritime Administration (MARAD). Bay Bridge West will bid on vessels destined for salvage, currently stored at Suisun Bay near Richmond, California.
"* In addition to MARAD vessels, Bay Bridge West will augment its salvage work by scrapping barges, tug boats and other private industrial vessels."
Environmental Recycling Systems has offered to dismantle ships in MARAD's California, Virginia, and Texas fleets by sending them to Turkey and Mexico, according to a 19 July 2005 article (130). In Feb. 2006, it was announced that Environmental Recycling Systems would also like to dismantle U.S. military vessels [presumably MARAD ships at Suisun Bay] as well as privately owned ships, tankers, and barges in Coos Bay.
Allied Defense Recycling LLC has worked in 2004 and 2005 to get a lease to open the former Naval shipyard and drydocks at Mare Island near Suisun Bay to salvage MARAD ships from Suisun Bay.
Thus, the primary source of vessels for West Coast shipbreakers would be MARAD ships at Suisun Bay. Currently, MARAD ships are prohibited from being sent abroad to be scrapped because of a pending lawsuit and a provision in the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that makes granting exemptions unlikely. However, the TSCA does not prohibit private vessels from being sent overseas to be scrapped (p. 11 in 73). Scrapping overseas is more economical because of lower labor costs and higher demand for scrap (130).
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The News-Times' Gail Kimberling reported on Nov. 18 (1) that the Bay Bridge facility in Newport: "could initially handle smaller ships up to 200 feet in length and eventually work up to vessels 350 feet and longer."
The Oregonian's Peter Sleeth (42) reported on December 4 that Bay Bridge would scrap ships "from 100 to 350 feet long, or longer in rare cases."
Bay Bridge's "Questions and Answers" (45) for the Port of Newport states that Bay Bridge would salvage vessels "from 100 feet to 350 feet. Occasionally, larger vessels may be salvaged, but at least at the beginning, Bay Bridge will work on smaller vessels."
At the Port of Newport's Dec. 6 Public Forum, they had a limited number of 11 x 17 inch maps entitled "Bay Bridge Project Site Drawing." This map shows four vessels at Bay Bridge's proposed Newport site: 220 ft, 350 ft, and two 455 ft vessels. This suggests that Bay Bridge really plans to often have vessels longer than 350 ft.
On Dec. 20, the Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner (82) reported that Bay Bridge's Mike Dunavant indicated that ships brought to Oregon "each year likely would be 450-footers or less."
The major source of ships to scrap for proposed shipbreaking operations on the West Coast will be MARAD vessels at Suisun Bay, California. Accordingly, it is appropriate to look at the length of ships at Suisun Bay that are available for scrapping.
For 60 Suisun Bay ships to be scrapped in February 2005 (see p. 7-10 in 47), I calculated that the average length was 514.8 ft, the minimum length was 214 ft (3 ships), the maximum length was 718 ft (1 ship), and only 7 of the 60 vessels were 350 ft or less. The Table below gives the length classes of the 60 vessels to be scrapped. Clearly, the typical length of ships to be scrapped is considerably longer than indicated by Bay Bridge Enterprises.
These ships will also be larger than are normally at Yaquina Bay. For example, the dredge Yaquina, which is now a big ship for Yaquina Bay, is only 200 ft long (51).
TABLE. Number of MARAD ships available for scrapping at Suisun Bay, California on 8 February 2005 in various vessel length classes. These data are compiled from p. 7-10 in 47.
-------------------------- Vessel Number Total of Length Vessels --------------------------- less than 100 feet 0 100-199 feet 0 200-299 feet 5 300-399 feet 4 400-499 feet 17 500-599 feet 18 600-699 feet 13 700-799 feet 3 800-899 feet 0 Total 60 --------------------------
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In the 1990's, the Navy repossessed 20 of the 62 ships it had sold to domestic shipbreaking yards in California, North Carolina, and Rhode Island because of environmental, safety, and contractor performance issues and had to tow them back to federal storage facilities (28, 33, 34, p. 6 in 147). One of the shipbreaking companies involved was Sigma Recycling of Wilmington, North Carolina that started in 1994 (28, 34). Part of the Pulitzer Prize winning investigative report stated that Sigma's experienced shipbreaker owner, Richard Jaross (34):
"had promised to set up a model yard, but what he delivered was far different. One worker was killed, another seriously injured. A minesweeper sank. Asbestos, oil and lead contaminated the site. Oil spilled into the river. It was next to impossible to keep track of the people and companies involved in the scrapping operation. Over two years, at least 16 companies and partnerships had a financial stake in the ships or the yard. In July 1996, the state finally shut the operation, forcing the Navy to reclaim 12 ships. If it hadn't been for anonymous tipsters, state officials said, they never would have known of the problems at the yard."The Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote about the raid that closed Sigma's facility in 1996 (28):
"Investigators discovered multiple environmental violations, including the improper handling of asbestos and waste oil. Several ships waiting for disposal, including Navy and Maritime Administration vessels, were confiscated. 'There was oil all over the ground, loose asbestos, too,' said Rick Shiver, who supervised site inspections for the North Carolina Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources. It took until 2003 to clean up the site, nearly seven years. Eventually, business connections to Jaross paid about $1 million to remove tons of contaminated soil and purge other contaminants."
Residents of Vallejo, California may remember that six Navy ships were awarded to a shipbreaking firm (Pegasus Inc.) at the former Naval base at Mare Island in 1995 but that the company went bankrupt in 1997 (p. 6 in 147, 148). A year later, the five smaller ships were taken to Suisun Bay, but the partially scrapped USS. Oriskany (a large aircraft carrier) remained until April 1999, when it was towed to Texas, after the City of Vallejo had threatened lawsuits and went to the U.S. Congress to get it removed because it was taking up valuable property without compensation (145, 146, 148).
A pattern of bankruptcies and closures were found during a 1998 Pulitzer Prize winning investigative report series on shipbreaking by the Baltimore Sun. One article of the series (33) states:
"Ship scrappers frustrate regulators by constructing a maze of corporate names and moving frequently. The Defense Department has repeatedly sent ships to scrappers who have records of bankruptcies, fraud, payoffs to government inspectors, and environmental and safety violations."
The "maze of corporate names" sounds like the current ownership of Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC, which is through a chain of subsidiary companies across the world.
Another article in the 1998 Pulitzer winning series reports (34):
"The shipbreaking industry, which involves about a dozen key operators, has left a dismal record of spills, accidents, deaths, lawsuits, bankruptcies and indictments at ports across the country."
During a 1998 U.S. Congressional hearing, a representative of Simsmetal America, Mike Dunavant, testified that they had scrapped Navy ships but had lost $2 million in scrapping an aircraft carrier in California, which is why they stopped recycling ships (p. 45 of 156). Dunavant also testified (p. 34 of 156):
"Simsmetal America is very interested in doing ship breaking again. We know we can do it safely, environmentally sound, and by following all rules and regulations from both State and Federal agencies because we have done it before. We are also aware that there are a number of other responsible companies in the United States that can properly dismantle these vessels, but we are businesses. We need to turn a profit. We did it right, we did it correctly, and we lost money. We believe, as a result of our experiences, to dismantle a complete vessel in the United States today, including proper remediation and appropriate safety measures will result in a loss. As the cost of remediation, including preparation of recyclable materials will always exceed the saleable value."
For Simsmetal (p. 45 of 156): "To do it right, the costs just outweigh what a recycler like us would get from that saleable scrap."
In 2000, the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Maritime and Departmental Programs of the U.S., Dept. of Transportation (which includes MARAD) wrote (p. 13 of 73):
"Even when it has been able to sell vessels, MARAD has encountered problems with domestic contractors. In 1999, MARAD sold 17 vessels to 3 ship scrapping companies located in Brownsville, Texas. At the time of our review, we found that only two companies were actively scrapping ships, and only one of these companies was currently scrapping a MARAD ship. MARAD has granted a number of extensions to contractors, and in one instance, MARAD had to resell vessels because of contractor default. During our review, we also found that another company had not taken possession of any vessels because of an ongoing dispute with the Port of Brownsville regarding contamination of its scrapping site. It has since taken possession of its vessels."
Further, the Deputy Assistant Inspector General stated about one of MARAD's shipbreaking contractors (p. 14 of 73):
"The company completed scrapping four MARAD vessels during 1998 and 1999; however, it defaulted on a contract for another five MARAD vessels in August 1999."
In 2001, Ship Dismantlement and Recycling Joint Venture announced that it would stop recycling ships in drydocks at Hunters Point in San Francisco because of marginal profitability and an inadequate supply of ships to scrap (p. 10 of 188, 192). If this facility had remained open, it could have also recycled MARAD ships in California in drydocks.
In 2001, Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC in Virginia that now scraps MARAD ships was created from two defunct scrapyards, and Bay Bridge was sold in June 2004 and June 2005.
Brownsville, Texas has been the hub of recycling MARAD ships (e.g., 28, 33, 34, p. 13 of 73, 92, p. 4 and 19-21 of 149, 155, p. 4 in 188, 189, 193, 194, 196, 198). Many ship recycling companies have come and gone in Brownsville. Prior to 1997, some of the companies included Andy International, JR-Steel, Luria Brothers, Consolidated Steel, and Brownsville Steel and Salvage (207). In 1997, ship recyclers included International Shipbreaking Ltd., Transforma Marine, and Best Group (207). Four years later in 2001, two of the 1997 companies remained (International Shipbreaking Ltd. and Transformer Marine), one (Best Group) was gone, and there were two new companies: Esco Marine and Bedoli Group (206). Another four years later in 2005, only two of the companies from 2001 remained (International Shipbreaking Ltd. and Esco Marine), and there were another two new companies Marine Metals, Inc. and All Star Metals, Inc. (28, p. 4 of 149). In addition, MARAD awarded D&D Steel, Inc. of Brownsville contracts during at least 1999-2002 (p. 4 of 188), but not recently (p. 4 of 149), so it has also stopped shipbreaking for MARAD. The Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper (28) wrote in 2005 that Brownsville has been a center for ship salvage companies since the 1960's and:
"Only the names of the yards have changed over the years, due to bankruptcies and closings."
In June 2003, another shipbreaking company, Baltimore Marine Industries, Inc. at the Sparrows Point shipyard in Baltimore, Maryland filed for bankruptcy (190). In 2004, it was reported (32) that North American Ship Recycling LLC (which with Bay Bridge is on the list of six ship scrappers for the U. S. Maritime Administration [section XI in 23]) in Baltimore at the Sparrows Point shipyard:
"reopened this year after emerging from bankruptcy with new owners and a new focus."
Company stability is important because bankruptcies leave unpaid creditors and perhaps environmental contamination that taxpayers may have to pay for, like the shipyards at Yaquina and Coos Bays.
MARAD and the Navy have attempted to improve their ship disposal programs since the 1990's (e.g., 149), but the U.S. shipbreaking industry has remained unstable, in part because of variable scrap prices and inadequate government funding that results in an unsteady supply of ships to recycle and subsequent periodic layoffs. The domestic ship recycling of MARAD ships is also threatened by the possibility of MARAD exporting vessels for scrapping.
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STEEL FIGURE. Average monthly U.S. prices for Heavy Melting No. 2 Steel Scrap. This is from the RAND Corp. report (p. 138 in 200). There are more than 100 classes of scrap, depending upon the size and source (p. 137-141 of 200), and prices differ among classes. Note the monthly variability in prices and also that West Coast prices in Seattle and San Francisco were consistently lower than in Houston.
Shipbreaking firms can make money by selling scrap (especially steel) and reusable materials (Appendix B in 200). Excluding submarines, the RAND Corp. estimated that 79-90% of Navy and MARAD ships of various types would be ferrous scrap (i.e., containing iron), 0-4% aluminum, 1-4% copper or copper alloys, 0-4% lead, and about 9% waste (p. 124 in 200). So if the price of scrap drops, a company's profits diminish, and they may even lose money.
The RAND Corp. notes that the amount of money a ship recycler may earn depends on "the very volatile scrap metal market and on the recycling contractor's resourcefulness in finding the best price for scrap and reusable equipment" (p. 31 of 200). RAND also notes that overseas ship recyclers, especially those in Asia, recycle and reuse more equipment and materials than U.S. recyclers (p. 113 and 126 in 200).
MARAD's 2001 report stated about its sales to domestic ship recycling companies (p. 3 of 187):
"Since 1994, MARAD has sold 22 vessels, only eight of which have been scrapped. The purchasers did not accept the remaining vessels and most of the sales contracts were terminated. Key factors were the marginal profits stemming from ship scrapping, which were influenced by the constantly changing market prices for scrap metal versus the costs for removal and disposal of hazardous material."
The value of scrap varies monthly and with location (Steel Figure). For example, International Shipbreaking Limited wrote in 1998 (196):
"Currently, foreign scrappers can receive $240 to $250 of revenue per ton from their scrapping operations."
But in 1998 (196)(boldface added):
"Ship scrappers in the Gulf Coast area of the United States currently receive approximately $180 of revenue per ton for scrapped vessels. This is the highest scrap market price in the nation due to the proximity to so many mini-mills in the United States and Mexico."
The RAND Corp. also reports that the price is directly related to the proximity to where the scrap will be processed and that the price for Heavy Melting No. 2 Steel Scrap in August 2000 was about $60 per ton greater in Houston, Pittsburgh, or Chicago than in Seattle or San Francisco (Steel Figure).
Additionally, in a 2005 interview with Alan Jones and Alan Sprott of Cascade General, Joel Gallob wrote (204):
"The market for scrap steel is not uniform across the country. Steel fetches $100 per ton more on the Gulf Coast than on the West Coast, Jones explained, because a lot of Mexican mills are competing for the metal. 'Say that's $260 per ton there versus $150 per ton in this area, that makes a big difference when you're talking about a 10,000-ton ship,' says Sprott.' "
If a ship recycling company is distant from high scrap prices (e.g., along the Oregon Coast), not only may it receive less for its scrap metal, but it may have higher transportation costs to transport the scrap to market. Such a company would have a more challenging time competing in bids for MARAD or Navy ships with ship recycling companies in Brownsville that are closer to markets with higher scrap prices.
In 2006, the Wall Street Journal reports about Bay Bridge Enterprises' Harsh Mishra (92):
" 'This is an inherently risky business. You could lose your shirt or you could get lucky,' says Mr. Mishra. He points out that shipbreakers must bid on contracts months in advance and 'you don't know what the steel scrap prices will be four or five months down the line.' "
Shipbreaking companies may not finish disposing of ships until 6 months or more after winning a contract. For example, Esco Marine was awarded two ships by MARAD in August 2004 but had not completely disposed of the ships until 8-10 months later, and Bay Bridge Enterprises was awarded contracts for three ships in late August 2003 but had not entirely disposed of them until 15-17 months later (p. 4 in 149).
Scrap steel prices dropped during 1997-1999, and International Shipbreaking, Ltd in Brownsville, Texas lost more than $3 million, reduced staff from 170 to 15 workers, and was on the verge of bankruptcy (155).
Calculations from U.S. Government Accountability Office data indicate that the annual average international scrap steel price dropped 21% from 2000 ($101/ton) to 2001 ($79.4/ton)(p. 42 in 66). The average price increased to $204 in 2004 (p. 42 in 66) and to as high as $350 in 2005 (42). Experts are not sure what prices will do (201), but it seems likely that they will change as they have done in the past (p. 42 in 66, p. 138 in 200). A price drop to 1994-2003 levels of $79-157/ton (p. 42 in 66) could test the finances of shipbreaking firms. This would be particularly true for companies that get contracts for several ships at one time, like Bay Bridge Enterprises did for five MARAD ships in 2003 (4).
Drops in the price of scrap steel can be one reason why shipbreaking and scrap metal firms sometimes go bankrupt or close.
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Inadequate funding can lead to instability for a shipbreaking company because it leads to uncertainty for ship recycling companies, an irregular supply of ships to salvage, and periodic layoffs. With inadequate and irregular funding, potential ship recycling companies may decide to not salvage ships because it is too financially risky.
A report about the Navy's ship scrapping program stated (p. 10 of 188):
"In November 2001, Ship Dismantlement and Recycling Joint Venture advised the Navy that it was shutting down its Hunters Point, San Francisco shipyard operations due to the high cost of maintaining a drydock facility dedicated to ship dismantling with no work under contract and insufficient projected future throughput."
"In 2001, VSE decided to discontinue SRR's ship remediation and recycling efforts at the Hunters Point Shipyard in San Francisco, California, due to the limited business opportunities associated with ship dismantlement work, due in part to an absence of any significant amount of government funding for these efforts. Profitability from the SRR work was marginal for VSE relative to the risk."
During Fiscal Years 2001-2005, MARAD was appropriated 0-$31 million for ship disposal (MARAD Budget Table). The News-Times' Joel Gallob interviewed Alan Sprott and Alan Jones of Cascade General (90, 108), and Gallob reports (90)(boldface added):
" 'Funding for shipbreaking,' said Alan Sprott, environmental manager for Cascade General company, a shipbuilding company in Portland, 'is sporadic. It depends on the whim of Congress. They allocated $21 million for 2006. But I've been told by International Shipbreaking' - one of the companies doing shipbreaking in Texas - 'that half of that money will go to the Navy because MARAD takes custody of some Navy ships, too.' The Navy has a parallel program, with a few contractors across the country approved to bid for ship disposal. 'So that leaves about $10 million, for all three of the MARAD (ghost) fleets, in California, Texas and Virginia. With $10 million you might get five ships scrapped,' warns Sprott. 'The rest of the ships will wait until Congress approves the money again. It's a poorly funded program, it's not dependable. It is not something to build a solid business model upon,' said Jones."
However, Congress appropriated as much or more than MARAD requested during FY 2003-2005, but not in 2002 (MARAD Budget Table). So it appears that MARAD did not request enough funding to recycle more ships each year; for example, a General Accountability Office report in 2005 noted (p. 20 of 66)(boldface added):
"In its 2001 report to Congress, MARAD provided a general estimate of costs to dispose of its inventory of 155 ships by the 2006 deadline, and it stated that it planned to further refine cost estimates as additional data relating to merchant-type vessels were collected during fiscal years 2001 and 2002. However, these costs were not converted into a long-term funding plan linked to disposing of all obsolete ships by 2006. In addition, MARAD did not revise its cost estimates based on actual contracting experiences. For example, the 2001 report estimated that it would cost about $350 million to scrap 140 of the 155 vessels--an average of about $2.5 million per ship--using ship scrapping services contracts. However, MARAD's budget requests for ship disposal for fiscal years 2002 through 2005 have totaled only $54.1 million, about one-sixth of the $350 million estimate."
But MARAD maintains that the capacity of domestic ship recyclers is too limited, not that they are inadequately funding domestic recyclers. For example, MARAD's 2005 "Report to Congress" states (p. 6-7 of 149):
"Domestic Recycling -- To date the domestic approach is the most expedient but also the most costly disposal alternative and remains the least cost effective disposal option for MARAD and Navy obsolete ships. Limited domestic ship recycling facilities (i.e., lack of cost-effective and productive capacity and industrial throughput), make this disposal method effective only for the removal of a small number of ships on a per contract basis. ... In light of the export limitation, and continuing challenges associated with alternative disposal methods, the rate of disposal is highly dependent on the availability of cost effective domestic facilities. Industrial capacity, in terms of annual ship disposal rates, is difficult to quantify because of several factors including the variance in vessel condition and the scope of hazardous material remediation that is necessary. However, due to capacity and resource limitations, the six domestic facilities that have been awarded contracts over the past few years have demonstrated a potential cost effective capability to dismantle and recycle up to a total of 17 to 22 vessels per year. Further, even at award rates that are lower than the 17-22 ship potential, the limitations of many domestic facilities often result in significant delays of months after contract award before the facility finally takes possession of the vessels and commences dismantling work. It is also not uncommon for domestic facilities to request significant extensions for completing the work beyond the original contract performance period. Over the past two years, with the exception of two facilities, domestic facilities have had significant production throughput problems, which significantly delayed completion of recycling projects awarded by MARAD."
MARAD made a very similarly worded rebuttal in response to criticism by the 2005 General Accountability Office (p. 52-53 of 66).
However, MARAD's estimate of an average cost of $2.5 million per ship in 2001 (p. 6 of 187) multiplied by 17 ships per year is $42.5 million per year. But MARAD requested 51% or less of this during 2002-2005 (MARAD Budget Table), so why didn't MARAD request an adequate amount?
Further, the lack of government funding may limit ship recycling capacity. In 1998, International Shipbreaking Limited wrote the U.S. Interagency Panel on Ship Scrapping (196) that the profit margin for domestic shipbreakers is "insufficient" to "attract the necessary risk capital to expand domestic capacity" and:
"And we would like to expand capacity to 180,000 tons of metal production per year (approximately 25 vessels per year). However, it would be imprudent for us to invest this capital unless and until we were assured that there are a steady supply of vessels to cut."
To get a steady supply of ships will require sufficient funding.
If there was more funding and ships were consistently supplied, would more domestic ship recycling firms participate, would more ships be scrapped, or current ship recyclers scrap ships more on schedule? The current situation leads to periodic layoffs and loss of trained personnel, so that it is predictable that it would be more difficult to dismantle ships on schedule when a ship becomes available. Further, if more funding was available, shipbreaking companies could also be more cost-effective; for example, MARAD stated in their 2001 report that scrapping costs are also dependent, in part, on "economies of scale savings for multiple awards" (p. 6 of 187).
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MARAD Budget Table. MARAD budget requests and appropriations during Fiscal Years 2001-2005. This is part of the U.S. General Accountability Office's Table 3 on p. 21 of footnote 66. NA=Not applicable.
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Current dollars (in millions)
Fiscal year__________________
2001* 2002 2003 2004 2005
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Budget request NA 10.0 11.1 11.4 21.6
Direct appropriation NA 0 11.1 16.1 21.6
Appropriations provided
through the Navy 10.0* 0 20.0 0 0
Total appropriated funds 10.0* 0 31.1 16.1 21.6
* MARAD did not request any fiscal year 2001 appropriations because it did not receive authorization to pay for scrapping services until late in the budget cycle.
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One of the factors leading to an unstable domestic ship salvage industry is an irregular supply of ships. If the supply of ships is intermittent, then there will be periodic layoffs and some shipbreaking companies may go bankrupt or quit ship recycling and other companies that have the facilities and ability to recycle ships may choose to not do so. U.S. shipbreaking companies are dependent upon the availability of ships from the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) (e.g., 4, 6, 42) and Navy (188, 190).
The U.S. Interagency Panel on Ship Scrapping's report in 1998 stated (195):
"Representatives of the US scrapping industry have stated that it is more difficult for companies to scrap ships profitably in the domestic market as a result of more protective environmental, safety, health and labor laws in the United States. Another factor affecting profitability of the US scrapping industry has been the inconsistent supply of ships to be scrapped. Still, some US ship scrapping organizations told the Panel that ship scrapping can be profitable, provided a steady supply of ships is available either from the US Government or from the commercial shipping industry."
However, MARAD wrote in 2001 that private ships continue to be recycled overseas (p. 16 of 187).
In 1998, International Shipbreaking Limited wrote the U.S. Interagency Panel on Ship Scrapping about the importance of a continual supply of ships to scrap (196):
"Like any commercial project which requires dedicated investment capital and a trained workforce, the domestic industry requires a steady stream of work in order to attract the capital and train the worker base. If there are disruptions in supply, costs skyrocket on a per ton basis. ... Finally, since a successful dismantling operation requires substantial amounts of heavy equipment, such as heavy lift cranes, hydraulic shears and moving equipment, this type of equipment must be effectively utilized in order to generate an adequate return on invested capital. Obviously, if the equipment is utilized sporadically due to an inconsistent supply of vessels, it will be difficult to receive an appropriate return on capital and therefore difficult to raise the necessary capital in the first place."
MARAD's 2001 report stated (p. 6 of 187):
"In February 2001, the President of the Shipbuilders Council of America indicated that 'the domestic capacity and expertise already exists to dismantle all of the surplus vessels in MARAD's custody within a five-year period.' According to some shipyards, their interest is dependent, in part, on some continuity of work. The assignment of more than one or two ships to a facility is necessary to justify the capital and labor costs required to integrate scrapping into normal shipyard activities. Moreover, a regular supply of vessels should allow for long-term cost savings as shipyards become more experienced at scrapping."
A 2001 National Defense Magazine stated in an article about the U. S. shipbreaking industry for MARAD and Navy ships (194):
"Every company official interviewed for this story said that he was concerned about keeping a trained crew on board. In order to maintain a trained workforce, Chambers [chief executive officer of International Shipbreaking Limited, ISL] explained, 'We need the ships to sustain it.' 'If Congress doesn't fund the program, the ships continue to languish and we have to let the people go,' he said. ISL laid off 85 people for five months and now only got half of them back, because there was no additional funding for the ships. According to Strem [vice-president of Metro Machine], Metro Machine could scrap about seven ships a year, but it is pacing the work from six to eight months per ship, to keep a steady workflow."
The 2002 Navy report about their ship disposal program states (p. 10 of 188)(boldface added):
"In November 2001, Ship Dismantlement and Recycling Joint Venture advised the Navy that it was shutting down its Hunters Point, San Francisco shipyard operations due to the high cost of maintaining a drydock facility dedicated to ship dismantling with no work under contract and insufficient projected future throughput. ... Ship Dismantlement and Recycling Joint Venture was the only privately operated facility on the west coast for dismantling of government ships in accordance with strict Federal, State, and local environmental and occupational safety laws and regulations. The establishment of another contractor ship dismantling facility on the west coast, if required or desired, will require new start-up costs to re-establish compliant ship dismantling processes. However, the requirement for another west coast ship dismantling facility will remain questionable without a long term funding stream that supports the award of at least three to four ships per year per facility."
In June 2003, Baltimore Marine Industries, Inc. at the Sparrows Point shipyard in Baltimore, Maryland filed for bankruptcy, and one of the contributing factors to its bankruptcy was an unsteady supply of MARAD and Navy ships to scrap (190).
Because the costs of scrapping ships in an environmentally sensitive way exceeds the value of recyclable materials, the government needs to pay shipbreaking companies to recycle ships (p. 3 of 187). If adequate funding is not available, then the supply of ships will be irregular.
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MARAD may export obsolete ships overseas and did so in 2003, though this was legally challenged. Denny Vaughan, senior partner with Environmental Recycling Systems that was coordinating a plan to export all MARAD ships in MARAD's California, Texas, and Virginia fleets to Turkey or Virginia indicated in a July 2005 article (130) that:
"Dismantling ships in developing countries is cheaper because of lower labor costs and high demand for the ships' metal, boilers and generators, said Vaughan, a retired Navy rear admiral."
Domestic shipbreaking companies would probably not be able to compete with foreign companies. In March 2005, Brownsville shipbreakers were concerned that the Bush Administration will seek exemptions and resume export of MARAD ships overseas to recycle because of recent trips by Bush aides to China's shipyards and MARAD's export of four ships to Able UK in 2003 (28).
In 2005, the president of Esco Marine, Richard Jaross, was described as being worried that their recent $1 million expansion would be wasted if MARAD exports more ships (28). Such fears may discourage companies recycling MARAD ships from more capital investment and discourage new companies from recycling MARAD ships.
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Brownsville (Texas) Shipbreaking Companies Are Already Scrapping Some of MARAD's Ships at Suisun Bay
There are currently no West Coast shipbreaking sites included among the six active MARAD shipbreaking locations (section XI in 23), but Navy ships in California were towed to International Shipbreaking Ltd of Brownsville to be scrapped as early as 1997 (189, 207).
In 2005, four "obsolete" MARAD ships at Suisun Bay on February 28 were listed with a homeport of Brownsville and a status of "Disposal" on 30 November 2005 (49), and MARAD gave contracts for two MARAD ships to International Shipbreaking Ltd. and ESCO Marine of Brownsville on 30 September 2005 (48). The four Brownsville ships and one ship (the Nemasket), whose status has changed from disposal to "historic" review in November 2005 (p. 16 in 50), represented five of the six highest priority ships for disposal at Suisun Bay in February 2005 (47). Further, a copy of the presentation by Alan Sprott and Alan Jones of Cascade General of Portland during their Jan. 6 presentation in Newport indicates that five MARAD vessels from Suisun Bay were awarded to 3 Brownsville shipbreaking firms in 2005 (85). Gary Whitney has often towed the ships to Brownsville (104, 127, 205). So Brownsville shipbreakers are currently scrapping MARAD ships from Suisun Bay.
Potential Additional Competition for Shipbreaking of MARAD's Ships at Suisun Bay
"In addition, MARAD is currently involved in litigation challenging an existing vessel export contract for various environmental issues concerning the export of solid PCBs. Therefore, any quotation submission that proposes the export of solid PCBs will be reviewed but may not be considered further until the pending litigation/legal challenges are resolved."
If the lawsuit is decided to allow exports for scrapping of MARAD ships with solid PCBs, then MARAD ships at Suisun Bay that shipbreaking firms propose to scrap in the Pacific Northwest could go overseas. If the verdict in the lawsuit is to not allow exports of MARAD ships with solid PCBs, then perhaps the PCBs could be removed in the United States and the ships could be exported overseas for dismantling as suggested by Gary Whitney (126). Reduced labor costs overseas could make shipbreaking overseas more profitable than in the United States. If this happens, then shipbreaking firms in the Pacific Northwest would not get as many MARAD ships as if there was no competition, so they may not do shipbreaking very long.
MARAD may export ships irregardless of the outcome of the pending court case because there is a provision in the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) for MARAD to petition the EPA for an exemption to allow the export of PCBs (p. 11-12 in 73, p. 6 in 149). However, MARAD notes that the process would take a long time and would be subject to legal challenge, "which is likely" (p. 6 in 149). Accordingly, MARAD believes that it is "nearly impossible to pursue any export ship recycling/dismantling contract" (p. 6 in 149) "due to statutory constraints contained in the Toxic Substances Control Act" (p. 1 in 149). The U.S. Congress could loosen the "statutory constraints," so that MARAD could dispose of its ships overseas, and MARAD has said in April and October 2005 that it is available to assist Congress in making such changes (p. 11 in 149, p. 10 in 152). The threat of export may be affecting domestic ship recycling companies.
Plans have been prepared to export MARAD's ships. Retired rear admiral Denny Vaughan of Environmental Recycling Systems has offered to dismantle ships in MARAD's California, Virginia, and Texas fleets by sending them to Turkey and Mexico, according to a 19 July 2005 article (130)(boldface added):
"The federal government is moving forward with a tentative deal to send all the remaining obsolete James River Reserve Fleet ships to recycling yards in Turkey or Mexico at a reduced cost. All the rotting ships in the James River ghost fleet could be gone in two years if the proposal succeeds, said Denny Vaughan, senior partner with Environmental Recycling Systems, a shipyard in Turkey that is coordinating the plan.
"The James River fleet currently has about 55 obsolete ships. Vaughan's group is also offering to dismantle 77 ships in reserve fleets in Texas and California.
"It's far from a done deal. Environmental Recycling Systems must compete with other shipyards vying for the recycling work. And the foreign deal needs approval from the Environmental Protection Agency, which would have to waive federal laws that forbid exporting hazardous waste.
...
"Environmental Recycling Systems is offering to dismantle the ships in the Texas and California fleets for free, and charge only preparation, pre-cleaning and towing costs for the James River fleet ships, Vaughan said.
"The Turkey-Mexico proposal has been in the bidding process for about two years.
...
"Environmental Recycling Systems is a shipyard near the Aegean Sea in Aliaga, Turkey, and has a coalition of 29 additional yards interested in taking American ships. Dismantling ships in developing countries is cheaper because of lower labor costs and high demand for the ships' metal, boilers and generators, said Vaughan, a retired Navy rear admiral.
"Vaughan would not disclose the exact locations of the Mexican shipyards in the proposal, other than saying they were on the country's east and west coasts.
"Vaughan said that shipyards in Turkey and Mexico should not be compared to those in India and Bangladesh, where concerns about deplorable work and environmental conditions in the 1990s caused a global outcry.
"Shipyard workers for Environmental Recycling Systems wear protective clothing, including steel-tipped shoes and hardhats, and hazardous materials will be handled according to EPA standards, Vaughan said. 'We want to abide by the highest standards,' he said."
As part of the lawsuit against MARAD and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to remove MARAD vessels from Virginia but not necessarily to ship them to Environmental Recycling Systems' facilities in Turkey and Mexico (130):
"An EPA spokeswoman said that the agreement has been reached in principle, but not all the parties have had a chance to sign the settlement. A Maritime Administration spokeswoman did not respond to requests for information.
"In the settlement, EPA agreed to process, 'without unreasonable delay,' the Maritime Administration's request for a waiver to the Toxic Substances Control Act, which bans the export of solid PCBs.
"The administration is seeking the waiver to move ahead with sending the remaining nine James River ships that are part of the Able UK deal to England. The Maritime Administration, known as Marad, also agrees, 'without unreasonable delay,' to award contracts for removing the remaining reserve fleet ships and to apply for more EPA waivers as needed."
Basel Action Network and the Sierra Club sued MARAD about sending ships to England to be dismantled and are opposed to send hazardous wastes overseas (130, p. 5 in 149). So they may sue if this deal goes through. But perhaps Environmental Recycling Systems recognized that they were unlikely to get an exemption to export ships with PCBs, so in February 2006 Environmental Recycling Systems is proposing to construct drydocks in Coos Bay (Oregon) for dismantling MARAD ships from Suisun Bay.
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In Bay Bridge's Jan. 26 Opinion piece to the Oregonian, Bay Bridge's Mike Dunavant and Marc McPherson said that their West Coast shipbreaking facility would have "plenty of work to keep 100-plus employees busy for generations" (99). They indicate that they would be supplied by existing federal ships and federal ships retired each year as well as by recycling private barges and tugboats (99). Similarly, for their proposed Newport facility, they stated that there was enough MARAD vessels currently at Suisun Bay to provide approximately 10 years of work, that more vessels would become available each year, and that they would also scrap barges, tug boats, and other private industrial vessels (46).
Their statements are inconsistent with MARAD statistics. In February 2005, MARAD had 60 ships available for scrapping at Suisun Bay (see p. 7-10 in 47). Bay Bridge planned to scrap 12-15 vessels each year at Newport (45; Mike Dunavant's statement at Dec. 6 public Port of Newport meeting [fide Carol Cole]). If so, in 5 years, they would scrap 60-75 vessels, which is equal to or greater than the number currently available. During four Fiscal Years from 2001 to 2004, the U.S. General Accountability Office found that there was a total average of 10.5 obsolete vessels per year (range 2-20 vessels) being transferred into MARAD's three fleets in Virginia, Texas, and California (p. 15 in 66), so the number added to just the California fleet at Suisun Bay could be expected to be less than that. Further, in 2001, MARAD estimated that after their current backlog of ships is gone that "an annual scrapping rate of about 6 ships per year is expected" (p. 10 of 187).
Accordingly, it is questionable that there would be enough MARAD ships at Suisun Bay to sustain a Bay Bridge facility for 10 years, especially since there is already competition for MARAD ships from Suisun Bay, and there may be increased competition if MARAD finds alternative ways to dispose of ships, such as exporting them.
Further, it is doubtful that one shipbreaker company would get all vessels because MARAD is under a statutory deadline to dispose of current obsolete ships by September 2006 (66). MARAD has been strongly criticized by the Government Accountability Office and others for not disposing of ships fast enough (66). Will MARAD accommodate Bay Bridge's or another shipbreaker's plan for 12-15 vessels each year for "generations" or will MARAD try to satisfy congressional wishes to dispose of ships faster?
It is also very questionable that scrapping private ships would be able to sustain a West Coast shipbreaking company for "generations." Privately owned vessels are not prohibited from being sent overseas to be scrapped as are government-owned ships (p. 11 in 73), and scrapping ships overseas is more economical because of lower labor costs and higher demand for scrap (130).
In addition, it appears that Bay Bridge was not planning to be in Newport for "generations." The Bay Bridge "Fact Sheet" for Newport (46) indicated that "the Port is considering a ten-year agreement." At the end of the Dec. 6 public meeting by the Port of Newport, Carol Cole heard one of the Port Commissioners say that the lease might only be for 5 years. A 5 year lease seems more realistic and sustainable based on current competition and fluctuations in the value of scrap steel and uncertain government contracts.
But if a shipbreaking lease is only for 5-10 years, is permitting shipbreaking worth the environmental risks, loss of aesthetic values, and, if the shipbreaking site is near recreational fishing and crabbing areas as Bay Bridge planned at Yaquina Bay, the loss of those uses?
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Bay Bridge's President and CEO Mike Dunavant talked to Newport News-Times' editor Gail Kimberling about the origins of Bay Bridge Enterprises. Kimberling wrote on Dec. 2 (35):
"Dunavant explained a company called Mercer was invited by the state of Virginia to bid on a shipbreaking site in Chesapeake, Va. When successful, Mercer immediately changed the name of its new acquisition to Bay Bridge Enterprises so as not to replicate the company name already being used in New Jersey. 'They went from Mercer to Bay Bridge in one day,' he said.
'I was general manager of Bay Bridge from 2002 until Adani (a firm based in India) came in and purchased the shipbreaking operation. I stayed and they made me CEO,' Dunavant said."
The Port of Newport's "Fact Sheet" for Bay Bridge Enterprises stated (p. 1 of 46):
"Bay Bridge Enterprises' operation in Chesapeake has been in the marine salvage recycling business for five years."
These accounts are not supported by independent reports that indicate that Bay Bridge has had a shorter history and has had several owners. In February 1999, Recycling Industries Inc. of Englewood, Colorado filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Colorado (37). On 11 December 2000, the bankruptcy judge dismissed the company's case, and the same day many subsidiaries of Recycling Industries Inc. (including Jacobson Metal Co., of Chesapeake, Virginia and Peanut City Iron & Metal Co. Inc. of Suffolk, Virginia) closed down and left hundreds of employees jobless (37). In January 2001, security personnel at many of these subsidiaries told telephone callers that the facilities were "indefinitely closed" (38). In August 2001, Mercer Wrecking & Recycling (Trenton, New Jersey) arranged to buy Jacobson Metal Co. and Peanut City Iron & Metal Co. Inc. (39, 40). In reporting about what the Mercer president said, Recycling Today wrote: "When the deal is finalized, the scrap yards will operate under the name Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC" (39, 40). The description of the two scrap yards suggests that they were scrap yards; there is no mention of shipbreaking (39, 40).
Less than three years later, in June 2004, Sims Group Limited of Australia bought Bay Bridge Enterprises (25, 26), and a year later in June 2005 Adani Virginia, Inc. bought it (7a, 46, 92).
In recent newspaper reports, the current owner of Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC has been reported to be the Adani Group in India. For example:
1) On Jan. 6, the Oregonian's Peter Sleeth wrote that Bay Bridge "is owned by an Indian company, Adani Global" (84).
2) On Jan. 10, the Wall Street Journal's Paul Glader reported that the Adani Group based in Ahmedabad, India owns Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC; essentially the same article was also given in the Baltimore Sun on Jan. 16 (92).
3) In an article in the Jan. 17 USA Today and the Jan. 18 Christian Science Monitor, reporter Brad Knickerbocker wrote that Bay Bridge had been "recently acquired by the multinational corporation Adani Group, headquartered in India" (95).
4) On Jan. 25, the Albany Democrat-Herald's Alex Paul stated: "Bay Bridge Enterprises is owned by the Adani Group, which has its main headquarters in Ahmedabad, India" (96).
5) On Jan. 26, the Oregonian's Peter Sleeth wrote that Bay Bridge is "owned by the Adani Group, headquartered in Ahmedabad, in the state of Gujarat, India" (94).
But these reports overlook the chain of subsidiaries that currently own Bay Bridge that were listed on 4 Dec. 2005 at the Adani Group's now discontinued web site (7a). However, I downloaded Google's Cache of that web site (7a), which verifies:
* Bay Bridge Enterprises is a "wholly owned subsidiary" of Adani Virginia Inc. USA
* Adani Virginia Inc. USA is a "100% subsidiary of Adani Global FZE, Dubai" in the United Arab Emirates
* Adani Global FZE is an "offshore company" and is "a wholly owned subsidiary company of Adani Global Limited, Mauritius"
* Adani Global Limited, Mauritius is "a wholly owned subsidiary company of Adani Exports Limited."
According to Adani's web site (7b): "Adani Exports Ltd. (AEL) is the flagship company of The Adani Group and is actively involved in the Global Trading Business. With its head office in Ahmedabad, India, AEL has extended its activities across the globe." The Adani Group's Vision is to be "globally competitive" and "India focused" (8). A Google search for "Adani Group" revealed over 11,000 entries.
The Economy and Transnational Issues sections of the CIA World Factbook (10) indicate:
1) the United Arab Emirates "is a drug transshipment point for traffickers given its proximity to Southwest Asian drug producing countries; the UAE's position as a major financial center makes it vulnerable to money laundering; anti-money-laundering controls improving."
2) Mauritius (an island in the Indian Ocean east of Madagascar) "has attracted more than 9,000 offshore entities"; it is also a: "minor consumer and transshipment point for heroin from South Asia; small amounts of cannabis produced and consumed locally; significant offshore financial industry creates potential for money laundering, but corruption levels are relatively low and the government appears generally to be committed to regulating its banking industry."
Why is there such a chain of subsidiary owners across the world? It appears that this operation is not accountable to any one country. Could liability for a large accident by Bay Bridge Enterprises Limited Liability Company be effectively avoided through such a chain of subsidiary ownerships? What chance would an Oregon or Washington port have of collecting damages from Adani Global FZE, Dubai or Adani Global Limited, Mauritius or the headquarters company, Adani Exports Ltd.?
The history of Bay Bridge Enterprises as a shipbreaking firm seems short and unstable, since it has been bought twice since 2001.
Additionally, the Wall Street Journal's Paul Glader wrote on 10 January 2006 that Adani paid less than $10 million for Bay Bridge and that (92):
"Bay Bridge operates from a small construction trailer on a football-field-long muddy finger of land extending from an industrial section of Chesapeake into the Elizabeth River."
Current operations from "a small construction trailer" do not suggest stability.
The self-description of Adani Group's Team is intriguing (9):
"The Adani Group's corporate ideology originates from the calculated adventurism of Gautam Adani, the group chairman. His daredevil sense of enterprise was the guiding spirit behind the rise of the Adani Group from a Rs 2 crore unit to a Rs 13,500-crore behemoth in just over a decade. With his brothers Rajesh Adani and Vasant Adani, he makes a dynamic trio of corporate generals. The four other director of Adani Exports Limited, Shri Jay Shah, Shri C R Shah, Dr. Pravin Shah and Dr. A C Shah, complement the team with their industrial expertise."
Note that I found this description on 26 Nov. 2005 on Adani's web site, but that they had later deleted it; however, I was able to find a Google Cache copy of their file that I have made available (9).
Is the chain of subsidiary owners of Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC being overlooked or is the Adani Group trying to hide this chain? I do not know. Perhaps the reporters did not ask if there was a chain of subsidiary owners and just assumed that the Adani Group in India is the owner. I do know that the Adani Group deleted their web page that easily showed these subsidiaries (7a). Adani did so since Bay Bridge started trying to have a shipbreaking facility in Newport, which is when this chain of subsidiaries became an issue on my web page and later on an Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition's web page. Now, only someone who knows about this chain of subsidiaries would know to look for them, so it is not surprising that reporters are not reporting the chain of subsidiary owners.
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The News-Times' Joel Gallob (68) reports that Ben White, the senior business development manager for the City of Chesapeake, "only has good things to say about the company" and that White said "they have been a very good addition to our business community." White notes that Bay Bridge is sited along "a very, very industrial waterfront, and it includes the big Norfolk Naval shipyard."
I have found little about the history of Environmental Recycling Systems and nothing about its experience with shipbreaking in the United States. It is not listed as one of the "active" shipbreaking companies by OSHA for MARAD or Navy ships (section XI in 23), and it was also not invited by MARAD to bid for ships to scrap in December 2005 (159, 160). In 2004 and 2005, it had bid to scrap all MARAD ships at Environmental Recycling Systems' facilities in Turkey and Mexico (130). G. Dennis Vaughan, a retired Navy rear admiral, said in February 2006 that he had entered the ship recycling business two years previously (131). A July 2005 article stated (130):
"Environmental Recycling Systems is a shipyard near the Aegean Sea in Aliaga, Turkey, and has a coalition of 29 additional yards interested in taking American ships. Dismantling ships in developing countries is cheaper because of lower labor costs and high demand for the ships' metal, boilers and generators, said Vaughan, a retired Navy rear admiral. Vaughan would not disclose the exact locations of the Mexican shipyards in the proposal, other than saying they were on the country's east and west coasts. Vaughan said that shipyards in Turkey and Mexico should not be compared to those in India and Bangladesh, where concerns about deplorable work and environmental conditions in the 1990s caused a global outcry. Shipyard workers for Environmental Recycling Systems wear protective clothing, including steel-tipped shoes and hardhats, and hazardous materials will be handled according to EPA standards, Vaughan said."
In February 2006, Environmental Recycling Systems proposed to build graving drydocks in Coos Bay to scrap ships.
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International Shipbreaking Limited, LLC (ISL) is located in Brownsville, Texas and was incorporated in 1995 (http://www.shiprecycling.com/prfile.html, 196). It can scrap ships for both the Navy and MARAD (section XI in 23) and has received a contract to scrap a MARAD ship at Suisun Bay, California (48). It scraps ships in-water in slips (e.g., S-Photo 1 and S-Photo 2). Its history is described and photos are given in a Fortune Small Business article in October 2004 (155). The director of the National Environmental Education and Training Center had worked with several shipbreaking firms and stated in the October 2004 article (155) that ISL has:
"a better operation than any other contractors at this point."
As of 15 March 2005, ISL is the only shipbreaking company of MARAD's ships that I could find with a web page (http://www.shiprecycling.com/about.html). Their web page includes a "Company Video" with some shots of in-water shipbreaking at their site and their perspectives on shipbreaking. Their 1998 letter to the U.S. Intragency Panel on Ship Scrapping is also informative (196). One of the advantages to shipbreaking in Brownsville is a "favorable climate for year round scrapping operations" (196).
Some photos of ISL workers not in the Fortune Small Business article include W-Photo 1 and W-Photo 4. I also have two of the photos from the article at W-Photo 6. According to OSHA "Inspection Detail" information, International Shipbreaking Limited is nonunion (see 44).
The frequency of inspections of ISL by OSHA and the EPA are also available.
Cascade General in Portland has graving drydocks in Portland and has a nonexclusive contract to dismantle ships with International Shipbreaking Ltd, of Brownsville, Texas (85, 91).
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Esco Marine is located in Brownsville, Texas. It can scrap ships for MARAD (section XI in 23) and has received a contract to scrap a MARAD ship at Suisun Bay, California (48).
In 2005, Richard Jaross was president of Esco Marine (28). He has been associated with several shipbreaking firms (28, 34). For one MARAD ship, he was caught selling ballast that belonged to the U.S. Government and pocketing the proceeds (34). At a shipbreaking venture in Los Angeles, he left his partner with an unfinished scrapping job after receiving complaints from OSHA and state investigators about serious safety and environmental violations (34). Jaross then worked at a Baltimore shipbreaking firm and attempted to set up a rival yard, but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers caught him illegally filling part of the harbor (34). In 1994, he set up what he said would be a "model" shipbreaking yard (Sigma Recycling) in North Carolina, but the State of North Carolina closed it down in 1996 after a worker was killed, a minesweeper sank, and asbestos, oil, and lead contaminated the site; 12 ships were confiscated, and it took nearly seven years to clean up the site (28, 33, 34). In December 1997, Jaross said he was out of the shipbreaking business and was selling used clothes to Africa (34). The Baltimore Sun investigative report stated in 1997 (34):
"Those who have dealt with Jaross are familiar with the pattern. 'He moves in, bends the rules to the extent possible, then just about the time the federal and state regulators realize there is a problem, he's finished scrapping the ship or he just takes off,' said David Heeter, a North Carolina assistant attorney general."
According to OSHA "Inspection Detail" information, Esco Marine is nonunion (see 44). The frequency of inspections of Esco Marine by OSHA and the EPA are also available.
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Environmental Recycling Systems has proposed to take all U.S. Maritime (MARAD) ships from MARAD's Virginia, Texas, and California fleets and scrap them at Environmental Recycling Systems' facilities in Turkey and Mexico.
Bay Bridge's parent company (the India-headquartered Adani Group) has a joint venture (Gujarat Adani Ports) with the Gujarat state government in India to run Mundra port and is also planning to enter the shipbuilding, ship repair and shipbreaking business, but they are planning to have it in a "closed environment," so that it would not be like the nearby, infamous shipbreaking yards at Alang (97, 98).
The Christian Science Monitor's Brad Knickerbocker reported that the Adani Group had corporate connections to the world's largest shipbreaking yard on the coast of India (95). I have not found confirmation of such connections. On Jan. 29, I emailed Brad Knickerbocker at the email contact provided by the Christian Science Monitor for more information, but, as of April 16, I have not received a response.
Getting and keeping steady, family-wage jobs depends upon a stable shipbreaking company, a stable steel market, and a continuing supply of ships to scrap. However, the shipbreaking industry is known for instability, fluctuating scrap steel prices, and unsteady government contracts for ships to scrap. Currently, scrap steel prices are at a high, so it is very possible that they will drop and when they do so, it is predictable that companies will lose money and layoff workers. Accordingly, it is predictable that there will be periodic layoffs. It is also doubtful that there will be enough ships to scrap for "generations" as has been claimed.
With the frequent changes in ownership of some shipbreaking companies (e.g., Bay Bridge Enterprises), it would not be surprising if wages or benefits (especially pensions) were trimmed. Further, there is competition to scrap MARAD ships, so wages and benefits may also be reduced to be competitive with other shipbreaking companies. For example, Cascade General shipyards in Portland bid in 1999 to recycle a Navy frigate, but International Shipbreaking's bid was much lower and won the contract (189). Cascade General's family wage jobs average $20-22/hour (85, 204), but Brownsville shipbreakers pay much less (see below). Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC and Brownsville shipbreakers are nonunion, so workers would not be protected by a contract if their wages and benefits are reduced or cut. Peter Sleeth of the Oregonian wrote (42):
"No West Coast facility exists for scrapping such ships. Dunavant [president and CEO of Bay Bridge Enterprises] said labor costs are too high in the San Francisco Bay Area, making the Northwest the target for his company and competitors. 'Those people were just going to gouge us to death to do the work down there,' he said of California."
In Brownsville, Texas ship salvage yards in 2005, the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper reported that workers earned about $7 per hour, they did not receive health benefits, few laborers spoke English, and as many as half of workers lived in Mexico and commuted to Brownsville under various labor programs (28). International Shipbreaking Ltd. in Brownsville was reported to "have no problem getting workers who work hard at $7.50 an hour" (204). A supervisor of more than 120 laborers earned only $40,000 in 2005 (28). A very large labor pool is available to Brownsville ship recyclers as shipyard workers in Mexico earn only about $50 a week, but they can make much more in Brownsville (28).
In 2002 at the Bay Bridge facility in Virginia, Harper reported that most of the laborers were "young Hispanic men making about $10 an hour" (5), and in 2006, the Wall Street Journal's Paul Glader reported that "half the laborers at Bay Bridge are Hispanic, and most start at $8.50 an hour" (92).
In their guide for ship scrapping, the EPA notes that "it is common that supervisors are bilingual because some workers are not able to speak English" (p. A-3 in 22).
A shipbreaking company may claim that it will bring many jobs and pay family-wages, but there is evidence that the number of steady, long-term jobs may be less than claimed and that wages may also be lower than reported. Claims about jobs and wages need to be carefully examined. It is prudent to not just accept claims that are made by proponents or opponents.
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It is predictable that there will be spurts of employment at a ship recycling company followed by layoffs because the price of scrap steel varies, an irregular supply of ships, and uncertain government funding. For example, scrap steel prices dropped during 1997-1999, and International Shipbreaking, Ltd in Brownsville, Texas reduced staff from 170 to 15 workers (155). A 2001 National Defense Magazine article (194) wrote that International Shipbreaking "laid off 85 people for five months and now only got half of them back, because there was no additional funding for the ships."
Further, after winning a government contract to scrap a ship in 2000, Baltimore Marine Industries indicated that they would be able to employ 40-60 workers for 3-4 months and "will recall idle workers" (191). In 2003, Bay Bridge Enterprises planned to hire 50-60 more people after winning a contract (4).
In 2004, MARAD awarded three ships to All Star Metals of Brownsville, and the Brownville Herald's Gilberto Salinas wrote (193):
"All Star Metals received three vessels for dismantling and the company owner says it will more than double it's current workforce in the next few months. '(This) will allow us as employers to add more employees to our company because of the detailed work that is involved in dismantling a ship,' said Nikhil Shah, of All Star Metals. 'With more awards to come, we hope to retain the current and new employees and train them to move up in the company.' "
In 2004, MARAD also awarded two ships to North American Ship Recycling (Baltimore, Maryland), and their company vice-president predicted that this would create 40-50 jobs (32).
In a March 2005 article, Scott Harper wrote about MARAD's contracts to scrap ships by Brownsville shipbreaking yards (28):
"While the federal contracts have come in bunches recently, they also have come in awkward spurts. So much so that yard executives say they have had to lay off employees while waiting for paperwork to clear in Washington and for more ships to arrive from Virginia."
In September 2005, the Washington Post reported that Bay Bridge's Mike Dunavant said that they "hired about 30 laborers and other staff members to handle the additional work this summer" after getting the contract to dismantle two MARAD ships (111).
Layoffs are hard on the employees without work. But layoffs or the threat of layoffs are also difficult for ship recycling companies because they cannot keep a trained workforce of good workers (e.g., 191, 194). They would lose good workers to employers who have more stable employment. Thus, when another ship becomes available, the company will have to hire more workers, many of whom may need to be trained.
At the Dec. 6 public meeting in Newport, Bay Bridge President and CEO Mike Dunavant was reported to have said (76):
"Bay Bridge has never laid off anybody."
On Jan. 10, the Wall Street Journal reported that (92):
"Adani had more than doubled the number of workers at Bay Bridge to 93 since acquiring it."
However, environmental subcontractor Clean Venture hired 45 employees to work at Bay Bridge by March 2004 (6). If there were less than 47 (93/2=46.5) employees at Bay Bridge prior to June 2005, and there were no layoffs, then did Bay Bridge only have one employee, Mike Dunavant, prior to June 2005?
There are other ways to reduce the number of employees working at the Bay Bridge site without Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC laying off anyone. Since Bay Bridge's environmental subcontractor Clean Venture hired 45 employees (6), wouldn't Clean Venture also do the layoffs? In November 2005, MARAD noted that there was a "tank contractor" at Bay Bridge (p. 6 of 167), wouldn't it rather than Bay Bridge do the hiring and firing of employees for tank cleaning? If the subcontractors did the hiring and firing, then Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC could, indeed, technically not layoff anyone when there was not enough work. Other ways to reduce the workforce without layoffs include having "on call" employees (who may have to quit if they are not called to work enough) or reducing the number of hours of employees to the point that employees have to quit and find other work.
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Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC Proposal for Newport (Yaquina Bay)
On 18 November 2005, the Newport News-Times' Gail Kimberling reported about Bay Bridge's President and CEO Mike Dunavant (1):
"Dunavant added he expects the company to employ 40 to 50 workers 'right away,' and just five families will be relocating from Virginia to work at the Newport site. 'The rest of the workers - 100 to 125 in the next two years - will all come from Oregon,' he said."
The Bay Bridge "Fact Sheet" stated (46):
"Bay Bridge West plans to have up to 125 employees at full strength within two years."
At the 6 Dec. 2005 public meeting in Newport, Neil Henning testified that "an economist with the Oregon Economic and Community Development Department has calculated that you get two jobs" in other industries "for every one job in this kind of industry" (76). He is on the Board of Directors for the Greater Newport Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce, Port officials, and the City of Newport "wooed" Bay Bridge to Newport (1, 2). Pat Ruddiman wrote two apparently identical letters to the Newport News-Times indicating that because of the 2 jobs created for each job brought by Bay Bridge, Bay Bridge's arrival could result in 375 jobs ([125 by Bay Bridge] + [125 X 2 jobs])(112).
However, the Wall Street Journal's Paul Glader (92) wrote on 10 January 2006 that Adani "had more than doubled the number of workers at Bay Bridge to 93" since acquiring it in June 2005. One wonders how realistic Bay Bridge's claims of bringing 100-125 workers to Newport are when it did not have 100 employees in Virginia and that it had less than 47 (i.e., 93/2=46.5) prior to last June. Further, the increase in employees since Adani purchased Bay Bridge may be related to an influx of two ships to scrap (111), not a change in management, since shipbreaking companies hire when they have ships. Further, Bay Bridge Enterprises was formed in 2001 and has been sold twice since then, so Bay Bridge does not have a long-term record of stability to suggest that they could really bring many steady jobs. Cycles in scrap steel prices and government contracts could be predicted to result in periodic layoffs and boom and bust cycles of instability that would make the maintenance of 100 or more new jobs doubtful.
Proposed Mare Island Shipbreaking Facility
In July 2005, former Navy commander Gary Whitney of Allied Defense Recycling LLC proposed opening the drydocks at the former naval shipyard at Mare Island (which is near Suisun Bay) to scrap MARAD ships at Suisun Bay and create jobs for "more than 100 workers" with "someday hundreds more" (125, 128).
Two Proposed Coos Bay Shipbreaking Companies
Two shipbreaking companies have made proposals for shipbreaking at Coos Bay, but details about the jobs they propose to bring were not given in the Feb. 17 Coos Bay World article by Elise Hamner (131).
Concluding Remarks about the Number of Jobs
It is easy for a shipbreaking company to claim that it will bring many jobs, and, at least in Newport, many people and organizations unquestionably believed the maximum number suggested as possible. At the Dec. 6 public meeting, Doug Hunt (President of the Yaquina Bay Economic Foundation), Marie Jones (Community Services Consortium), Pat Rudiman, and Neil Henning spoke in favor of the proposed lease because it would bring jobs (76), and I also saw Phil Hutchinson (Newport Chamber of Commerce) testify in favor of the proposal (also see 82). Did any of them prudently question the number of jobs or the wages that Bay Bridge said they would pay?
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The only company for which I have found information about their proposed wages along the West Coast is Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC. One of the reasons that Bay Bridge said they were not interested in doing ship dismantling in Oregon rather than in California was because labor costs were too high in California (42, 82). Bay Bridge is nonunion.
On 18 November 2005, the Newport News-Times' Gail Kimberling reported about Bay Bridge's President and CEO Mike Dunavant's proposal for a Newport ship dismantling facility (1):
"Wages, he continued, will range from $10 to $30 an hour with full benefits and a retirement plan."
The Bay Bridge "Fact Sheet" for Newport stated (46):
"The Bay Bridge jobs will be family-wage jobs ranging from $10 per hour for some positions all the way to $30 or $40 per hour, depending on skills required. In addition, Bay Bridge will provide full employee health benefits coverage, including vision and dental and a 401K retirement plan."
The Bay Bridge's "Questions and Answers" stated (45):
"Wages will range from $10 up to $30 or even $40 per hour, based on job type and skill level. Bay Bridge will also provide full health benefits, including vision and dental, and a 401k match retirement plan for employees."
In contrast, the Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner reported about the jobs that Mike Dunavant's Bay Bridge proposed for Newport (82):
"Wages could range from $8 to $10 an hour for inexperienced workers, on up to $30 for highly experienced employees. Benefits would be included. And, Dunavant said, almost all workers would be hired locally."
The Wall Street Journal's Paul Glader (92) wrote that workers at Bay Bridge in Virginia started at $8.50 per hour (92).
Bay Bridge's West Coast project manager Marc McPherson told the High Country News' Elizabeth Grossman that the lower-paying jobs are for "entry-level, unskilled positions, often held by student workers in summer" (153).
Bay Bridge's Mike Dunavant was reported to have said that the average salary of their employees is $40,000 per year, and "there is usually overtime" (76). A worker earning $20/hour for a 40 hour week with no overtime who works 52 weeks per year would earn $41,600, which suggests that the average wage at Bay Bridge is less than $20 per hour.
The lure of good jobs is very enticing. However, it has not been stated how many jobs will be $10-$15 and, as pointed out by Joanne Barton, $10-15 per hour is not a family wage (76).
Besides questions about differences in wages that have been claimed, there are also other questions that need to be independently asked and answered. Are Bay Bridge's wage claims only for its employees and not for its subcontractors? Does Bay Bridge Enterprises have any control over the wages of its subcontractors? Can the subcontractors pay minimum wage? In 2004, Bay Bridge had at least one subcontractor (New Jersey-based environmental subcontractor, Clean Venture) to dismantle MARAD ships (6, 129), and, in November 2005, MARAD noted that there was a "tank contractor" at Bay Bridge (p. 6 of 167).
Another question is if a West Coast ship recycling company pays an average of $20/hour with benefits, will it be able to compete with Brownsville ship recyclers that pay much less? If not, it is predictable that it is more likely to have periodic layoffs than more competitive ship recycling companies.
Will people and governments exercise due diligence in questioning claims about wages by a shipbreaking company and its subcontractor(s)?
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According to OSHA "Inspection Detail" information for each, Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia and All Star Metals LLC, Esco Marine, International Shipbreaking Limited, and Marine Metals in Brownsville, Texas are nonunion (see 44).
Consequently, West Coast shipbreaking jobs may also be nonunion.
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Concerns have been raised at the Port of Newport's Nov. 22 Board Meeting and Dec. 6 public meeting that jobs may be lost or there may be monetary losses in Newport as a consequence of the Bay Bridge facility. For example, Peter Heisler noted that Bay Bridge may bring 100 jobs but that it may threaten many more jobs in scientific research, fishing and tourism (76). There are four main areas of concern:
1) David Jincks, a former Port Commissioner and president of Midwater Trawlers Cooperative (a cooperative for deepwater commercial fishermen that fish along the Oregon and/or Alaska coasts), has pointed out that there is already limited space for their group near the Port's International Terminal, and this problem will be aggravated if Bay Bridge uses the space next to them (2, 76)--see Figure 1 map. Jincks reported that this cooperative brings about $16 million per year into Newport, and the fleet could go elsewhere, so Newport could lose millions of dollars per year (2, 76).
2) Some of the 340 jobs at the OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center (HMSC) and some of the 30-50 jobs at the Oregon Coast Aquarium may be lost because both facilities need uncontaminated water (76). The HMSC has a $34 million research budget (76). Former HMSC Director Lavern Weber testified that the HMSC "could easily lose 100 jobs" if water quality was impaired (76).
3) Some tourism jobs may be lost because scrapping ships would diminish the aesthetic quality of Yaquina Bay. Jay Moeller, who has worked his whole life in the tourism industry, noted that "Anything that impedes the visual scenery is not good for tourism" (76). However, the Port of Newport's "Questions and Answers" about Bay Bridge (45) states:
"In fact, Bay Bridge will likely help tourism in some ways. The vessels themselves provide a visual curiosity and attraction to the general public--additional waterfront 'flavor' for visitors and residents alike. There are dozens and dozens of groups of merchant marine veterans, former shipmates who frequently travel to visit their old ships for nostalgic reasons, prior to scrapping. Many visitors also appreciate experiencing a working waterfront, since there are so few left in the nation. The opportunity to visit a working waterfront that includes fishing, sightseeing, marine life, and marine work is a positive benefit for visitors. Then there are the scores of federal and state agency employees who will be regularly visiting to monitor the site--which also helps the hospitality industry."Tourists do visit the Newport Bayfront to enjoy a working bayfront as well as tourist shops, but the Newport Bayfront is over 0.5 mile from the proposed Bay Bridge site and is disconnected from it, so tourists will not be able to walk to Bay Bridge. Further, the Port of Newport has not encouraged tourists to come to the International Terminal area where Bay Bridge would be sited, so Bay Bridge may attract former shipmates, but it seems doubtful that they will attract ordinary tourists or that tourists would even be allowed in the shipbreaking area. Further, OSHA and Virginia DEQ did not monitor Bay Bridge's Virginia site as often as Bay Bridge has reported, so the increase in tourism from government monitors may be minimal, especially since the governmental monitors such as for OSHA may also be monitoring other sites in Newport at Yaquina Bay as well. They may not be coming exclusively for Bay Bridge.
4) The values of nearby homes could diminish because shipbreaking is noisy and unsightly as Mike Becker, spokesman for the Yaquina Heights Homeowners Association, has suggested (2, 74); also see Aesthetic Concerns. Bay Bridge's Dunavant counters that homes near their Virginia site have increased in value 23% over the last three years (35), which would be an average of 7.7% per year. But these homes would have actually declined in value relative to home prices elsewhere in the greater "Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News" area in Virginia-North Carolina that increased an average of 10.5% per year during the past 10 years and an average of 18.8% per year during the two years from the second quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of 2005 (p. 5 and 6 in 77).
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Click to see photos of shipbreaking workers
Poor working conditions at U.S. shipbreakers were reported in the 1997 Baltimore Sun's Pulitzer prize investigative reporting series (e.g., 33, 34, 151). For example (33):
"Workers, mostly Mexicans, often have to pay kickbacks to get their jobs and are sometimes cheated of their pay. Unable to speak English or read warning signs, they have no one to turn to with complaints. 'They look for us first because we don't know the law,' says Juan Chavez. 'If the boss or foreman says you have to do something, what can we do?' "and "A yearlong investigation by The Sun has found" (33):
"The mishandling of asbestos was so serious that it led to federal convictions for Seawitch Salvage and its owner, Kerry L. Ellis Sr., last May. Workers testified during the trial that Ellis had repeatedly assured them that they weren't being exposed to asbestos. They were worried, they said, but feared losing their jobs if they complained about the unsafe practices."
In 2002, the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote (5):
"On a recent morning at Bay Bridge Enterprises, on the Elizabeth River [in Virginia], crews wearing respirators and protective suits were scraping lead paint, hustling to meet an April completion deadline. 'You basically have to remove anything loose -- paint chips, floor tiles, you name it,'' said Tim Mullane, operations manager at the Chesapeake yard. The workers, mostly young Hispanic men making about $10 an hour, were using industrial vacuums to suck up the lead chips. The paint chips will be packaged later for out-of-state disposal. Nearby, on rutted shoreline, dumpsters are stuffed with metal ducts, pipes, engine parts, gauges and dials. Each will be checked for toxic and radioactive levels before appropriate disposal, said Rich Lodgek, the yard's environmental health and safety officer."
In 2004, the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote about Bay Bridge's in-water shipbreaking with its New Jersey-based environmental subcontractor, Clean Venture, to dismantle "ghost" ships for the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD)(6):
"PCBs and asbestos are just two of the toxic materials stuffed inside the old ships. PCBs (short for polychlorinated biphenyls) are thought to cause cancer and were used in wiring and gauges.
"Asbestos, also carcinogenic, was wrapped around pipes and mixed into floor tiles and walls, as a flame retardant.
"The wastes are being yanked from the ships, wire by wire, tile by tile, by teams of workers who wear respirators and plastic, protective suits. Dunavant said Clean Venture has hired about 45 workers, most of them local, to complete the dirty, hard job.
"After they finish their shifts, the laborers must remove their coveralls and wash off in a decontamination trailer, built inside a fenced-in square along the docks. Warning signs and safety reminders are fastened to the shiny chain-link fence. A guard with a clipboard and red flag controls access.
"Clarence LaMora, operations manager for Clean Venture, described how the hazardous wastes are to be handled: They are double-bagged, tied and stored away from the docks in separate cargo containers.
"Once the metal containers are full, trucks haul them to certified waste sites on the East Coast. Their weights, dates of removal and destinations are logged onto reams of records, which government inspectors can easily check.
"The asbestos is going to a special landfill in King and Queen County in Eastern Virginia. Lead-paint chips, vacuumed from decks and steel sidings, are being taken to a hazardous-waste landfill in Pennsylvania. The PCBs are going to a toxic dump in New York, LaMora said."
In 2006, the Wall Street Journal's Paul Glader wrote (92) about shipbreaking operations at Bay Bridge Enterprises:
"At Bay Bridge, workers in protective suits and respirators first drain oil and remove hazardous materials such as asbestos-laden insulation and cables coated with polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs. They then rip out copper plumbing, metal bunks and lavatory appliances. Taking apart the ship itself usually starts at the top, with workers using blowtorches to cut the hull into removable chunks. Shipbreakers must consider the weight and balance of a ship as they do this, to make sure the ship doesn't tip from side to side during the demolition process, potentially injuring workers.
"On a recent day, Sheldon 'Patrick' Dass and other workers were down inside the Sunbird with hand torches, slicing up rusty file cabinets, piping, sinks, beds and metal walls. 'You've got to know what you are cutting,' says Operations Manager Denson Spence, 47, who often joins the men in cutting up the ships. 'You don't want to cut the wrong thing.' Platforms could collapse, a pipe leading to a tank could explode or a cut below water level could cause water to gush in. ... When the work day was done, the men headed for a special locker room in a 'decon' trailer in a fenced-off area. They decontaminated their work clothes by placing their white, disposable plastic suits in a sealed bin and their cotton work uniforms in a hamper to be washed. They showered and scrubbed with industrial soaps. Half the laborers at Bay Bridge are Hispanic, and most start at $8.50 an hour."
See W-Photo 5 for a photo of a Bay Bridge Enterprises worker wearing protective gear and a respirator; workers at Brownsville shipbreaking firms also wear protective gear and respirators (see W-Photo 1, W-Photo 2, W-Photo 3, W-Photo 4, and W-Photo 6a).
Because of work conditions, there are concerns about worker safety at shipbreaking companies.
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(See photos of shipbreaking workers.)
Given the working conditions, shipbreaking is expected to have short-term safety concerns as well as long-term concerns from exposure to toxic materials unless there is adequate training, preventative measures, and protective clothing and equipment such as respirators. OSHA is trying to reduce workplace hazards for shipbreaking (23).
In 1997, the Baltimore Sun's Pulitzer prize investigative reporting series pointed out safety problems at some U.S. shipbreaker companies (e.g., 33, 151). In 2005, OSHA continued its National Emphasis Program on shipbreaking because of the "continuing high incidence of injuries and illnesses related to shipbreaking operations" (section XII in 23). In 2005, the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper reports that U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) statistics indicate that shipbreaking is about two times as dangerous as construction work (28). In 2006, the Wall Street Journal's Paul Glader wrote (92) about shipbreaking:
"The business is also dangerous. Mr. Berry, at International Shipbreaking, says his firm, which employs mostly Hispanic workers, has experienced some fatal worker accidents in recent years. 'It can be a dangerous business,' says Mr. Berry, 'but we make it as safe as it possibly can be.' "
Although U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) inspections have often been infrequent, OSHA has often found some violations that they classed as "serious" (OSHA Table).
However, the Port of Newport's "Fact Sheet" for Bay Bridge states: "Bay Bridge has not had a time-lost worker accident in four years, since 2001, which is almost unheard of in any industry" (46). Bay Bridge's Dunavant also reported that they "have had no deaths, no lost time injuries" (72). However, Clean Venture was the main subcontractor at Bay Bridge in 2004 (6) and MARAD noted that there was a "tank contractor" at Bay Bridge in November 2005 (p. 6 of 167)--if there is a lost-time accident to a shipbreaking company's subcontractor, is it included with the company?
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Accidental fires are a risk during shipbreaking. The EPA's guide to shipbreaking (p. 7-4 of 22) notes that one source of fires is the use of cutting torches to cut apart a ship. Workers using cutting torches during shipbreaking are shown in W-Photo 1, W-Photo 3, and W-Photo 4. Because MARAD ships contain oil or fuel when they arrive for shipbreaking, these torches could cause a fire.
While one ship was being scrapped in Baltimore in 1996, no one was standing fire watch, a fire started, and for the "sixth time" the Baltimore Fire Department was called (34). A few days after that fire, another fire broke out in the same ship (34). With large industrial and shipyard areas, the Baltimore Fire Department would be expected to have the resources and trained crews to put out such fires, but what about community fire departments in the Pacific Northwest?
The News-Times Joel Gallob reported about a presentation given by Alan Sprott of Cascade General, the biggest ship repair yard on the West Coast that is located in Portland that also has done shipbreaking (106):
"Sprott recalled one fire he and his coworkers at Cascade General fought. 'It burned for 36 hours. It was scary,' he said. The fire occurred in the engine room, and, he said, 'made quite a mess.' ... Old vessels being dismantled, Sprott warned, 'will catch fire - there are flammable things on board. Most of the fires are small and are contained. And you have fire watches. But they can get away from you.' "
OSHA recognizes the safety dangers of fires during shipyard work, including during shipbreaking, and in their background to fire hazards write (105)(boldface added):
"However, firefighting on board vessels is considerably different from structural firefighting. When traditional structural firefighting techniques are used on a vessel fire, the result can be ineffective and even catastrophic. The potential is much greater for serious injury to firefighting personnel when tactics do not reflect the unique nature of firefighting on vessels. Typically, in structural firefighting, immediate steps are taken to open up the structure, vertically and horizontally, to remove smoke and heat. Hose lines are then used to attack the fire. When fighting a vessel fire, there may be little or no ability to ventilate the heat, smoke, and gases produced by a fire. One of the first steps that may be taken is to shut down ventilation systems to close off the fire's progression and starve it of oxygen. Hose lines are used to cool down surrounding metal decks and bulkheads. For large or intense structural fires, a defensive fire-fighting option is to "surround and drown." This means that hose lines are positioned outside the structure and voluminous amounts of water are applied until the fire goes out. Strategic options for vessel fires, on the other hand, are very limited and nearly always require an aggressive interior attack.
"While larger shipyards may have their own fire responders, smaller shipyards use outside fire responders, typically the local fire department. These municipal or other fire departments may have little experience in fighting fires in shipyards, especially on vessels. Proper coordination, familiarization, and training are necessary to ensure the safety of outside firefighters who respond to shipyard fires.
"Fighting vessel fires may also be more complicated than traditional firefighting because outside firefighters seldom have the opportunity to learn the layout of the vessel. ...
"Maintaining an adequate supply of air is another tactical problem for firefighting operations on ships. Firefighters are usually equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) that optimally provide a 30-minute supply, after which the compressed air bottle has to be refilled or replaced. Vessel firefighting operations can last many hours so firefighters have to be rotated frequently to resupply their SCBA and counteract fatigue.
"Vessel fires may also present a problem firefighters do not often have to think about -- introducing a large amount of water into the vessel, so much so that the vessel may become unstable and possibly capsize or sink. This potential problem may require consultation with experts, such as naval architects or U.S. Coast Guard engineers, to assure vessel stability.
"Radio communication is another complicating factor common to fighting vessel fires. Steel bulkheads and compartments in ships block or limit radio signal transmissions. ... All possible solutions to this problem involve additional personnel and delays in establishing command and control, which may increase the potential for mishaps."
The risks of firefighting would be particularly great for firefighters in small communities such as Newport. Newport has a largely voluntary firefighting crew that would require much special training and additional equipment to deal safely with fires onboard 500 ft or longer MARAD vessels. While firefighters available to Bay Bridge's Virginia facility are presumably trained and are ready for fires onboard such large ships because of other shipyards in that area, would firefighters in coastal communities be able to do so safely?
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The proposed lease by the Port of Newport to Bay Bridge Enterprises was first publicly announced in the Nov. 18 News-Times, but the article did not mention any opportunity for public input (1). The article noted that the Port and local and state officials had been discussing a lease with Bay Bridge for two months (1), but at the Dec. 20 Port Commission, Rob Halverson pointed out that the Port Commission first learned of the proposed lease in mid-October, so the Port Commission had only been dealing with the issue for about a month before it was publicly disclosed. At the Port's Nov. 22 meeting, Lincoln County Commissioner Terry Thompson urged the Port Commission to respond quickly, since big companies like to move fast (2). After some concerns about the lease were raised at the Port's Nov. 22 meeting, the Port decided to not vote on a "letter of intent" to lease the property to Bay Bridge at that meeting but to allow public written comments and questions until noon on Dec. 2, to have an "open forum" on Dec. 6, and to have a work session "with interest group representatives" on Dec. 7 (2, 3). The results of the Nov. 22 meeting were not reported in the News-Times until Nov. 26 because of the Thanksgiving holiday (2, 3), so readers on Nov. 26 only had about six days to prepare input. Other citizens did not learn of this opportunity until later. The short notice to citizens even though the Port had been negotiating with Bay Bridge for two months, the lack of citizen input into the lease before the Port had planned to vote on a "letter of intent," and the brief timeframe for public input angered many citizens (see below).
On Nov. 30, the News-Times announced that citizens concerned about the Bay Bridge facility were forming a group, Friends of Yaquina Bay Estuary, that would meet on Dec. 1 (30).
The format of the Dec. 6 "open forum" or "public meeting" (3, 52, 75) was not widely publicized, so many citizens (including myself) did not know what to expect, how to prepare, or if we would have a chance to testify. Some citizens were under the impression that it was going to be a question and answer format. Some citizens heard the day before that the meeting location had been changed from the Yaquina Yacht Club to downstairs in the Embarcadero--I do not know if other citizens showed up at the Yacht Club on Dec. 6 and left because there was no meeting there. When I arrived downstairs at the Embarcadero about 5 minutes before 6 PM on Dec. 6, it was chaotic because there was so many people. Many were standing along the sides of the room, many were standing at the back of the room, and many were also standing in the hall. An Embarcadero employee in a chef's uniform told people to crowd even closer together because there were more people standing in the hallway. I stood in the back, and it was definitely uncomfortable after standing there for a long time. Many people left before 8 PM, but many people remained standing. What I do not understand is why the "wall" partition at the back of the room was not opened up because there was another room with chairs behind the area where we were all standing. I noticed this when I accidently leaned against the back "wall" in the corner and the partition moved so I could see the other room. In any case, if the Dec. 6 meeting had been better organized by the Port with the goal of accommodating everyone who showed up, many more people could have sat, listened, and spoke.
John Baker, who facilitated the Dec. 6 meeting, said that they would go through the signup sheets for attendance and for speaking and that they would try to allow those who signed first to speak first. This would allow a fair chance for proponents and opponents. But then about the first seven people called to speak were strongly in favor of Bay Bridge. The single exception was that when "Doug Hunt" was called, two men answered--one a banker from Toledo, who was probably the person that had been planned to speak, but he deferred to the Doug Hunt who was associated with NW Steelheaders, who spoke about their concerns. The obvious chain of speakers in favor of Bay Bridge angered one member of the audience enough to rise in vocal objection. With so many citizens already upset at the Port's handling of the proposed Bay Bridge lease and so many people uncomfortable from standing, the Port's apparent choice of speakers at the start of the meeting was not soothing.
The Newport News-Times' Joel Gallob reported that "easily 250 people" attended, 52 people spoke against the project, and 18 spoke in favor (71). The large attendance at the Dec. 6 meeting and the concerns raised about public process and other issues (71, 75, 76) indicate that many people are upset at the Port's proposal and the way they have handled it.
In the Nov. 26 News-Times, it was announced that the Port would have a "work session with interest group representatives" on Dec. 7 (3), but in the Nov. 30 News-Times, the Port said this was to be a "special meeting" for "thorough consideration of all input and outstanding issues" (52). At the Dec. 6 public meeting someone asked the Port Commissioners if the Dec. 7 meeting was open, and a Port Commissioner announced it was a public meeting. On Dec. 6, I talked to several people and none of us had been invited by the Port to attend their Dec. 7 meeting, but many of us decided to attend anyway, unsure of what, if any, input we would be allowed.
At the start of the Dec. 7 meeting, the Port Commissioners announced that they would be postponing a decision (75). The audience was allowed to ask a few questions about the proposed timetable of action. Port Manager Don Mann said they would discuss the timeline at the Port's next meeting (75), which would be Dec. 20. A few people (including myself) attended the Dec. 20 Port meeting, but there was no timetable given. At the Port's Jan. 24 meeting, Port Manager Don Mann announced at the start of the meeting that negotiations between the Port and Bay Bridge had broken down because of financial reasons and the extended timeline before Bay Bridge could begin; the Port Commissioners then voted to decline Bay Bridge's proposal before public input was allowed.
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There were several newspaper articles about Bay Bridge's proposed shipbreaking facility at Newport in the Coos Bay World newspaper in December with the World's Elise Hamner doing some investigative reporting in mid-December (e.g., 80, 81, 82). A Dec. 22 Coos Bay World editorial noted that the mothballed military ships should not be taken to "any of Oregon's Bays" (140). The World's Hamner and Carl Mickelson also wrote articles about rumors of a shipbreaking facility coming to Coos Bay on Jan. 11 (141, 142). On Feb. 11, the Coos Bay World's editorial noted that the Port of Newport had made a big mistake in not involving the public sooner and that public officials at other sites where shipbreaking may occur need to give citizens the opportunity to be informed and to comment (144). Five days later, the Port of Coos Bay announced at their Feb. 16 meeting that two shipbreaking companies had proposed to operate in Coos Bay (131). One company was identified as Environmental Recycling Systems, and the other was not named (131). The Port of Coos Bay announced at that meeting that they would not be going deep into negotiations with any ship recyclers without first having a community discussion and that the Port needs more information (131). Hamner reports that the Port wants to have an open and balanced discussion of all issues and that public meetings "could start in early March" (131).
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Taxpayers may pay for a shipbreaking company through tax money given to a company to attract it. A shipbreaking company may also get tax breaks if it is located in an enterprise zone and can meet complex requirements.
According to the Nov. 18 News-Times, the Port of Newport will make about $700,000 of site preparations for Bay Bridge "that will be funded through a combination of state monies and grants" (1). The Port's "Questions and Answers" about Bay Bridge indicates that (45):
"The State of Oregon has made some job credit loans and grants available and has committed to spending Strategic Reserve dollars. For any dredging, the Port will likely access the State Marine Navigation Improvement Fund. These are some of the initial investments and sources."
The News-Times' Joel Gallob adds (150):
"The state may add $200,000 in support for the project from the state's Strategic Reserve Fund. 'That is discretionary with the governor,' explained Bob Warren, the Oregon Economic and Community Development Officer for the coast. That fund provides 'forgivable loans' the governor can waive repayment of if certain requirements are met. 'With almost any company, that's always a part of the discussion' his office has with an incoming firm, said Warren. 'It's about the only discretionary money available to help a company locate in a specific place.' "
State monies could be expected to be from taxpayers.
Bay Bridge's shipbreaking facility at Newport would have been in an enterprise zone designed to attract new businesses, which could have reduced its taxes. The taxation reduction for a new business in an enterprise zone is complicated and certain requirements need to be met, as the News-Times' Joel Gallob reports (150):
"If the port [of Newport] does sign a lease with Bay Bridge, the shipbreaking firm would certainly receive a tax exemption for three years, and probably up to five, under the enterprise zone program. The exemption would enable the company to not pay property taxes on new buildings or structures, additions to existing ones (there are none at the site now), and certain personal property, according to Art Fish. As the Business Incentives Coordinator for the Oregon Economic and Community Development Department, Fish oversees the state's enterprise zone program.
"... But Bay Bridge would have to pay property taxes on the land it would lease. Currently, the port, as a public entity, pays no property taxes on the 39 acres it leases from Hall - and since it is, under the lease, controlled by the port, neither does Hall. If Bay Bridge were to lease part of that acreage, the company, as a private entity, would have to pay taxes on it to the extent it is not exempted from doing so under the enterprise zone rules. ... In order to qualify for the tax exemption, a company has to pay a majority of its new employees - all of them when it's a new operation - 1.5 times the average county salary. In Lincoln County, that average is about $26,000, Fish said. So the average wage would have to be at least $39,000. But that wage is calculated (unlike the county average salary) by including not only salaries but also benefits. 'If these are well-paying jobs, that's not hard to meet,' Fish said, given Lincoln County's relatively low wage structure. The three-year exemption could be extended for two years, he added, with the approval of entities that are members of the zone.
"The exemption would apply to various categories of taxable property, but not all. Besides new buildings, the exemption could apply to concrete shipbreaking pads, fences, a parking lot, lighting, docks, the two-sided and roofed haul-out building, and the planned three sheds. A large crane, big enough to be effectively stationary, Fish said, 'would probably be exempt.' "
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Public officials need to set priorities and recognize that shipbreaking may hurt higher priority projects.
Many Newport citizens were angered about how it appeared that the Port tried to push through the Bay Bridge lease so quickly. It seems surprising that the Port has done this because the Port had carefully worked since at least April 2005 to build public support for its proposed $15 million bond issue in May 2006 for the International Terminal (1, 12a, 12b). The Port is also planning to do much more public relations work in the months before the election to try to get the public to vote for the bond (13). The Port's handling of the proposed lease has increased public distrust of the Port. I have heard several citizens say they will not vote for the Port's bond issue because of the way the Port has handled the Bay Bridge issue.
At the Port's Jan. 24 meeting, I heard Port Manager Don Mann urge the Port Commissioners to put off the vote until November 2006 because too much time had been spent on the Bay Bridge issue to have enough time to work on the a May ballot. But a decision was not made at the meeting about the timing of the ballot.
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Coastal ports in the Pacific Northwest compete for money to have their navigation channels dredged. For example, a topic at the February 2006 Port of Coos Bay Port Commission was (131) "how to remain a contender for dwindling federal dredging funds."
The Port of Newport also has problems getting dredging money and says that with the ship salvaging facility proposed by Bay Bridge Enterprises that the likelihood of getting federal funds for dredging "would be all but guaranteed" (1). The Port's "Questions and Answers" about Bay Bridge states that scrap metals shipped by barge or cargo ships will increase cargo tonnage shipped through the Yaquina Bay federal navigation channel and thus improve the cost-benefit ratio used to determine budgets for federal dredging (45). The federal government does not recognize fish landings as a cost-benefit (45), so fisheries landings do not help get dredging funds.
A shipbreaking facility would also be scrapping unwanted U.S. Maritime Administration ships, so the federal government would probably be very supportive of dredging.
However, the likelihood of continued dredging depends upon the stability of a shipbreaking company and the ship scrapping industry, which have a history of instability. For example, Bay Bridge has only been operational for four years. The guarantee of federal dredging funds may also only be while a shipbreaking company operates, but a drop in the price of scrap steel, a lack of government contracts, and shipbreaking competition may result in few or no ships to scrap. Consequently, the promise of long-term dredging is uncertain.
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The EPA's "Guide for Ship Scrappers" (22, especially its Appendix A) is a good guide to the complexities of ship salvage work, including toxic materials, in the United States. In many countries, there are not as many safety and environmental regulations for ship scrapping (31). The EPA notes (p. A-12 in 22) for the United States:
"Ship scrapping operations have become a concern for environmental regulators because they:
* Generate large amounts of waste, including asbestos and PCBs, that potentially pose significant environmental impacts if managed poorly, and
* Have demonstrated difficulties in complying with the environmental regulations that are applicable to their operations."
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In 2000, the EPA wrote in their guide for ship scrappers (p. A-6 in 22):
"Many of the vessels currently designated for scrapping were built in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s using what was then state-of-the-art material in their construction. Many of these materials have since been classified as hazardous, including, but are not limited to, asbestos, PCBs, lead, chromates, mercury, and cadmium. Recently, the U.S. Government ship scrapping program has come under criticism because some ship scrapping companies have violated environmental standards, worker health and safety regulations, and accepted ship scrapping practices. Some instances of illegal dumping of asbestos, PCBs, oil, lead, and chromates, as well as dangerous working conditions, have been reported in the United States."
In his statement to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2000 (see p. 6 and 8 in 73), Thomas J. Howard, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Maritime and Departmental Programs, U.S. Department of Transportation wrote about U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) disposal of their Reserve Fleets in Virginia, California (Suisun Bay), and Texas:
"OBSOLETE VESSELS POSE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
The 114 obsolete vessels currently awaiting disposal pose environmental risks because they are deteriorating, contain hazardous materials, and contain oil that could leak into the water. These vessels are literally rotting and disintegrating as they await disposal. Some vessels have deteriorated to a point where a hammer can penetrate their hulls. They contain hazardous substances such as asbestos and solid and liquid polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). If the oil from these vessels were to enter the water, immediate and potentially very expensive Federal and state action would be required."
Ship paints can also be toxic as noted on p. 6-1 of the EPA's shipbreaking guide (22):
"Paint and preservative coatings can be found on both interior and exterior surfaces of a ship. Particularly on older ships, paint may be flammable or may contain toxic compounds, such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), heavy metals (e.g., lead, barium, cadmium, chromium, and zinc), and pesticides. Lead compounds, such as red lead tetraoxide (Pb3O4) and lead chromate, have been used extensively in marine paint. In general, metal-based paints, some containing as much as 30 percent heavy metals, were intended to protect ship surfaces from corrosion due to exposure to the elements. Other paints containing pesticides, such as tributyl tin and organotin, have been used on the hulls of ships to prevent the buildup of sea organisms (e.g., bacteria, protozoa, barnacles, and algae)."
Tributylin has been mentioned as a chemical of concern for Bay Bridge operations in Newport, but Susan Mackert of the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality says that ships Bay Bridge scraps in Virginia do not have tributylin (53). I do not know if tributylin is in the exterior paint of any of the MARAD ships at Suisun Bay that would be brought to Bay Bridge's site in the Pacific Northwest for shipbreaking.
In 2004, Bay Bridge worked with its New Jersey-based environmental specialist, Clean Venture, to dismantle "ghost" ships for the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), and the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote about Bay Bridge's shipbreaking (6):
"PCBs and asbestos are just two of the toxic materials stuffed inside the old ships. PCBs (short for polychlorinated biphenyls) are thought to cause cancer and were used in wiring and gauges.
"Asbestos, also carcinogenic, was wrapped around pipes and mixed into floor tiles and walls, as a flame retardant.
"The wastes are being yanked from the ships, wire by wire, tile by tile, by teams of workers who wear respirators and plastic, protective suits. Dunavant said Clean Venture has hired about 45 workers, most of them local, to complete the dirty, hard job.
"After they finish their shifts, the laborers must remove their coveralls and wash off in a decontamination trailer, built inside a fenced-in square along the docks. Warning signs and safety reminders are fastened to the shiny chain-link fence. A guard with a clipboard and red flag controls access.
"Clarence LaMora, operations manager for Clean Venture, described how the hazardous wastes are to be handled: They are double-bagged, tied and stored away from the docks in separate cargo containers.
"Once the metal containers are full, trucks haul them to certified waste sites on the East Coast. Their weights, dates of removal and destinations are logged onto reams of records, which government inspectors can easily check.
"The asbestos is going to a special landfill in King and Queen County in Eastern Virginia. Lead-paint chips, vacuumed from decks and steel sidings, are being taken to a hazardous-waste landfill in Pennsylvania. The PCBs are going to a toxic dump in New York, LaMora said.
"The biggest environmental threats from the ships, he said, are their waste oils, stored for decades in tanks below the water line. The fuels are highly toxic, often containing heavy metals and other contaminants that have leached from the tanks. If spilled through holes in thinning hulls, the wastes could threaten waterways and wildlife, LaMora said."
The EPA (22) and OSHA (section XIII in 23) discuss handling PCBs, asbestos, lead, and other potentially hazardous materials during shipbreaking. Even bilge water can be of concern, as the EPA writes on p. 4-1 of 22 [boldface added]:
"Typically, government-owned ships received for scrapping have minimal bilge water onboard. Bilge water consists of stagnant, dirty water and other liquids, such as condensed steam, and valve and piping leaks, that are allowed to drain to the lowest inner part of a ship's hull (i.e., the bilge). Bilge water may also be found in onboard holding tanks, often referred to as oily waste holding tanks or slop tanks. Bilge water originates from many sources both when a ship is in operation and when a ship is being scrapped. It may contain pollutants, such as oil and grease, inorganic salts, and metals (e.g., arsenic, copper, chromium, lead, and mercury). When a ship is in operation, bilge water may originate from leaks and spills, steam condensate, and boiler blowdown. This drainage may include small quantities of oils, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic fluid, antifreeze, solvents, and cleaning chemicals. During ship scrapping, bilge water is created through the accumulation of rain water (because the decks are open) and the collection of water from fire lines that leak, are left open or are used to wet down compartments. Additional bilge water may be generated during asbestos removal and metal cutting activities."
Since it regularly rains in the Pacific Northwest, the creation of contaminated bilge water by rainfall during ship scrapping is of concern.
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If a company has little experience with shipbreaking, it may cause environmental contamination. The Brownsville shipbreakers have experience with shipbreaking (28), but I do not know if they have caused any contamination because of infrequent inspections that may have been inadequate to determine contamination.
In Feb. 2006, Environmental Recycling Systems proposed to do shipbreaking in drydocks in Coos Bay. In 2004-2005, this company was proposing to do shipbreaking in Turkey and Mexico. Environmental Recycling Systems is not listed as one of MARAD's six active shipbreaking firms (section XI in 23), and I have thus far been unable to find records of this company scrapping ships in the United States, so it is unclear how much experience they have for doing so in the U.S.
The report by Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper about the Bay Bridge shipbreaking facility in Virginia in March 2004 states (6) [boldface added]:
"The state [of Virginia] initially wanted Bay Bridge Enterprises to apply for an individual environmental permit for the shipbreaking, a process that could have taken months; after all, the yard has almost no experience with shipbreaking. But state officials relented after Clean Venture was hired and promised 'zero discharges' to the Elizabeth River, according to case records."
Bay Bridge's environmental experience with shipbreaking appears to come though its subcontractor, Clean Venture a New Jersey-based environmental contractor (6). If Bay Bridge proposes another shipbreaking site on the West Coast, government officials and citizens could ask about which, if any, environmental subcontractor that Bay Bridge will have.
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The News-Times' Gail Kimberling on Nov. 18 (1) and the owner (Adani Group)(7a) reported that Bay Bridge Enterprises claims that it is one of only six certified "green" shipbreaking yards in the United States. The Port of Newport's "Fact Sheet" for Bay Bridge (46) states:
"Bay Bridge Enterprises is one of six "Green Certified" salvage recyclers in the nation--even the world."
But the origin of this certification is in question, and the News-Times' Joel Gallob (2) reported on Nov. 25 that "Dunavant could only say it was the Virginia DEQ." The Virginia DEQ does not have the jurisdiction to certify "green" ship salvage yards throughout the United States and definitely not throughout the world.
Gail Kimberling's Dec. 2 article (35) report from her telephone interview with Bay Bridge President and CEO Mike Dunavant states :
"The 'green' status of Bay Bridge is a designation bestowed by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), which approves companies for salvaging and recycling the nation's ghost fleet. 'Ours cannot be anything but green because we have never had a violation,' Dunavant said."
The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) does not certify ship breaking facilities as "green"; its intent is to establish a pool of vendors and to determine if a vendor's proposal to MARAD for ship breaking is "technically acceptable" (p. 5 in 41). One of the criteria for being "technically acceptable" is for a vendor to have the capability and facilities to dispose of ships in an "environmentally sound" manner (p. 7 in 41). There is a list of six ship breaking firms in the U.S. that have are included in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of OSHA with the Department of Defense, MARAD (Department of Transportation), and the EPA (section XI in 23). Bay Bridge Enterprises, four ship breaking firms in Brownsville, Texas, and one ship breaking company in Baltimore, Maryland are the six companies listed (section XI in 23). The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality has issued one nonfine violation to each of two of the shipbreaking firms in Brownsville (28) that are among the six MARAD shipbreaking sites (section XI in 23). So being on this list does not mean there may not be environmental violations.
I have computer searched OSHA's 23 and MARAD's 41, and the word "green" is not included in those documents about shipbreaking.
I have not found any evidence that any other shipbreaking company in the U.S. is claiming to be "green certified," though Bay Bridge claims that there are five others.
Further, Richard Gutierrez of Basel Action network told the High Country News' Elizabeth Grossman that there is no government or other third-party entity that gives a "green" certification to shipbreakers (153).
In conclusion, Bay Bridge's changing story about the origin of its "green certification," and its unsubstantiated claim that it is one of six "green certified" shipbreakers in the U.S. raises questions about its credibility. If Bay Bridge tries to locate a facility in their community, government officials and citizens need to ask to see Bay Bridge's certificate for being "green."
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The 1997 Baltimore Sun Pulitzer-prize winning investigative report series (e.g., 33, 34, 151) and testimony during a 1998 U.S. Congressional Hearing (156) noted numerous, serious environmental violations for several U.S. shipbreaking companies.
In 2004, the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality had issued one nonfine violation to each of two of the shipbreaking firms in Brownsville (28) that are among the six MARAD shipbreaking sites (section XI in 23). The EPA reported no violations for these shipbreaking companies in the past 3 years, but EPA infrequently inspected the Brownsville shipbreakers and inspected them only for the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
On the other hand, Bay Bridge Enterprises' president and CEO Mike Dunavant stated (81):
"We've never been cited for environmental violations - zero."
The News-Times' Joel Gallob reports that the Virginia DEQ "had no problems" with Bay Bridge Enterprises (54). The Virginia DEQ only had "a few minor issues" with Bay Bridge that Bay Bridge were very agreeable to resolve (54) and issued no citation or warning (81). Upon request, the Virginia DEQ's Susan Mackert sent me copies of her 4 most recent reconnaissance inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises on 10 Jan. 2006, and they do not list any violations, though she gave some recommendations in her May inspection. The EPA reported no violations in the past 3 years, but the EPA only inspected Bay Bridge once in the past three years on 14 June 2004 for the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)--they did not inspect for the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Toxic Substances Act (TSCA), or other regulations that are included in p. A12-13 of the EPA's guide for ship scrapping (22). MARAD has not been forthcoming with their inspection reports of Bay Bridge Enterprises, so it is not known if they found any violations. Even if MARAD found none, questions remain about the adequacy of their inspections because MARAD's objectivity is in question.
I have not seen evidence for Bay Bridge's claim of being "green certified," and no agency has provided information that they tested water or sediment quality in slips used for shipbreaking by Bay Bridge, where contamination could be expected. Further, OSHA and Virginia DEQ inspections of Bay Bridge were not as frequent as Bay Bridge has stated. Accordingly, I am sceptical of Bay Bridge's claims, so although it appears to be true that Bay Bridge has not been cited, has Bay Bridge had any environmental violations for which they were not cited?
Is the lack of environmental violations by the Brownsville shipbreakers or Bay Bridge because they have not had any environmental incidents that resulted in contamination or is it a consequence of infrequent or incomplete inspections that did not detect incidents of contamination?
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P. E8-E11 of Appendix E of MARAD's Environmental Assessment for towing MARAD vessels across the Atlantic to salvage in England discusses issues about towing vessels and concludes that the environmental risk for towing would not be significant (114). P. E10-E11 indicates that there were no losses of approximately 173 MARAD vessels towed overseas during 1983-1994 (114). P. E8 (114) states that section 4.7.7 of the 8.5 Mb Environmental Assessment concludes:
"navigation safety will be assured through the substantial number of vessel inspections, reviews, tow approvals, and certificates that will be developed for each vessel prior to the initiation of tow activities."
However, MARAD's "Report to Congress" in 2002 indicates that there really is a risk during towing (p. 8 of 188):
"MARAD is gravely concerned about the environmental threat that currently exists with our highest risk vessels, and with the increasing threat as all obsolete vessels continue to deteriorate. The increased threat was most recently illustrated by an incident in November 2001 when one of MARAD's ships, under tow to a scrapping contractor facility in Texas, began taking on water 12 miles off Miami Beach due to a breach in the underwater hull. Rapid response and emergency repairs of more than $100,000 prevented a potential sinking, discharge of oil, and negative publicity."
Further, p. 10-13 of Needless Risk, the Basel Action Network notes that the risk of sinking, breaching, or leaching of obsolete MARAD vessels will be increased when they are towed (93). The risk is particularly great during tandem tows of two obsolete vessels by one tug because it is more difficult to control the vessels in bad weather (93).
Further, Mike Becker wrote in the Newport (Oregon) News-Times (113):
"I have spent 35 years in the marine insurance industry. Underwriters use the term "problem maximum loss" to analyze a potential catastrophe situation. Two situations come to mind, first, an accident while the vessel is under tow. There have been 2,400 accidents involving vessels under tow on the West Coast since 1980. They involve everything from sinkings to vessels being towed into everything on or adjacent to a waterway including boats, bridges and jetties. If the tow damaged the Yaquina Bay Bridge no one could provide enough insurance to cover the economic loss. Striking a jetty and sinking in the channel could easily run in excess of $50,000 based on the cost of the "New Carissa." The second and more damaging scenario, in my opinion, would be a Nov. 13th storm or a Columbus Day storm with three or four ships moored to pilings in the bay. That type of event could very well cause multiple damage within the harbor if the ships did break loose. "
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Transporting MARAD's ships from Suisun Bay to a shipbreaking site may introduce nonnative (exotic or nonindigenous) species in the ballast water of a ship or attached to the ship's hull to the shipbreaking site.
The Oregon Invasive Species Council wrote in their Frequently Asked Questions (162):
"An invasive species is a non-native species whose introduction does, or is likely to, cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health. An invasive species can be a plant, animal, or any other biologically viable species that enters an ecosystem beyond its native range. ... Invasive species cost the U.S. economy over $120 billion dollars annually. This includes the cost of control, damage to property values, health costs, and other factors. However, this cost does not consider the ecological damages caused by invasive species, which is difficult to quantify."
In 2002, the Oregon Invasive Species Council was created by Oregon State Statute (118), and the Oregon Invasive Species Action Plan was published in June 2005 (119). Consequently, the significance of invasive species in Oregon has only recently become a major issue. The Oregon Invasive Species Council (118), Oregon Invasive Species Council's Frequently Asked Questions (162), and Oregon Invasive Species Action Plan (119) web sites have information about invasive species in Oregon, though I have not found any information about invasive species that may be brought into Oregon with MARAD ships from Suisun Bay for shipbreaking.
The Aquatic Bioinvasion Research and Policy Institute (ABRPI) was established in October 2004 and is a joint initiative between Portland State University (PSU) and the Smithsonian Environmental Research Center (SERC) (120). Their web site says (120): "Its primary goal is to advance an array of collaborative and coordinated research, education and outreach activities that focus on the biological aspects of invasions in aquatic (marine and freshwater) ecosystems."
The San Francisco Estuary Institute (SFEI) also has reports about exotic (nonnative) species in Tillamook Bay, the lower Columbia River, Puget Sound, Washington State as well as in San Francisco Bay and California (123).
The April 2006 Oregon DEQ Fact Sheet (182) had a section, "Hull fouling or Invasive Species" that states:
"In terms of ship movements and invasive species, the U.S. Coast Guard has authority at the federal level and MARAD is responsible for the vessels in the reserve fleet. In Oregon, the Department of Fish and Wildlife has authority under the Wildlife Integrity Rules (OAR 635-056-0000 to 0150) to place imported wildlife species into three categories: prohibited, controlled and non-controlled. Included in all three groups are mollusks, crustaceans and fish species that may or may not be associated with these derelict ships."
The News-Times' Joel Gallob reports that Stephen Phillips of the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission is concerned about invasive species such as Chinese mitten crabs being introduced to Oregon from ballast water from San Francisco Bay (69). However, Bay Bridge's Mike Dunavant said that any ballast in the Suisun ships is very old, so nothing would be alive in it (35). But will ballast water from Suisun Bay or San Francisco Bay be added to a ship to stabilize it for its tow to an Oregon or Washington shipbreaking site?
Ian Davidson of the Aquatic Bioinvasion Research and Policy Institute is assessing species attached to ship hulls (i.e., "hull fouling") that could introduce invasive aquatic species to the lower Columbia River (121), and C. E. deRivera et al. have a report about monitoring nonindigenous (nonnative) species to West Coast National Marine Sanctuaries and National Estuarine Research Reserves (122) that would be particularly relevant to the South Slough National Estuarine Research Reserve at Coos Bay.
Knowledge about species attached to the hulls of MARAD ships moored for many years in Suisun Bay is scant. The Oregonian's Peter Sleeth reported that federal law does not require hulls to be examined, and the only source for information that he could find about what is living on the hulls of Suisun Bay ships is Gary Whitney (116). Whitney's company towed two MARAD ships from Suisun Bay to Brownsville, Texas for shipbreaking (116). Sleeth reported that Whitney indicated that these ships "have from one to four inches of marine growth on their hulls, with strands of grass as long as two feet" (116). However, former Navy commander Whitney is trying to lease the drydocks at the former Mare Island near Suisun Bay to scrap MARAD ships. Consequently, he may view any prospective shipbreaking facilities in Oregon and Washington as unwanted competition, so one may wonder if his report of hull fouling may be exaggerated to hinder or eliminate competitors.
Sleeth reports that Andrew Cohen of the San Francisco Estuary Institute, Ian Davidson of the Aquatic Bioinvasion Research and Policy Institute, and James Carlton of Williams College (who is another expert on exotic aquatic species and has studied exotic species in Coos Bay) recommend that the hulls of ships be examined before they are moved from Suisun Bay (116). Davidson suggested that they also be examined after they arrive at a shipbreaking site (116). Davidson, and Stephen Phillips of the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission suggested that the best alternative to prevent introducing invasive species would be to clean the hulls of ships before they come to Oregon (69, 116).
Bay Bridge Enterprises may or may not have a plan that they hope will solve the invasive species issue. At the Jan. 24 Port of Newport Meeting, Port Manager Don Mann stated that Bay Bridge would clean ship hulls before bringing them to Newport (124). I attended that meeting, and I believe Mann said that Bay Bridge could contract out the hull cleaning for $15,000 per ship. However, Bay Bridge's Mike Dunavant and Marc McPherson wrote on Jan. 26 that they were still looking at solutions to eliminate invasive species (99), so it is unclear if Bay Bridge believes that cleaning ship hulls is the solution or if they think that cleaning the hulls is too expensive or time-consuming.
Cleaning ship hulls may be initiated to allow shipbreaking to commence but may not be continued and/or may not prevent the introduction of invasive species. On 13 March 2006, the Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner wrote about James Carlton's March 9 presentation about invasive species at the Oregon Institute of Marine Biology (OIMB) in Charleston at the southwest end of Coos Bay (161)(boldface added):
"So for Coos Bay, scientists' best guess is that there are about 100 species that likely are not native here. For sure, they know 65 organisms are basically newcomers. Then again, he said, it's hard to analyze history, especially microscopically.
"Here, Carlton swung around his talk to the present. 'Can more species come?' Carlton asked rhetorically.
"It's hard to imagine anyone in the audience didn't know the answer. For scientific sake, Carlton explained that it's logical to assume new organisms might have a tough time getting established due to climate, water quality and habitat barriers. But there's always a lucky one and the water's getting warmer. And as to preventing newcomers to Coos Bay from the species clinging aboard the decommissioned military ships at California's Suisin [Suisun] Bay near San Francisco, that's something that will require study, Carlton said. He has characterized the ships as floating reefs, since most have been anchored there for decades.
"The fuzzy hulls could be scraped, but as the costs go up, the less likely it is to happen. Some people have speculated that the ships could be anchored in fresh water, as captains of the 18th and 19th centuries did to rid their hulls of ship worms. That too, presents unknowns. He gave a recent example. It happened when the USS Missouri was sailed from Bremerton, Wash., to Hawaii about seven years ago. The vessel was anchored in the Columbia River's freshwater near Astoria for a time to kill the hull inhabitants, but upon its arrival in Hawaii, researchers found the water hadn't been quite fresh enough. Hawaii soon had a new species."
In response to the original title of Hamner's article (161), Carlton wrote, in part (165) on March 18:
"The result of human-mediated invasions around the world has been innumerable environmental disasters, causing vast economic loss, and huge impacts to human health and survival - but these should not be subsumed under 'invasions are natural.' "
The concern about invasive species on ship hulls became a major public concern for Bay Bridge's proposed in-water shipbreaking facility at Newport and was one of the reasons why Governor Kulongoski wanted shipbreaking to be done in drydocks after the Port of Newport rejected Bay Bridge's proposal (69, 107, 116, 117).
By 17 February 2007, the Oregon State University Hatfield Marine Science Center's (HMSC) "Response to Proposed Shipbreaking in Yaquina Bay," especially their letter of Jan. 9, included concerns about "introduced species." But their response is no longer available on the Internet.
Also see Frequently Asked Questions about shipbreaking and the risk of non-native species associated with hull fouling communities by the Aquatic Bioinvasions Research and Policy Institute at Portland State University.
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At Bay Bridge's proposed Yaquina Bay site, Bay Bridge said the ship's interior would be dismantled and removed while it is in water (1, 46). Bay Bridge's President and CEO Mike Dunavant (82) indicated that:
"Workers would carve a vessel down to essentially a canoe and then drag the hull, using winches or bulldozers, onto concrete for cutting."
In Virginia, Bay Bridge cut even the hull of a ship while it was in water (Images 6, Images 7). Image 5a and particularly Image 5b show a tracked vehicle in the water with a ship without a bow in water that has been cut far beyond a "canoe."
In the U.S., most shipbreaking is done in slips, which are dredged openings in the bank of a ship channel and are generally 400-700 ft long and 100-120 ft wide at the entrance (p. A4 in 22; also see photo in 33 and p. 11-13 in 66). However, some shipbreaking is done in dry docks (p. A4 in 22), which can totally contain and treat any spills. Shipbreaking at Bay Bridge's Virginia site is done in a main slip and in a drag slip (7a, 92). Photos by the Virginia DEQ show that the main slip is not much wider than the width of a ship (Image 2) and that their drag slip is also narrow (Image 4, Image 5).
However, Bay Bridge proposed to do shipbreaking at Yaquina Bay in a very exposed site along the open Yaquina River channel and in a nearby cove (Figure 1, Figure 2). Based on Bay Bridge's map in Figure 1, the opening of the cove at Yaquina Bay is about 600 ft wide, which is considerably greater than the 100-120 ft width of U.S. shipbreaking slips listed in the EPA's guide for shipbreaking (p. A4 in 22). The Yaquina area is not protected by a breakwater and thus is very exposed to storm winds and waves. Storm winds come from a southerly direction, and storm wave heights are influenced by wind speed, duration of wind, and the fetch (i.e., the distance of open water that the wind blows over, 100). Thus, wave heights can increase at the site that Bay Bridge proposed at Yaquina Bay because of storm winds blowing across the large Idaho Flats embayment south of their site (see Figure 2). During 1998-2005, wind gusts of 60-70 mph were sometimes measured during October-March at the OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center near Bay Bridge's proposed site, and a wind gust of 51 mph was recorded in June 2000 (101).
The exposure of Bay Bridge's proposed area along the Yaquina channel and the east side of the cove also makes these sites very vulnerable to floating debris during high tides and floods. During my 12 January 2006 visit to the area, I saw a large log, dock remnants, a wooden pallet, and a buoyant tire washed alongshore or onshore above the riprap along Bay Bridge's proposed shipbreaking area.
Since Bay Bridge chose such an exposed site at Yaquina Bay, Bay Bridge may also propose to do shipbreaking at very exposed sites elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest.
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Click to enlarge: "A worker examines the viscosity of sludge he found in ship's hold"
Many of the MARAD ships at Suisun Bay are reported to "still have bunker oil, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products in their fuel and storage tanks" (115), and some of these vessels have become so deteriorated that their hulls would need to be wrapped in neoprene before they could be moved without leaking bunker oil and other petroleum by-products (115, 117).
Some obsolete U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) ships have leaked oil where they were moored in Virginia, and a MARAD spokesperson said fuels would be removed when ships were scrapped (11). Consequently, such leaks are also possible at a shipbreaking site in the Pacific Northwest. The chances of leaking increases as the number of ships increases, with Bay Bridge planning to scrap as many as 12-15 ships per year at their West Coast site (45). In Virginia, MARAD and state regulators were apparently unaware of oil sheens near MARAD ships until state regulators received an anonymous tip in 1998 (11). In 2000, the Virginia DEQ sent MARAD a violation notice about oil leaks, but MARAD responded by saying their ships were federal and "not legally subject to the regulations and penalties of the Virginia State Water Control Law" (11).
MARAD ships to be scrapped contain variable amounts of fuel or oil (see Table below). One MARAD ship arrived at Bay Bridge's site in Virginia with 170,000 gallons of diesel fuel onboard (p. 1 of the September Virginia DEQ 2005 report), and one of MARAD's five ships that Bay Bridge won the contract in 2003 to dismantle had an estimated 342 long tons (=383 tons weighing 2,000 pounds) of oil (4). While some MARAD ships had little fuel or oil, other ships to be scrapped had as much as 1,631 tons of "Oily Water," 712 tons of "Heavy [bunker oil] Fuel," 293 tons of "Diesel Fuel," or 28 tons of "Hydraulic Oil" (see Table below).
TABLE. Weights in tons of various materials onboard U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) ships at their James River fleet in Virginia that were to be sent to the United Kingdom to be scrapped. These weights were calculated from data in Caponiti, James E. (MARAD). 25 July 2003 letter to David Fellows amending notification of "Transfrontier Movement of the MARAD Fleet Notification No. USDC170603," as given on p. 18 and cited on p. 19 of 93.
N=number of ships, Ton=2,000 lbs (data were originally in tonnes [metric ton], where 1.102 tons=1 metric ton), Heavy Fuel=heavy bunker fuel oil.
-----------------------------------------------------
Oily Heavy Diesel Hydraulic
Water Fuel Fuel Oil
(tons) (tons) (tons) (tons)
-----------------------------------------------------
Ships (N) 13 7 9 8
Average Weight 264 361 134 9
Minimum Weight 1 10 1 1
Maximum Weight 1,631 712 293 28
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The EPA's ship scrapping guide (p. A-4 in 22) states:
"The removal of fuels, oils, other liquids (e.g., bilge and ballast water), and combustible materials from the ship generally occurs throughout the ship scrapping process."
Bay Bridge's President & CEO Mike Dunavant said that as part of ship dismantling, crews would pump out all old fuel and oil (4). Since ships are in water during part of Bay Bridge's shipbreaking, there is a possibility of an accidental leak into the water as a ship is moored or while fuel or oil is transferred to shore.
The Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote about his interview with Clarence LaMora, the operations manager for the environmental subcontractor Clean Ventures at Bay Bridge Enterprises' shipbreaking site in Virginia in March 2004 (6):
"The biggest environmental threats from the ships, [LaMora] said, are their waste oils, stored for decades in tanks below the water line. The fuels are highly toxic, often containing heavy metals and other contaminants that have leached from the tanks. If spilled through holes in thinning hulls, the wastes could threaten waterways and wildlife, LaMora said. One study suggested that if just two ships anchored in the James River were to spill their contents, as much as 50 miles of historic waters would be tainted, including those touching nature sanctuaries, Jamestown Island and key shellfish grounds. Earlier this month, workers were removing black oily water from dark holds within the Robert C. Conrad, a support ship built in 1962. The liquid was being pumped through a thin hose, not unlike what motorists put in their cars at gas stations, leading to a green fuel truck parked along the water. A worker sat and watched for leaks. He wore a hard hat and looked bored."
Reporter Dave Schleck wrote about subcontractor Clean Ventures' work at Bay Bridge Enterprises in May 2004 (129):
"Clean Ventures has pumped about 180,000 gallons of liquid from the ships -- mostly oily water, but some fuel too. None of it has spilled, LaMora said."
Accordingly, it is appropriate to be concerned about leaks or spills of oil, fuel, and oily water from moored MARAD ships brought to a site for shipbreaking. Leaks or spills could occur while a ship is moored or while the materials are pumped from the moored vessel. If shipbreaking was done in drydocks, then leaks or spills would be contained except while a vessel is being transported to the drydock.
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A yellow boom floating on tranquil water is visible at the end of an in-water shipbreaking slip at International Shipbreaking Limited in Brownsville in S-Photo 1 and at Bay Bridge Enterprises in BBE Image 3. Such booms can help contain floating contaminants or debris. This includes oil or oily water present in MARAD ships. The EPA's guide for shipbreaking states (p. A-4 in the EPA's 22):
"The U.S. Coast Guard requires booms around the ship to help contain any spills."
Note that it is not stated that booms will contain spills, only that they would "help" contain spills.
Bay Bridge's President and CEO Mike Dunavant told the Newport News-Times that each vessel at their proposed Yaquina Bay site would be completely surrounded by a 12-inch harbor boom "just in case, only as a precaution" (35). Bay Bridge's "Fact Sheet" also states that "all vessels will be surrounded by floating booms at all times" (p. 2 in 46). But at Bay Bridge's Virginia site, they usually but not always had a boom deployed during shipbreaking. A deployed boom was reported during Virginia DEQ reconnaissance inspections in May and September 2005 but was not noted as being present or absent during their July 2005 inspection. During the DEQ's November 2005 inspection, Bay Bridge had a boom in their drag slip, but not in their main shipbreaking slip because the boom that was "normally located behind the slip had temporarily been removed by Sims Metal to allow for the arrival of their barge"; the barge was not associated with Bay Bridge. According to the Virginia DEQ, Sims Metal owns the Bay Bridge site and sometimes dismantles barges in the main slip also used by Bay Bridge.
Unlike the protected and placid water for a boom at the end of a slip at Bay Bridge's Virginia site (Image 2), the site Bay Bridge proposed for shipbreaking at Yaquina Bay was along the main channel and in a large cove and thus very exposed. Accordingly, Bay Bridge or another shipbreaking company may propose a similarly very exposed site for shipbreaking elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest.
The effectiveness of booms used for in-water shipbreaking could be compromised by debris, waves, winds, and/or tides. On 12 January 2006, I saw and photographed debris including logs, wood pallets, and dock remnants along the shore of Bay Bridge's proposed shipbreaking site at Yaquina Bay. Waves generated by winds blowing across the large embayment to the south of Bay Bridge's proposed site at Yaquina Bay could go over booms, and Bay Bridge's booms may also be compromised by boat wakes (i.e., the proposed site was beside the channel and would be subject to boat wakes). Winds may also effect the boom if much of the boom's surface is exposed, so it may act as a sail in winds of 60 mph or more that have occurred during October-March and 50 mph winds that have occurred in June 2000 at the Hatfield Marine Science Center (101).
Further, strong tidal currents may affect booms placed around ships near the channel. In contrast to Bay Bridge's Virginia site where the Mean Tidal Range or average difference between high and low tides is only 2.8 ft, the Mean Tidal Range at Yaquina Bay's Hatfield Marine Science Center is 6.4 ft (102). Further, the difference during Portsmouth's "spring" tides is only 3.3 feet, compared to a difference of 8.3 ft between Mean Lower Low Water and Mean Higher High Water at Yaquina Bay (102). The greater tidal range at Yaquina Bay [and at many other locations in the Pacific Northwest] can lead to very strong tidal currents. For example, it is predicted that tide heights will change 10.3-12.1 ft in less than 8 hours on at least one day every month in 2006 at the Hatfield Marine Science Center (103).
A boom may be effective in trapping oil in a protected slip with one relatively narrow end and little tidal range like in Virginia, but it seems questionable how effective a boom would have been at Bay Bridge's proposed shipbreaking area at Yaquina Bay. Would it have been possible to maintain booms around Bay Bridge's ships during storms, when a combination of debris, winds, waves, and tidal currents could shift a boom and waves could overtop it which is also when accidental spills may be more likely? Would such booms become navigation hazards if their position shifts, since the proposed site at Yaquina Bay was along the main channel?
The Virginia DEQ did not monitor water quality or sediment contamination in Bay Bridge's slips (Susan Mackert and Roger Everton, Virginia DEQ, 10 January 2006 emails), so the Virginia DEQ does not have evidence whether there was or was not any spills of oil or oily water at Bay Bridge's Virginia site. The EPA has done only one test in 3 years, and the EPA has not responded to my questions about whether they tested water or sediment quality in Bay Bridge's slips.
By 17 February 2007, the Oregon State University Hatfield Marine Science Center's (HMSC) "Response to Proposed Shipbreaking in Yaquina Bay," especially their letter of Jan. 9, that included concerns about "containment" is no longer available on the Internet.
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The exterior paints on some MARAD vessels are in "poor condition" with "severe peeling and bubbling" on "nearly all weather surfaces" (p. 42-43 in 86), and some of the older MARAD ships at Siusun Bay are flaking PCB-laden paint into the water (117).
Ship paints can be toxic as noted on p. 6-1 of the EPA's shipbreaking guide (22):
"Paint and preservative coatings can be found on both interior and exterior surfaces of a ship. Particularly on older ships, paint may be flammable or may contain toxic compounds, such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), heavy metals (e.g., lead, barium, cadmium, chromium, and zinc), and pesticides. Lead compounds, such as red lead tetraoxide (Pb3O4) and lead chromate, have been used extensively in marine paint. In general, metal-based paints, some containing as much as 30 percent heavy metals, were intended to protect ship surfaces from corrosion due to exposure to the elements. Other paints containing pesticides, such as tributyl tin and organotin, have been used on the hulls of ships to prevent the buildup of sea organisms (e.g., bacteria, protozoa, barnacles, and algae)."
Tributylin has been mentioned as a chemical of concern for Bay Bridge operations in Newport, but Susan Mackert of the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality says that ships Bay Bridge scraps in Virginia do not have tributylin (53). I do not know if tributylin is in the exterior paint of any of the MARAD ships at Suisun Bay.
Paint chips could fall into the water for moored vessels awaiting in-water or drydock shipbreaking or for vessels being dismantled in slips during in-water shipbreaking. During in-water shipbreaking, paint flakes or chips that fall inside a vessel may be contained, but not those that fall off the exterior of the hull and into the water because booms around a ship during in-water shipbreaking may contain materials floating on the water but not paint chips that fall into the water and sink.
During in-water shipbreaking, hull paint could also be scraped off into the water as a ship is being winched onshore (e.g., see MARAD's Figure 2 in S-Photo 3). Bay Bridge's site drawing shows a ship being winched onshore at the northeast corner of the cove at Yaquina Bay (Figure 1) and at Bay Bridge's Virginia site heavy machinery went into the drag slip to drag part of a ship hull out of water (Image 5a and especially Image 5b).
Bay Bridge's proposed shipbreaking site at Yaquina Bay was along the channel and in an open cove subject to strong tidal currents, so paint chips and possible contamination could be pulled away from the shipbreaking site into the Bay. This may also be a concern at other sites chosen for shipbreaking.
I have not found any evidence that any governmental agency has ever tested water or sediment quality in Bay Bridge's slips in Virginia, so it is not known if paint chips or other loose toxic materials have contaminated water or sediments in their shipbreaking slips.
By 17 February 2007, the Oregon State University Hatfield Marine Science Center's (HMSC) "Response to Proposed Shipbreaking in Yaquina Bay," especially their letter of Jan. 9, that included concerns about "containment" is no longer available on the Internet.
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Click for enlargement 
The EPA's guide for shipbreaking notes that the upper decks and superstructure are cut first, followed by the main and lower decks; then the hull is pulled ashore (p. A5 in 22). Workers at Bay Bridge Enterprises (e.g., BBE Image 1) and International Shipbreaking Limited (155) carve a vessel down to a "canoe" before dragging the hull onshore; "canoe" is a shipbreaking term for the gutted hull (82, 155). It often rains in the Pacific Northwest, and this rain would collect in the "canoe." In contrast, Brownsville is a shipbreaking hub, in part, because of "tropical weather that allows for an uninterrupted work schedule" (28), which means much less rain than in the Pacific Northwest.
The EPA acknowledges the creation of bilge water during shipbreaking in their guide on p. 4-1 of 22 [boldface added]:
"Typically, government-owned ships received for scrapping have minimal bilge water onboard. Bilge water consists of stagnant, dirty water and other liquids, such as condensed steam, and valve and piping leaks, that are allowed to drain to the lowest inner part of a ship's hull (i.e., the bilge). Bilge water may also be found in onboard holding tanks, often referred to as oily waste holding tanks or slop tanks. Bilge water originates from many sources both when a ship is in operation and when a ship is being scrapped. It may contain pollutants, such as oil and grease, inorganic salts, and metals (e.g., arsenic, copper, chromium, lead, and mercury). When a ship is in operation, bilge water may originate from leaks and spills, steam condensate, and boiler blowdown. This drainage may include small quantities of oils, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic fluid, antifreeze, solvents, and cleaning chemicals. During ship scrapping, bilge water is created through the accumulation of rain water (because the decks are open) and the collection of water from fire lines that leak, are left open or are used to wet down compartments. Additional bilge water may be generated during asbestos removal and metal cutting activities."
Because the site Bay Bridge selected at Yaquina Bay site was so exposed, they or other shipbreaking companies may also select an exposed site elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest. It is predictable that strong winds would blow away tarps or other temporary shelter placed over a ship to keep rain out, so rains could create contaminated bilge water. According to Bay Bridge's "Fact Sheet" for the Port of Newport (46), wastewater (which would include bilge water) will "be pumped into tanks onshore and transported out of the area." Where will the wastewater go? To a site where it will be known as possibly contaminated and appropriately treated?
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Fires are a risk during shipbreaking. A ship fire lasted 36 hours at Cascade General in Portland and required a million gallons of water to put out (85, 106). Fortunately, the vessel was in a dry dock, so the water that would be contaminated by paint chips and other loose debris or liquids could be contained and was treated by Cascade General's water treatment facility (85, 106). If such a fire occurred at the proposed Newport Bay Bridge facility, it is predictable that part of the water used to extinguish the fire would go into Yaquina Bay and would not be contained or treated.
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Click to enlarge
The EPA's guide for shipbreaking notes that the upper decks and superstructure are cut first, followed by the main and lower decks; then the hull is pulled ashore and cut (p. A5 in 22).
At Brownsville, the hull is at least sometimes cut while it is water (W-Photo 7).
The hull is cut and the bow is also sometimes removed while a ship is in water at Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia. Bay Bridge's "Fact Sheet" for the Port of Newport states (p. 2 in 46):
"In addition, demolition will not occur in the water, but on shore in specified work areas. Only the superstructure is removed while the vessel is in the water."
Dictionary definitions of superstructure include "the structural part of a ship above the main deck" or "any construction built above the main deck of a vessel as an upward continuation of the sides."
On the other hand, Bay Bridge's President and CEO Mike Dunavant (82) stated:
"Workers would carve a vessel down to essentially a canoe and then drag the hull, using winches or bulldozers, onto concrete for cutting."
Dunavant's statement contradicts their "Fact Sheet" because if a vessel is cut down to a "canoe" ("canoe" is a shipbreaking term for the gutted hull [155]), then decks below the superstructure are also removed. A Wall Street Journal photo of shipbreaking at Bay Bridge shows that the area below the main deck has been cut and removed (BBE-Image 1).
Further, Bay Bridge spokesman Marc McPherson stated (108):
"We do everything with winches. You tug the vessel up on land, onto a concrete pad, and cut a section off."
But Bay Bridge's statements that that they drag the vessel up on land before cutting on concrete are clearly inconsistent with their actions in Virginia. Photos at Bay Bridge clearly cut the hull of a ship while it was in their shipbreaking slips (BBE-Images 6, BBE-Images 7). The whole bow of one of Bay Bridge's ships is missing while it is still in water, but it is not clear if it was cut off with torches or mechanical shears (BBE-Image 5a and especially BBE-Image 5b).
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Virginia DEQ photos of in-water shipbreaking at Bay Bridge reveal the methods that Bay Bridge used to try to catch slag during cutting of the hull of one vessel (the Shirley Lykes) while it was in water (BBE-Images 7, BBE-Image 8). The May 2005 Virginia DEQ reconnaissance inspection report of Bay Bridge notes:
"A double control system has been implemented when cutting is taking place. A crane lifts a "float" to sit directly under the area where cutting is being performed to catch slag before entering State waters (photos 5 - 6 [see BBE-Images 7a, 7b, BBE-Image 8]). An additional float is placed in the water in the same area to catch any slag that is not caught by the first float (photo 7 [see BBE-Image 7c])."
The "Floats" in these Images may be effective over the placid waters of Bay Bridge's Virginia shipbreaking slips, but it is questionable how effective they would be at an open exposed site like Bay Bridge chose at Yaquina Bay site during windy days or on days with strong storm waves, tidal currents, or boat wakes. For example, the "float" the crane holds in the air alongside the hull may blow back and forth in winds, and the "float" in the water may rock in waves.
Cutting the superstructure or the hull while the ship is in water could result in metal slag from the cutting torches going into the water. Chemicals in the metal scrap or slag could then leach into the water or sediments as noted in the EPA's guide for shipbreaking (p. 7-4 of 22).
Particulates will also be produced during torch cutting of the superstructure and hull. The EPA's guide to shipbreaking writes (p. 7-4 of 22):
"Specifically, torch cutting will generate large amounts of fumes and some or all of the following materials as particulates: manganese, nickel, chromium, iron, aluminum, asbestos, and lead."
If the in-water shipbreaking site is exposed to winds as are common along the coast of the Pacific Northwest, then those particulates could be blown overboard and fall into the water.
By 17 February 2007, the Oregon State University Hatfield Marine Science Center's (HMSC) "Response to Proposed Shipbreaking in Yaquina Bay," especially their letter of Jan. 9, that included concerns about "containment" is no longer available on the Internet.
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Click for 175% enlargement
The photo above shows a large heavy, tracked vehicle in the water of the drag slip at Bay Bridge's Virginia site. It appears that the "claw" of the vehicle may be lifting a chain or cable going from the partially dismantled ship to shore (see 400% enlargement Image 5b). Having such vehicles in the water where a vessel is winched onshore could stir up sediments, and the vehicle may also leak hydraulic and other fluids into the water.
Bay Bridge's President and CEO Mike Dunavant (82) acknowledged that such vehicles may be used in winching a vessel onshore as he stated [boldface added]:
"Workers would carve a vessel down to essentially a canoe and then drag the hull, using winches or bulldozers, onto concrete for cutting."
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Click for enlargement
Unpaved areas with scrapping near in-water shipbreaking slips are shown by MARAD (S-Photos 3) and at International Shipbreaking Limited (W-Photo 6b, S-Photo 1, S-Photo 2). Further, much of Bay Bridge's shipbreaking area is dirt, sand, or unpaved. For example, BBE Image 9 and BBE Image 10 show scrap from ships on or mixed with dirt or sand. BBE Image 8 shows that a heavy crane operated on dirt or sand. Other Virginia DEQ photos of Bay Bridge similarly show unpaved surfaces and a collapsed retaining wall along a shipbreaking slip.
Having scrap on unpaved surfaces increases the risk of soil contamination. This would be particularly true along the coast of the Pacific Northwest where strong winds and heavy rains could spread debris.
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For the Newport site, Bay Bridge President & CEO Dunavant said all hazardous wastes and scrap would be taken away by barge, truck or railroad (42). The Newport News-Times' Gail Kimberling did not mention hazardous materials during Bay Bridge's shipbreaking and reported about the proposed operation in Newport on Nov. 18 (1)(boldface added):
" 'Ghost vessels' would be towed to the Newport-based salvage yard, where initial abatement - dismantling of the ship's interior - would take place completely within the confines of the vessel. 'Everything is packaged, and taken by crane from the ship to trucks to be hauled away. Nothing is kept on site,' Dunavant said."
At the Nov. 22 Meeting of the Newport Port Commission, the News-Times reported (2):
"Dunavant said he knows there are concerns with pollution from paint chips, oils, heavy metals and other sources, but he insisted 'we're different. Every drain, we have cloth in it to catch paint chips. We take the asbestos out with a licensed professional. Everything is contained; any hazardous waste is double bagged, put in a container and taken to a landfill. Fluids - not (heavy) oil, that's been cleared out, it's mostly oily water - are sucked out by a vacuum truck,' and never reach the river."
In 2004, the Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper wrote that Bay Bridge worked with its New Jersey-based environmental subcontractor, Clean Venture, to scrap ships at Bay Bridge's Virginia site (6). A description of their onsite storage of hazardous materials (6) [boldface added]:
"Clarence LaMora, operations manager for Clean Venture, described how the hazardous wastes are to be handled: They are double-bagged, tied and stored away from the docks in separate cargo containers. Once the metal containers are full, trucks haul them to certified waste sites on the East Coast. Their weights, dates of removal and destinations are logged onto reams of records, which government inspectors can easily check. The asbestos is going to a special landfill in King and Queen County in Eastern Virginia. Lead-paint chips, vacuumed from decks and steel sidings, are being taken to a hazardous-waste landfill in Pennsylvania. The PCBs are going to a toxic dump in New York, LaMora said.
Reporter Dave Schleck wrote about Bay Bridge's operations in 2004 (129):
"Workers in protective gear remove asbestos insulation, double-bag it and put the waste in a truck container that makes weekly runs to the King and Queen County Landfill. They store wires and cables from the ships in a covered metal container inside a locked warehouse. Barrels filled with paint chips lie nearby. A raised concrete curb surrounds the hazardous-material area, a precaution to prevent spills from spreading."
There is a discrepancy between Dunavant's statement that "nothing is kept on site" and statements that hazardous materials are stored until they are shipped offsite.
Since it will take time to remove hazardous materials, it seems plausible that materials will be stored onsite at a shipbreaking site until there is enough to ship rather than have daily, partial shipments.
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There are safety and environmental concerns about shipbreaking. If done properly in drydock, and if sufficiently and independently monitored, concerns would be greatly reduced.
I urge readers to read some of the articles in the Baltimore Sun's Pulitzer Prize winning series in 1998 for investigative reporting by Will Englund and Gary Cohn about shipbreaking in the U.S. (e.g., 33, 34, 151). They reported that there was then "official indifference" about shipbreaking, and they cite many instances of inadequate U.S. government monitoring of safety and environmental concerns (33, 34, 151). Their series resulted in changes in the way that MARAD and the Navy contracts out domestic shipbreaking, but is government monitoring of domestic shipbreaking adequate today?
The Virginian-Pilot's Scott Harper article in March 2005 about shipbreaking (recycling) at Brownsville, Texas yards is informative about current shipbreaking there (28). But Harper's article does not examine the frequency and adequacy of governmental inspections, though it is noted that OSHA did not inspect 2 of the 4 shipbreaking yards (28). Harper also reported that inspections for illegally or undocumented workers appears insufficient (28).
At Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC in Virginia "half" to "most" of the workers were Hispanic in 2002 and 2005 (5, 92); it is not stated if all had legal documents. One of the 1998 Baltimore Sun articles suggests that Hispanic workers may sometimes be exploited and states (151):
"Elizondo, the union organizer, believes the shipbreaking industry flourishes here because of Washington's indifference to the Latino laborers of Brownsville. ... 'Well, let's dump this on Brownsville. Let Jose take care of it.' "
For Virginia and Texas shipbreaking companies, inspections by OSHA were often infrequent and/or were often incomplete inspections. I found no evidence to support Bay Bridge's claims that they were frequently inspected by OSHA.
In researching Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC shipbreaking in Virginia, I have discovered that the frequency and/or comprehensiveness of inspections by MARAD, the EPA, and the Virginia DEQ are also open to question. I have found no evidence that any governmental agency inspected the water or the sediments in the slips where Bay Bridge conducted their much of their ship recycling. The lack of inspections is a red-flag to communities in the Pacific Northwest considering shipbreaking because it raises questions about how sufficient inspections are. MARAD has a vested interest in getting rid of their ships, so will "they look the other way" to avoid seeing safety and environmental violations? For example, MARAD did not see the oil sheens near their ships in Virginia, and it took an anonymous tipster to point this out.
There are shortcomings in monitoring by the Oregon DEQ, ship recycling companies' self-monitoring, anonymous tipsters, and citizen groups.
In the following sections, I examine some aspects of shipbreaking monitoring because it is better to ask these questions before a shipbreaking compay arrives than afterwards and end up in a costly cleanup that includes taxpayers like shipyards at Yaquina and Coos Bays.
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In MARAD's push to fulfill statutory mandates by the U. S. Congress to dispose of obsolete ships and in response to criticism by the Government Accountability Office for not doing so quickly enough (66, 73, 149, 152), MARAD's ability to objectively monitor shipbreaking to ensure safety and environmental concerns may be compromised.
For example:
"John Jamian, deputy administrator of the U.S. Maritime Administration, which administers the disposal of the Navy's ships, told The Oregonian that he had never heard of hull fouling as a problem. He said he would have his staff check on the issue. 'To me, that is a reckless statement . . . that there is a danger of moving invasive species,' he said. 'We are very, very sensitive to the ecological systems we are working with.' Jamian noted that migratory birds can disperse exotic species in their droppings."
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MARAD has not been forthcoming about their inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia. On Jan. 6, I telephoned MARAD's Office of Environmental Activities with questions about MARAD inspections. The contact, Shannon Russell, was out, but I was asked to leave my telephone number or email address. Russell emailed me later on Jan. 6, and I emailed her questions about MARAD's inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia. The next day, Russell responded in email by asking "Are you a reporter or who do you work for?" I responded that I was a citizen, was concerned about the proposed Bay Bridge facility in Newport, Oregon, and repeated my questions. I did not receive a response. On Jan. 8, Russell was quoted in an Oregonian article as saying that MARAD desired a West Coast shipbreaking site (104), so perhaps this affected her lack of response to my questions.
On Jan. 10, I received contact information for the MARAD inspector of Bay Bridge, Zoe Washnis, and I emailed Washnis on Jan. 11 with questions about her inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia. She responded the same day that she did not have any involvement with the Newport facility and referred my email to Susan Clark, MARAD Public Affairs Officer. I responded to Washnis that I was interested in her inspections in Virginia, not in her involvement with Newport. Susan Clark responded that I needed to do a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for such information. After several attempts at trying to find out information about FOIA requests, I sent a FOIA request for 2005 MARAD inspection records at Bay Bridge on Jan. 12. MARAD FOIA Office Information Management Specialist Jeannette Riddick responded that the due date for my request would be Feb. 13, but that Bay Bridge Enterprises could delay or object to disclosing information (see p. 1 of 167). I had not heard anything about my request by Feb. 16, so I emailed Jeannette Riddick about it on Feb. 16 and did not receive a response until March 14.
On March 14, Riddick forwarded MARAD's Joel Richard's (Acting Freedom of Information Act Officer) letter indicating that they had found two documents to fulfill my Jan. 12 FOIA request for all MARAD inspection reports of Bay Bridge Enterprises in 2005 (see p. 2 of 167). The documents (13 Sept. 2005 and 3 Nov. 2005 memos from Willie Barnes, SAR Environmental Specialist) are given in p. 3-6 of 167). Note that MARAD's Definitions at its Ship Disposal Program Library (166) indicate that "contractor" is "a business entity that holds a Government contract," so, in this case, "contractor" refers to Bay Bridge Enterprises.
Highlights from the September 2005 document (p. 3-4 of 167):
Highlights from the November 2005 document (p. 5-6 of 167):
The only two 2005 MARAD inspection reports gave no indication that MARAD conducted any soil, water, or sediment tests at Bay Bridge Enterprises. MARAD's inspections appear cursory during these visits, but they did make requests to Bay Bridge as a consequence of their walk throughs (see p. 4-6 of 167). It is not clear, but the September report seems to indicate that bi-weekly meetings were then going to start--if so, were meetings less frequent before then? MARAD's main actions seemed to be reviewing Bay Bridge's bi-weekly reports.
On February 2, I made a FOIA request for MARAD's inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in 2004. On Feb. 6, Jeannette Riddick acknowledged my request and indicated that the due date for it would be March 7. I have not received another response as of May 23.
Bay Bridge President and CEO Mike Dunavant was reported in the Nov. 18 News-Times as saying that their Virginia facility was under "constant inspection" by the U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), [Virginia] Department of Environmental Quality, and U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) (1). In addition, the News-Times' Joel Gallob reported (72) on Dec. 9 that Dunavant said:
" 'We are constantly inspected," Dunavant said in response to environmental concerns. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) 'inspects our air, soil and water, they do sampling every other week, DEQ and OSHA come by once or twice a month. ... MARAD monitors us weekly, we monitor ourselves weekly.' "
Also, Bay Bridge's "Questions and Answers" for the Port of Newport (45) states:
"The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) administers the contracts for the vessels, monitors and inspects the work and work site constantly, conducting site visits every other week."
However, OSHA's and the Virginia DEQ's inspections were not as frequent as Bay Bridge stated. MARAD's two inspection reports in September and November 2005 are inconsistent with Bay Bridge's statements that MARAD inspected them constantly, since it appears that MARAD reviewed Bay Bridge's bi-weekly reports, and there was no indication that MARAD independently conducted water or sediment tests in shipbreaking slips or soil tests of upland areas.
I have not found inspection information for any of the shipbreaking companies of MARAD's ships at their web site (http://marad.dot.gov/). Based on the difficulty of getting the few records that MARAD provided for Bay Bridge Enterprises, I have not made Freedom of Information Act requests for MARAD's inspection records of other shipbreaking companies listed in footnote 23.
Local governmental officials and citizens at a proposed shipbreaking site in the Pacific Northwest need to be prudent and exercise due diligence by requesting MARAD's inspection reports and test results of the shipbreaking company to determine the frequency and adequacy of MARAD's inspections. If the shipbreaking company has not been previously inspected by MARAD, then officials and citizens would be prudent to request MARAD's inspection reports for other shipbreaking companies before assuming that MARAD inspections will be frequent and adequate. If MARAD can not provide any evidence of water or sediment tests in shipbreaking slips or soil tests of upland areas, then it should not be assumed that MARAD makes those tests.
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In general, OSHA infrequently inspected shipbreaking companies that scrapped MARAD ships (OSHA Table). During 2003-2005, OSHA more frequently had planned, complete inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises than of the four Texas shipbreaking companies (OSHA Table). In several years, the Texas companies had no inspections (OSHA Table).
However, Bay Bridge President & CEO Mike Dunavant was reported in the Nov. 18 News-Times as saying that their Virginia facility was under "constant inspection" by the U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), [Virginia] Department of Environmental Quality, and U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) (1).
The Port of Newport's "Questions and Answers" about Bay Bridge (45) states:
"OSHA will constantly monitor and inspect the site."
The News-Times' Joel Gallob reported (72) on Dec. 9 that Dunavant said:
" '[Virginia] DEQ and OSHA come by once or twice a month.' "
These statements are not supported by OSHA records that indicate OSHA only conducted 6 planned, complete inspections in the past 3 years at Bay Bridge and that 6 months or more elapsed between some inspections (OSHA Table).
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OSHA TABLE. OSHA inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia and four MARAD shipbreaking yards in Brownsville, Texas during 2003-2005, as of 6 March 2006 (44). All of these companies received MARAD ships for scrapping (p. 4 in 149).
* Inspection is listed as "Open" on 6 March 2006; other inspections are listed as "Closed."
@ Two inspections listed for the same day with a different number of violations.
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Violations__
Date Type SC Sum Serious
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BAY BRIDGE ENTERPRISES LLC (Virginia)
1/13/2003 Planned Complete 9 4
1/29/2003 Referral Partial 2 1
8/5/2003 Followup Partial 0 0
12/16/2003 Planned Complete 0 0
2/13/2004 Complaint Partial 0 0
9/14/2004 Planned Complete 3 3
3/22/2005 Planned Complete 4* 3*
4/5/2005 Planned Complete 1 1
11/15/2005 Planned Complete 5* 3*
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ALL STAR METALS (Texas)
"No Insp./Exempt Voluntary"
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ESCO MARINE (Texas)
2003: no inspections.
3/25/2004 Complaint Partial 10 9
7/1/2004 Referral Complete 8 3
7/14/2004 Referral Partial 8 5
12/7/2004 Planned Complete 26*@ 25*@
12/7/2004 Planned Complete 17*@ 17*@
4/8/2005 Accident Complete 8 4
4/20/2005 Planned Complete 2 2
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INTERNATIONAL SHIPBREAKING LIMITED (Texas)
[Inspections in 2002 but not in 2003-2005]
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MARINE METALS (Texas)
2003: no inspections.
2004: no inspections.
4/19/2005 Planned Complete 10 9
5/25/2005 Planned Complete 0 0
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In 2004, Bay Bridge indicated that they were also monitored by the EPA (6). However, as reported by the Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner (81), the EPA has only inspected Bay Bridge once in the past three years in June 2004 (also see EPA Table). I have requested information from the EPA about their inspections of Bay Bridge, but I have received no response so I filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request on Feb. 9. On March 9, the EPA mailed their response to my FOIA request and indicated that they had no inspection records at all for Bay Bridge.
P. A12-13 of the EPA's guide for ship scrapping indicates that shipbreaking facilities are subject to the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Toxic Substances Act (TSCA), and other regulations (22). Yet the EPA is listed as having 0-1 inspections in the past three years for four shipbreaking companies, and inspections were only for the RCRA (EPA Table). Why were there no inspections for the CAA, CWA, and TSCA? For two facilities, the last inspection was in 2000, and no information was available for inspections of Marine Metals (EPA Table).
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EPA TABLE. EPA inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in Virginia and four MARAD shipbreaking yards in Brownsville, Texas during 2000-2005, as of 5 March 2006 (83). Bay Bridge Enterprises originated from Recycling Industries that was once at the same property, so that why is the search for "Bay Bridge Enterprises" initially comes up with Recycling Industries. All of these companies received MARAD ships for scrapping (p. 4 in 149). The only statute associated with inspections was RCRA (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); there were no listings for inspections association with the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), or the Toxic Substances Act (TSCA). According to the EPA's dictionary (83), the number of inspections and "formal enforcement actions" refer to the specific statute cited, which in this case is only for the RCRA. ?=no data were available in the search of the database.
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Past 3 Years________
Formal
Inspec- Enforcement Date of Last
Shipbreaking Company Statute tions Actions Inspection
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Bay Bridge (Virginia) RCRA 1 0 06/10/2004
All Star Metals (Texas) RCRA 0 0 12/22/2000
Esco Marine (Texas) RCRA 1 0 02/25/2004
International Shipbreaking
Limited (Texas) RCRA 0 0 04/14/2000
Marine Metals (Texas) ? ? ? ?
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Bay Bridge President & CEO Mike Dunavant was reported as saying their Virginia facility was under "constant inspection" by the U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), [Virginia] Department of Environmental Quality, and U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) (1). The News-Times' Joel Gallob reported (72):
" 'We are constantly inspected," Dunavant said in response to environmental concerns. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) 'inspects our air, soil and water, they do sampling every other week, DEQ and OSHA come by once or twice a month.' "
However, Virginia DEQ Inspector Susan Mackert stated (54):
"Originally, when they began work at Bay Bridge, I would go there once a month and observe it, what they were doing, how they were doing things. I did that, and based on what they were doing, I reduced it to once every other month, one day for a few hours."
Mackert was reported by the Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner (81) as saying that she visited Bay Bridge "about four times a year." Mackert said her inspections were "totally unannounced" and that, as a water compliance inspector, her job was to ensure that no potential pollutants got into the water (81). Crystal St. Clair-Canaii, a Virginia DEQ environmental specialist noted that she had inspected Bay Bridge's "indoor operation" once (81).
Upon request, Mackert sent me copies of her 4 most recent reconnaissance inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises on 10 Jan. 2006, and they were approximately two months apart. So the Virginia DEQ had not visited Bay Bridge once or twice a month as Bay Bridge reported. Also note that her reports are clearly labeled as reconnaissance inspections, not complete inspections as one may infer from Bay Bridge statements.
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Spills or oil leaks from a ship being dismantled while moored in a slip could result in the water or sediments being contaminated from uncontained oil, paint chips, metal slag from torch cutting of the hull, tracked vehicles in a slip, or water used to put out a fire. Below are the results from my requests to several governmental and nongovernmental agencies for inspection records of water or sediments in Bay Bridge's shipbreaking slips. In summary, no governmental agency provided any such records.
MARAD's only two inspection reports of Bay Bridge in 2005 do not provide any evidence that MARAD tested water or sediment tests in Bay Bridge's shipbreaking slips.
In response to my questions about whether the Virginia DEQ tested water or sediments in Bay Bridge's shipbreaking slips, Virginia DEQ Inspector Susan Mackert replied on 10 January 2006 that "I myself have not sampled water or sediments at Bay Bridge during any of my inspections." On 4 January 2006, I also emailed Roger Everton, Virginia DEQ Water Compliance Manager, about Virginia DEQ water or sediment sampling--he did not directly answer my questions, but his response indicates that the Virginia DEQ has not done so. He suggested that the Elizabeth River Project has done some monitoring, though it "is basin wide and is not designed to target specific facilities."
In response to my email of 5 January 2006, Joe Rieger (Director of Watershed Planning, The Elizabeth River Project, 475 Water Street, Suite 103; Portsmouth, Virginia 23704) responded (boldface added):
"I do not know a whole lot about Bay Bridge and have only seen their operations from a distance. I do not have any data which suggest that there is any contamination in their slips, however we are unaware of any samples ever being collected directly in their slips."
The Habitat Management Division of the Virginia Marine Resources Commission has jurisdiction over submerged lands in Virginia. According to the Virginia Marine Resources Commission web site, Jay Woodward has the assigned territory that includes Cheapeake, Virginia where Bay Bridge is located, and I found his email address at the Commonwealth of Virginia web site. On 19 Jan. 2006, I emailed him to see if the Virginia Marine Resources Commission had ever tested submerged lands or sediments or knew of any contamination in Bay Bridge's shipbreaking slips. On Jan. 20, he responded:
"I have forwarded your email to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality for their input regarding water quality and I will do some research here on any past dredging of sediments or known, reported bilge discharge at the facility. It may take a week or so to get back to you."
I received no further communication as of Feb. 16, so I emailed him again, but I have not received a response as of May 23.
P. A12-13 of the EPA's guide for ship scrapping indicates that shipbreaking facilities are subject to the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Toxic Substances Act (TSCA), and other regulations (22). Yet the EPA is listed as having one inspection at Bay Bridge only for the RCRA in the past 3 years.
On 5 January 2006, I emailed Paul G. Dressel (Chief, Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Branch, US EPA Region 3, Office of Enforcement, Compliance and Environmental Justice, 215-814-2154, dressel.paul@epa.gov) and asked if the EPA had tested water or sediments in Bay Bridge's shipbreaking slips. On Jan. 19, Dressel replied, although he did not answer my question about testing. He said "I have shared your question with the EPA HQ's Water Office to see if any monitoring of sediments at the Bay Bridge facility was conducted." I responded on Jan. 19 and again asked if there were any water or sediment tests. I have received no further response from Dressel as of May 23.
On Feb. 9, I made an online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (http://www.epa.gov/foia/requestform.html) to the EPA for their inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises (4300 Buell Street, Chesapeake, Virginia 23324; EPA Source ID: VAD988207619 [see "Bay Bridge Enterprises" at 83]). Information about doing these requests to the EPA is at http://www.epa.gov/foia/broc.htm. My request:
For 2001-2005, I request:
1) dates of EPA inspections under the Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Toxic Substances Control Act
2) copies of EPA inspection reports for these inspections
3) does Bay Bridge Enterprises have a Clean Water Act permit, and, if so, when does it expire?
On March 8, the EPA's Jeffrey Pike (Senior Program Manager, Waste & Chemicals Management Division) responded in a letter that the Toxics Programs & Enforcement Branch and the Pesticides/Asbestos Programs & Enforcement Branch "found no information responsive to your request" and that the RCRA program included a copy of the 1993 "Notification of Regulated Waste Activity" by Jacobson Metal Company. Bay Bridge Enterprises was created from the purchase of the defunct Jacobson Metal Company and Peanut City Iron & Metal Co. Inc. in 2001. Also included in Pike's mailing was a March 1 letter from the EPA's Josephine Watson (Water Protection Division), who indicated: "Requested information is not known to exist in EPA's Water Protection Division's possession." So the EPA indicates that they had done one RCRA inspection of Bay Bridge on 10 June 2004, but they could not provide any records of it. Accordingly, there is no evidence that the EPA has ever tested the water or sediments in Bay Bridge Enterprises' shipbreaking slips.
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Shipbreaking appears to have many regulations, but OSHA and EPA inspections were infrequent, and no agency appears to have monitored Bay Bridge Enterprises' shipbreaking slips in Virginia. MARAD apparently checked Bay Bridge's paperwork to see if Bay Bridge followed regulations; paperwork inspection is not the same as comprehensive site inspections that include chemical tests of water, soil, and sediments for contaminants. Bay Bridge Enterprises's president indicated that they monitored themselves weekly (72) . Bay Bridge's "Questions and Answers" for the Port of Newport (45) stated:
"Bay Bridge monitors itself to meet or exceed all work safety and environmental standards."
The April 2006 Oregon DEQ Fact Sheet appears to indicate that a ship recycling company in Oregon would have some self-monitoring responsibilities (182).
If it is mainly up to a shipbreaking company to self-report incidents, citizens may be concerned because they realize that a company may not report its accidents or spills because of the trouble that doing so may cost the company. Citizens may also be concerned because some shipbreaking companies have had histories of environmental violations and some Oregon shipyards have left contamination whose cleanup was paid for in part by taxpayers.
The current system of infrequent and incomplete inspections by government agencies is not fair to shipbreaking companies that try to honestly and completely monitor themselves because citizens may not believe the results. It is up to the U. S. Congress and State Legislatures to adequately fund inspections by government agencies.
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Oregon citizens and governments may look to the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to prevent contamination by ship recyclers, but it is questionable if the Oregon DEQ can do so. The Oregon DEQ, like DEQ's of other states, is not adequately funded. This is a national problem; for example, the April 2006 Reader's Digest (168) notes:
"As state natural resource agencies have become increasingly short-staffed and underfunded, they are less able to detect and respond to threats."
In late 2005, the Oregonian's Steve Duin and Michael Milstein (170, 171) reported that the Oregon DEQ is underfunded by the State Legislature. Oregon DEQ Director Stephanie Hallock indicated that only 10% of the DEQ's budget comes from the state's general fund or the lottery--71% comes from fees paid by those that are regulated (170). Under a 1997 state law that allows private parties to pay the DEQ to "expedite or enhance" DEQ regulation, the DEQ accepted about $103,000 from the Northwest Pulp and Paper Association (an alliance of paper mills) to review DEQ regulations about water turbidity (171). In late 2005, the DEQ proposed less restrictive regulations that would benefit paper mills and other factories by allowing them to release more turbid (murky) water (170, 171). The DEQ's actions were controversial because it appeared that those that would benefit from the change paid to have the changes made (170, 171, 172).
The Northwest Environmental Defense Center's Mark Riskedahl wrote (169) about the Oregon DEQ:
"Is it not enough that the state legislature routinely hobbles the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, stringing it along each biennium with just enough funding to keep it from crumbling entirely? The Oregon DEQ is filled with a core group of sharp and dedicated employees, who are placed in the unenviable position of knowing that if they are perceived by those holding the agency's purse strings in Salem as doing their job of protecting Oregon's environment too well, the agency's budget may be slashed ever further. The resulting climate of perpetual fear, low expectations and risk aversion that pervades the DEQ is both inevitable and unacceptable.
... Ship-scrapping makes sense, but only when accompanied by the appropriate degree of regulatory oversight to insure that public safety and environmental health are protected. That oversight, however, is something that the underfunded and inadequately staffed Oregon DEQ is currently unable to provide."
In December 2005, the Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner (81) wrote about the Oregon DEQ's permit requirements for Bay Bridge Enterprises' proposal for shipbreaking at Newport:
"Bay Bridge has a general stormwater permit in Virginia. It's similar to the basic permit that would be required in Oregon. In Oregon, Bay Bridge's permitting likely would be a quick and easy process, according to Tim McFetridge, senior environmental engineer with DEQ. That's because the company is proposing to do the hazardous materials cleaning and removal work inside the vessel, as it does in Virginia. Other companies haul away hazardous materials. A plan required for the state permit would spell out management practices the company would follow to keep toxins from escaping into the water. That's it. Once a plan a submitted, the turnaround for a stormwater permit is about a week, McFetridge said. There is no public process for our stormwater permit, he said. Having said that I kind of cringe, he added.
"DEQ is open to hearing people's concerns and the files on such a permit would be open to anyone. At this point, he said, the agency considers such a business at low risk of contaminating an area such as Yaquina Bay. McFetridge said DEQ hasn't dealt with this kind of operation in the past, because to his knowledge, there haven't been any in Oregon. As a result, there aren't specific state rules and intensive permitting requirements as would be required for operations such as pulp mills along waterways."
After the Newport shipbreaking debate ended in January 2006, Governor Kulongoski indicated that shipbreaking in Oregon should be done in drydocks. The DEQ's Fact Sheet of 3 April 2006 indicates that "DEQ will examine any proposed operation to ensure that it would offer equal or better environmental protection than a dry dock" (182). So in-water shipbreaking would be permissible in Oregon if it offers environmental protection at least equal to a dry dock. The DEQ Fact Sheet continues (182) (boldface added):
"Wastewater discharges from the facility would likely be regulated under an individual National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by DEQ. The NPDES permit would include effluent limits, and would require sampling or monitoring, and reporting. Wastewaters are required to be tested for pollutant concentrations prior to discharge and would need to meet water quality standards at their discharge.
"Bilge and ballast water discharges are one type of wastewater that would be regulated. Storm water that has been in contact with the vessel or ship breaking operations would also be regulated. The facility may be required to analyze all of its wastewater for a variety of pollutants, including toxic substances, petroleum products, total suspended solids, temperature and pH."
Although the DEQ is "likely" to require an individual NPDES permit and wastewater "may be" analyzed, requiring this seems appropriate because:
* toxic materials are encountered and are stored until they can be transported elsewhere
* there may be oil leaks or spills and booms to contain oil may fail
* paint chips can fall into the water and cause pollution
* rainfall may create contaminated bilgewater
* water used to put out a ship fire may become contaminated
* for in-water shipbreaking, metal slag from cutting ship hulls in water can create contamination
* for in-water shipbreaking, tracked vehicles operating in water of drag slips may create pollution.
A precedent has been set for requiring a more restrictive permit because the DEQ required the Cascade General shipyard in Portland to get an individual rather than a general stormwater permit (177).
One concern about whether the Oregon DEQ's individual NPDES permit will be adequate to prevent contamination by ship salvagers is that the Oregon DEQ's water quality program is not in compliance with federal EPA standards. In January 2005, the EPA reported many problems with Oregon DEQ's NPDES Program (173, 174). The Oregonian's Joe Rojas-Burke (174) wrote about the EPA's report (173):
"The final report, sent this week to the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, details a range of problems that Oregon must solve--or risk a potential federal takeover of its enforcement of water quality laws. That is a last-resort possibility, according to federal authorities, but it remains to be seen if Oregon will be able to commit the money and staff to bring its water quality enforcement into compliance.
"DEQ's water quality administrator, Holly Schroeder, said efforts to fix the problems are making progress. For instance, when the EPA launched its review, Oregon ranked worst in the nation for its backlog of expired wastewater permits held by major industrial plants. Nearly 60 percent of such permits were lapsed. A drive over the past year has brought the backlog rate down to 31 percent, Schroeder said in an interview Thursday. 'We still have work to do, but we're showing some results already,' Schroeder said. The federal report acknowledged the progress on the permit backlog but spelled out a series of other problems with DEQ's oversight of wastewater and sewage disposal:
* Issuing permits that don't adequately assess how discharges will increase total pollution levels in the receiving river or stream, thus potentially failing to uphold water-quality standards.
* Relying too heavily on mutual agreements with permit-violators that allow them too much time to comply with requirements and that fail to set interim targets for working toward compliance.
* Setting penalties for polluters without calculating whether the cost is high enough to be a true incentive to stop polluting."
A second reason why the Oregon DEQ's individual NPDES permit may be insufficient for ship scrapping is inadequate staffing of DEQ. The April 2006 Reader's Digest (168) noted that many state resource agencies are understaffed and underfunded. For Oregon, the Portland Tribune's Ben Jacklet wrote (176)(boldface added):
"Environmental experts say industrial storm water pollution is a major water quality problem. Yet the DEQ, the agency in charge of enforcing more than 600 storm water permits held by businesses throughout Oregon's northwest region, has just one employee in charge of the program: [Dennis] Jurries. Jurries acknowledged that he has a hard time keeping close watch over all the businesses that have private storm water outfall pipes. 'I'm one person,' Jurries said. 'I've got six counties, soon to be seven counties, and 600 to 700 permits. ... The workload has gone up, and our resources are down. Most of these sites I've never seen and never will see.' "
Many citizens are sceptical of the effectiveness of DEQ monitoring of water quality to prevent environmental contamination because the DEQ did not prevent contamination at Hoy Marine on Port of Newport property in Yaquina Bay or at five shipyards at Coos Bay. The result was that the EPA could have declared Hoy Marine and one of the Coos Bay sites to be Superfund sites, and taxpayers paid for part of the cleanups because owners were unable to do so.
The Oregon DEQ's Fact Sheet indicates that "the presence of an on-site inspector" is being "considered" as a requirement for an Oregon shipbreaking company (p. 2 of 182). If this is required and if the inspector can report without being influenced by the shipbreaking company, then the chance of contamination would be greatly reduced.
If an independent, on-site inspector is not required, then the DEQ may be unable to do much monitoring because of underfunding and understaffing. Citizens may be sceptical of self-monitoring by shipbreaking companies, so citizen groups may need to monitor water quality, review and comment on new permits, and file lawsuits if other options are exhausted. Anonymous tipsters have also sometimes been important in pointing out water quality issues.
More can be learned about Oregon DEQ monitoring of water quality by searching the archives of the Oregonian http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/ for "DEQ Water Pollution").
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Anonymous tips have been critical in alerting state regulators about environmental contamination at a North Carolina shipbreaking company (34) and for oil leaks from MARAD ships in Virginia (11). An anonymous tip also alerted an environmental group that a Columbia River shipyard lacked a stormwater permit, so that the state was not monitoring the shipyard (177).
Although important, anonymous tips are rare, so it does not seem prudent to rely on them to monitor shipbreaking companies.
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If government agencies sufficiently monitor and inspect ship recycling companies, there would be no need for citizen monitoring. But I have found no evidence that any governmental agency tested water or sediments in Bay Bridge Enterprises' shipbreaking slips in Virginia, and it seems questionable that the Oregon DEQ would inspect shipbreaking companies or sufficiently monitor them. The need for citizen involvement is a national issue, since the April 2006 Reader's Digest (168) writes:
"Everyday citizens can play an important role in helping protect local resources by serving as guardians, observers and first-responders. Getting your feet wet in neighborhood conservation efforts can be as simple as joining your area river, lake or wetlands organization. Across North America, volunteers are helping to transform overlooked waterways into cherished assets. Many citizens' groups are even developing water-quality monitoring programs to chart the health of their local waters. And often residents are the first to discover a nasty spill or a fish kill in their area. To learn more about efforts near you, visit the River Network online directory at rivernetwork.org, or contact your regional chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Ducks Unlimited or Trout Unlimited."
Citizen groups can be located by searching River Network (http://rivernetwork.org/library/libnetdirsearch.cfm). Watershed councils may be involved, and SOLV has an Oregon Adopt-A-River program (http://www.solv.org/programs/oregon_adopt_a_river.asp). In Oregon, some citizen groups active in water quality include the Northwestern Environmental Defense Center (http://www.nedc.org/), Columbia Riverkeeper (http://www.columbiariverkeeper.org/), Willamette Riverkeeper (http://www.willamette-riverkeeper.org/), and Tualatin Riverkeepers (http://www.tualatinriverkeepers.org/). Their web pages indicate that their goals are to visually monitor and test water quality, review permit applications and comment on them, monitor permits issued by the Oregon DEQ and other agencies, ensure the enforcement of the Clean Water Act and other laws, educate the public and companies about water quality issues, and file lawsuits when other options have been exhausted. The Northwestern Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) states:
"Through our industrial stormwater enforcement initiative, NEDC works to insure that corporate polluters throughout the region obtain necessary Clean Water Act permits and then comply with the terms of those permits. We also require the installation of appropriate filtration and treatment technology, and work with polluters to remedy the environmental harm caused by their illegal discharges."
Activities of these groups to monitor and protect rivers as well as the need for these groups because governmental agencies are not doing enough are discussed in footnotes 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, and 181.
If there is an active citizen group for a ship recycling site, it may help ensure permits and monitoring, but it would not be able to prevent environmental contamination. Such a group may be able to discover contamination and try to have the contamination stopped and cleaned up before the problem becomes greater.
If there is no citizen group or if a citizen group is unable to sufficiently monitor or test water at a site where a shipbreaking facility is proposed, then contamination may not be discovered until costly cleanups result as at ship repair yards at Yaquina and Coos Bays.
Another difficulty that may limit the ability of citizen groups to stop contamination is that governments or companies may ignore citizen groups.
[Return to Table of Contents]
The Newport News-Times' Joel Gallob (74) reported for the Dec. 6 public meeting:
"He [Bay Bridge President Mike Dunavant] said his company 'has to get a $5 million insurance contract for each vessel. We are insured, bonded, with a letter of credit.' "
The concern is that $5 million may not be enough if there is a major incident. For example, Mike Becker, who provided insurance for the Port of Newport, said that over $100 million of damage could occur if 2-3 of Bay Bridge's ships broke free (74). The stability of Bay Bridge is at question, and taxpayers had to pay for cleanup at shipyards at Yaquina and Coos Bays because the companies were unable to pay for the clean up costs.
[Return to Table of Contents]
The channel near Bay Bridge's proposed site is very popular for crabbing and fishing by local residents and tourists (see p. 108 and 109 for numbers of people fishing or crabbing from boats in 1998-1999 and map on p. 6 of 59). Others dig clams (p. 112 of 59) across the channel at Idaho Flats or to the east at nearby Sally's Bend (see Maps). Many people could question whether they should eat any fish, crabs, or clams caught near a shipbreaking facility, especially since ships are near the channel and not in slips or drydocks, so that contaminants may not be contained.
[Return to Table of Contents]
Some of the Suisun vessels look to be in good shape, but others look poor (see Photos of Ships in Suisun Bay Fleet). The Bay Bridge site map for the proposed Newport facility shows four vessels at a time, so it is possible that at least one would look poorly. In Virginia, Bay Bridge had four ships that were being dismantled at their site in December 2005 (67).
During the process of dismantling, the ships and the Bay Bridge facility do not look very aesthetic (see Photos at Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC). At Bay Bridge, the hull of one ship had been partially cut while in the water (Image 5b, Image 6, Image 7), a tracked vehicle worked in the water (Image 5b), another had scrap laying alongside it (Image 10), and much of the activity is on unpaved surfaces.
The Coos Bay World's Elise Hamner (81) reported about Susan Mackert's (Virginia DEQ water compliance inspector) comments about the Bay Bridge site in Virginia: "It's not a pretty facility, she said. It's a working scrapyard."
Some may argue that NW Natural Gas' large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tank just to the east of the proposed Bay Bridge site at Newport (see Maps) is not aesthetic, so a ship salvage operation woud not degrade aesthetic values. Others would disagree because the LNG tank may not be beautiful, but at least it is symmetrical, is painted, and has been well-kept for--it is not a rusting hulk or being cut to pieces. It is also not noisy like a ship salvage operation would be.
There are also concerns about noise that are expressed about the proposed Bay Bridge facility in Dec. 20 letters from Francis Pisciotta, President of Friends of Yaquina Bay, to the Newport City Planner and to the Port Commission. The letter to the Port Commission was hand-delivered to the Port Commission during the Port's Dec. 20 meeting. The linked file (newport-noise.pdf) does NOT contain the tables mentioned in the letter.
A loss in aesthetic values could affect property values as they may have done near the Bay Bridge site in Virginia.
[Return to Table of Contents]
1. Kimberling, Gail. 2005. Newport Chosen for Salvage Operation. P. A1 and A3 in Nov. 18 Newport (Oregon) News-Times. Kimberling is also the managing editor of the News-Times.
2. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Port Mulls Proposal for Ship Salvage. P. A1 and A2 in Nov. 26 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
3. Anonymous. 2005. Port Plans Steps Before Salvage Decision. P. A2 in Nov. 26 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
4. Harper, Scott. 2003. Local Yard Wins in Bid to Scrap 5 'Ghost' Ships. Sept. 4, The Virginian-Pilot. This is now at http://www.cpeo.org/lists/military/2003/msg00992.html
5. Harper, Scott. 2002. Snags in Ship's Cleanup Show Why So Few Are Recycled. April 7, The Virginian-Pilot.
6. Harper, Scott. 2004. Local Salvage Yard Takes on Ghost Fleet. March 21, The Virginian-Pilot. This was no longer available at the Virginian-Pilot web site on 8 March 2006, but it is at http://www.ban.org/ban_news/local_salvage_040321.html
7a. Adani Overseas Operations [includes subsidiaries] web site at http://www.adanigroup.com/bizareas/adglbl.htm was present on 4 December 2005 but had been discontinued by 26 January 2006. But I have saved Google's Cache of http://www.adanigroup.com/bizareas/adglbl.htm in a file at adglbl.htm. To find the Cached version, Google Search for "Adani Group Jabel Ali Dubai" and, on 29 Jan. 2006, the first entry "Adani Group :: Business Areas :: Global Trading :: Adani Global" has the URL http://www.adanigroup.com/bizareas/adglbl.htm; select "Cached." Also try the URL to see if it is available now and if it is different from the Cached version that I found or that is available when you try. In addition, p. 10 of Adani Exports Limited's Consolidated Balance Sheet for Financial Year 2004-2005 on 31 March 2005 (which is before Adani purchased Bridge Enterprises in June 2005, adglbl.htm) shows Adani Global Ltd in Mauritius as a 100% subsidiary of Adani Exports Limited and Adani Global FZE in Dubai as a 100% subsidiary of Adani Global Ltd. Bay Bridge Enterprises may appear on the Balance Sheet (Consolidated) for Fiscal Year 2005-2006 at http://www.adanigroup.com/finan_ann%20reports.html.
7b. Adani Exports Limited [flagship company] at http://www.adanigroup.com/comp_ael.html as of 26 January 2006.
8. Adani Group Vision at http://www.adanigroup.com/home_vision%20and%20mission.html as of 26 January 2006.
9. Adani Group: The Team. This was available on 26 Nov. 2005 at http://www.adanigroup.com/team.htm but not on 26 January 2006. However, I have downloaded the Google Cache of the web page available on 26 January 2006 at ad-team.htm. To find the Cached version, Google Search for "Adani Group Team Adventurism" and, on 29 Jan. 2006, the third entry "Adani Group" has the URL http://www.adanigroup.com/team.htm; select "Cached." Also try the URL to see if it is available now and if it is different from the Cached version that I found or that is available when you try.
10. CIA--The World Factbook: Mauritius and CIA--The World Factbook: United Arab Emirates.
11. Harper, Scott. 2002. Part 2: "Ghost Fleet" Could Unleash Disastrous Spill. April 7, The Virginian-Pilot. This is at http://www.hamptonroads.com/pilotonline/special/ghostfleet/part2.html. Part 1 of the report also is informative about the Ghost Fleet in Virginia and is at http://www.hamptonroads.com/pilotonline/special/ghostfleet/part1.html
12a. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Port of Newport Considers Bond Request to Repair International Terminal. April 29, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
12b. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Survey Reveals 'Favorable' Public Opinion of Port of Newport. Aug. 26, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
13. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Port of Newport to Seek Bond to Rebuild International Terminal. P. A1 and A2 in Sep. 30, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
14. There are a multitude of articles about the pollution and its cleanup at the Yaquina Bay property that the Port of Newport leased to Hoy Marine, a boat repair yard. Starting in 1999, these are accessible online by doing an "Advanced Search" for "Hoy" in the Archives of the Newport News-Times at http://www.newportnewstimes.com and setting the start date to 1/1/1999.
15. Hall, Shaun. 1999. Federal Investigators Detail Probe of Hoy's Marine Pollution. July 16, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
16. Anonymous. 1999. State Begins Clean-up of Contamination at Hoy Marine. Dec. 1, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
17. Anonymous. 1999. Yaquina River Ship Repair Cleanup Has History of Pollution. May 16, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
18. Anonymous. 2002. Hoy Guilty of Clean Water Act Violations. Jan. 16, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
19. Gallob, Joel. 2004. Port Unhappy with Perpetual Pollution Disposal Site Monitoring Duty. Nov. 3, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
20. Gallob, Joel. 2005. State Says Environmental Cleanup at Hoy's Marine Site Complete. Jan. 14, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
21. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Disposal Site Could Be Leased by Port. Oct. 7, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
22. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2000. A Guide for Ship Scrappers: Tips for Regulatory Compliance. EPA 315-B-00-001. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. This is a 261 page [1.2 MB] document.
23. U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational and Health Administration (OSHA). 2005. OSHA's National Emphasis Program (NEP) on Shipbreaking. Directive Number: CPL 02-00-136. Information Date: 03/16/2005.
Section XI states:
There are currently two active Navy locations covered by the MOA:
Metro Machine Corporation, 5195 South 19th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19112 ((757) 543-6801).
International Shipbreaking Limited, 18501 R.L. Ostos Road, Brownsville, TX 78526 ((956) 831-2299).
There are currently six active MARAD locations covered by the MOA:
All Star Metals LLC, 101 Boxcar Road, Brownsville, TX 78521 ((956) 838-2110);
Bay Bridge Enterprises, LLC, 4300 Buell Road, Chesapeake, VA 22324 ((757) 543-7464);
Esco Marine, Inc., 16200 Joe Garza Sr. Road, Brownsville TX 78521 ((956) 831-8300);
International Shipbreaking Limited, 18501 R.L. Ostos Road, Brownsville, TX 78526 ((956) 831-2299);
Marine Metals, 16901 R.L. Ostos Road, Brownsville, TX 78526 ((956) 831-4284);
North American Ship Recycling LLC, 600 Shipyard Road, Baltimore, MD 21219 [Sparrows Point Shipyard] ((410) 477-6260).
24. Thompson, Michael W. 2003. Scuttling the Ghost Fleet. June 2, Bacon's Rebellion: the Op/Ed Page for Virginia's New Economy.
25. Porter, Ian. 2004. Sims Grabs Lease on Key US Shredder. June 23, The Age (Australia).
26. Marley, Michael. 2004. More 'Ghost' Ships to be Exorcised in US. June 28, American Metal Market.
28. Harper, Scott. 2005. Dismantling the Ghost Fleet. March 21, The Virginian-Pilot. This was no longer available at the Virginian-Pilot web site on 8 March 2006, but it is at footnote-28.htm. The slide show with photos by Chris Tyree is also no longer available at the Virginian-Pilot web site on 8 March 2006, but part of the photos are at W-Photo 1, W-Photo 2, W-Photo 3, and W-Photo 7; part of photos are also at http://navy.memorieshop.com/Brownsville/Slides-1.html.
29. Becker, Mike. 2005. Letter to Editor: At What Cost? P. A6 in Nov. 26 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
30. Anonymous. 2005. Friends of Yaquina Bay Estuary Announce Meeting. Nov. 30 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
31. Bailey, Paul J. 2000. Is There a Decent Way to Break Up Ships? International Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva, Switzerland.
32. Harper, Scott. 2004. 2 More in "Ghost Fleet" Slated for Environmentally Safe Scrap. Sept. 14, The Virginian-Pilot. This is now at http://www.ban.org/ban_news/2004/040914_2_more.html
33. Englund, Will and Gary Cohn. 1997. Scrapping Ships, Sacrificing Men. Dec. 7, Baltimore Sun. This is part of a series on shipbreaking that earned the 1998 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting (http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1998/investigative-reporting/works/). The section "Shipbreaking, American Style" in 158 also discusses the background of this series. Other articles from this series that are used in this web page include: 34, 151, 157.
34. Cohn, Gary and Will Englund. 1997. The Curious Captains of a Reckless Industry. Dec. 8, Baltimore Sun. This is part of a series on shipbreaking that earned the 1998 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting (http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1998/investigative-reporting/works/). See 33 for more information about this series.
35. Kimberling, Gail. 2005. Bay Bridge 'Committed to Newport,' CEO Says. Dec. 2 Newport (Oregon) News-Times. Kimberling is also the managing editor of the News-Times.
36. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Adani Group, Bay Bridge Enterprise, and Ship-breaking. Dec. 2 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
37. Anonymous. 2000. Recycling Industries Inc. Closes Two More Facilities. Dec. 18, Recycling Today: The Portal to the Recycling Industry. I have downloaded this file as rtoday-37.htm. On 29 Jan. 2006, I was able to sign up for free access to their web site and information at http://www.recyclingtoday.com/.
38. Anonymous. 2001. Scrap Industry News: Recycling Industries Appears Finished. Jan. 22, Recycling Today: The Portal to the Recycling Industry. Scroll down the web page I have downloaded as rtoday-38.htm. On 29 Jan. 2006, I was able to sign up for free access to their web site and information at http://www.recyclingtoday.com/.
39. Anonymous. 2001. Mercer Finalizing Deal for Idled Recycling Industries Yards. August 20, Recycling Today: The Portal to the Recycling Industry. I have downloaded this file as rtoday-39.htm. On 29 Jan. 2006, I was able to sign up for free access to their web site and information at http://www.recyclingtoday.com/.
40. Anonymous. 2001. Scrap Industry News: More Recycling Industries Assets Sold. Sept. 20, Recycling Today: The Portal to the Recycling Industry. Scroll down the web page I have downloaded as rtoday-40.htm. On 29 Jan. 2006, I was able to sign up for free access to their web site and information at http://www.recyclingtoday.com/.
41. U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), Solicitation DTMA1Q05006, 7 January 2005.
42. Sleeth, Peter. 2005. Newport's Dilemma: Good Jobs vs. Big Risks. Dec. 4, Oregonian. This is at http://www.oregonlive.com/search/index.ssf?/base/front_page/1133663106105660.xml?oregonian?fpfp&coll=7
43. P&O Nedlloyd. 2004. P&O Nedlloyd and the Environment 2004: Always Taking Care.
44. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) Inspections. Help is at http://www.osha.gov/tutorials/est_srch.html.
1) Go to http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.html
2) Enter name of company in "Establishment" (List as "All Star Metals," "Bay Bridge," "Esco," "International Shipbreaking," and "Marine Metals" to get all entries because not all entries have "LLC" or "Inc." For example, Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC is listed as "Bay Bridge Enterprise," "Bay Bridge Enterprises," "Bay Bridge Enterprises, LLC" and "Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC"; consequently, searches for "Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC" would not reveal all inspections.)
3) Select State in "All Offices" (Virginia for Bay Bridge; Texas for all others)
4) Select "Fed & State"
5) Leave OSHA Office as "All Offices"
6) Select "Closed" Case Status
7) Enter Start Date as "January 1, 2000"
8) Submit
9) Verify location of business is the same as the shipbreaking firm (see addresses at end of footnote 23)
10) Return to step #2 and toggle Case Status to "Open"; leave everything else unchanged
11) Submit
12) Verify location of business is the same as the shipbreaking firm (see addresses at end of footnote 23)
45. Bay Bridge Frequently Asked Questions. Questions and Answers: Bay Bridge Enterprises, Marine Salvage Recycling Operations at the Port of Newport. 30 Nov. 2005. See bbfaq_body.htm. This was removed from the Port of Newport's web site at http://www.portofnewport.com by 29 Jan. 2006; I had downloaded a copy. An updated 12/01/05 version was available as a paper handout copy at the 6 December 2005 Port of Newport Public Forum--besides changes in formatting, the only difference that I can see between the Nov. 30 and Dec. 1 versions is that the Nov. 30 version gives information about Port Commission meetings at the end.
46. Bay Bridge Ship Salvage Facts. Fact Sheet: Bay Bridge Enterprises, Marine Salvage Recycling Operations at the Port of Newport. 1 Dec. 2005. See bbfacts_body.htm. This was removed from the Port of Newport's web site at http://www.portofnewport.com by 29 Jan. 2006; I had downloaded a copy. An "updated" 12/01/05 version was available as a paper handout copy at the 6 December 2005 Port of Newport Public Forum--besides changes in formatting, the only difference that I can see between the Dec. 1 and the "updated" Dec. 1 versions is that the Dec. 1 version gives information about Port Commission meetings at the end.
47. U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD). 2005. Obsolete Non-Retention Vessels for Standing Quotations. February 8. This is at https://voa.marad.dot.gov/programs/ship_disposal/standing_quot/docs/Obsolete%20Non-Ret%20Vessels%20for%20SQ%2002-8-2005.pdf. (P. 7-10 lists 60 MARAD ships at Suisun Bay that are "obsolete," and gives their lengths, weights, and order of priority for disposal. On 30 November 2005, the status of one of these ships was changed to "Historic Review" and four of the ships were listed with a "Homeport" of Brownsville and a Status of "Disposal" (49).
48. U.S. Dept. of Transportation. 2005. Maritime Administration Moves Ahead on Ship Disposal: Four More Disposal Contracts Announced. Sept. 30. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Transportation.
49. In 2005, it appears that MARAD awarded contracts to dispose of at least two and perhaps as many as four MARAD ships at Suisun Bay to Brownsville, Texas shipbreaking firms. On 20 Sept. 2005, MARAD announced that contracts to dismantle two MARAD ships at Suisun Bay (the Connecticut and the Nemasket) were awarded to International Shipbreaking Ltd. and ESCO Marine of Brownsville, Texas (48). In the 30 November 2005 MARAD inventory for Suisun Bay, the Nemasket is now listed as being on "Historic Review" (p. 16 in 50), the Connecticut is now listed with a "Homeport" of Brownsville with a Status of "Disposal," and three other ships listed in Suisun Bay in February 2005 (the Wahkiakum County, the Tioga County, and the Wabash AOG-4) are now listed with Brownsville as a "Homeport" and a status of "Disposal" (p. 13 and 16 in 50). These five ships represented five of the top six MARAD ships for disposal at Suisun Bay on 28 February 2005 (p. 7 in 47). The lengths and weights of MARAD ships at Suisun Bay in February 2005 are given on p. 7-10 of 47, in order of priority for disposal.
50. U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD). 2005. National Defense Reserve Fleet Inventory for the Month Ending November 30, 2005. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration. Produced and Distributed by Division of Reserve Fleet (MAR-612) on December 6, 2005.
51. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. [no date]. Hopper Dredge Yaquina. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District.
52. Anonymous. 2005. Port of Newport Seeks Public Input on Proposed Salvage Operation. Nov. 30 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
53. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Shipbreaking: the Environmental View. Dec. 2 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
54. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Virginia DEQ Gives Bay Bridge Clean Bill. Dec. 2 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
55. Cortright, R., J. Weber, and R. Bailey. 1987. The Oregon Estuary Plan Book. Oregon Dept. of Land Conservation and Development. (This is Atlas GC97.8.O7 C61 at OSU Libraries. An online version is that contains much but not all [especially the maps] of the same material is at http://www.inforain.org/mapsatwork/oregonestuary/)
56. Dahlgren, Robert B. and Carl E. Korschgen. 1992. Human Disturbances of Waterfowl: an Annotated Bibliography. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Resource Publication 188
57. Korschgen, Carl E. and Robert B. Dahlgren. 1992. Human Disturbances of Waterfowl: Causes, Effects, and Management. U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Fish and Wildlife Leaflet 13.2.15. Waterfowl Management Handbook.
58. Merrifield, K. 1998. Waterbird Censuses of Yaquina Bay, Oregon: March 1993-February 1994. Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Wildlife Diversity Program. Tech. Report 98-1-01.
59. Merrifield, K. 2001. Larid, Alcid and Crow censuses of Yaquina Bay, Oregon: June 1997-June 1999. Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Wildlife Diversity Program. Tech. Report #01-05.
60. Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. 2005. Oregon Threatened and Endangered Species List. Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. [Their list was last updated on 1 September 2005.]
61. Audubon. 2002. Brant (Branta bernicla). National Audubon Society. [Audubon lists the status of Brant as "yellow"; the meaning of this status is at http://www.audubon.org/bird/watchlist/bs-bc-what_is_the_watchlist.html.]
62. Pacific Flyway Council. 2002. Pacific Flyway Management Plan for Pacific Brant. Pacific Flyway Study Commission, Portland, Oregon.
63. Wetzel, David J. 1996. Brant Use of Yaquina Estuary, Lincoln County, Oregon in the Spring of 1976. Journal of Oregon Ornithology 6:715-722.
64. Bayer, Range D. 1996. Censuses of Black Brant at Yaquina Estuary, Lincoln County, Oregon. Range D. Bayer. 1996 Journal of Oregon Ornithology 6:723-780.
65. Pitkin, David S. 2000. Wintering Ecology, Site Fidelity and Breeding Origins of Black Brant in Oregon. U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Oregon Coast National Wildlife Refuge Complex, 2127 SE OSU Drive, Newport, Oregon. Unpubl. Report.
66. United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2005. Maritime Administration: Improved Program Management Needed to Address Timely Disposal of Obsolete Ships. March 2005. GAO-05-264. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services. 62 pages, 2.2 Mb (slow to download)--see a one-page summary, GAO Highlights of GAO-05-264, for the highlights.
67. Harper, Scott. 2005. Oregon Town Making Waves for Local Company. Dec. 14, The Virginian-Pilot. This was still available on 8 March 2006.
68. Gallob, Joel. 2005. City of Chesapeake Likes its Shipbreaking Yard. Dec. 7, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
69. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Shipbreaking Issues Include Invasive Species, Chemicals. Dec. 7, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
70. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Port of Newport Delays Letter of Intent with Bay Bridge. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
71. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Environmental Concerns Dominate Town Hall. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
72. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Bay Bridge President Responds to Testimony. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
73. Howard, Thomas J. 2000. Maritime Administration: Limited Progress In Disposing of Obsolete Vessels. May 24. Statement of Thomas J. Howard, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Maritime and Departmental Programs, U.S. Department of Transportation, Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives. Report No. MA-2000-097.
74. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Insurance a Concern at Meeting. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
75. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Public Process Becomes an Issue in Port Talks. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
76. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Number and Quality Jobs Debated at Port Town Hall. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
77. PMI Mortgage Insurance Co. 2005. Economic & Real Estate Trends. PMI Mortgage Insurance Co., Fall 2005
78. Cooper, Tony. 2003. Barely Shipshape: Devoted Volunteers Provide TLC for Retired - Not 'Mothballed' - Navy Vessels on Suisun Bay. February 7, San Francisco Chronicle.
79. Gallob, Joel. 2006. Shipbreaking Opposition Doubles. Jan. 6, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
80. Hamner, Elise. 2005. Community Split Over Proposed Ship Disposal Site: Citizens Questioning Bringing Toxins into the Bay. Dec. 17, The World (Coos Bay newspaper). This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
81. Hamner, Elise. 2005. Virginia Company Has No Environmental Violations. Dec. 20, The World (Coos Bay newspaper). This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
82. Hamner, Elise. 2005. Labor Costs Push the Search for Ship Salvage Site North. Dec. 20, The World (Coos Bay newspaper). This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
83. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO). Search Compliance Data at
http://www.epa.gov/echo/compliance_report.html; their data dictionary is at http://www.epa.gov/echo/dfr_data_dictionary.html
1) enter Facility Name ("All Star Metals," "Bay Bridge Enterprises," "Esco," "International Shipbreaking," and "Marine Metals")
2) enter City of Facility (Chesapeake for Bay Bridge Enterprises; Brownsville for the others.)
3) enter State of Facility (Virginia for Bay Bridge; Texas for the others. There is no need to enter the Zipcode)
4) select "Include Minor Facilities" at the end of the page or will not find inspections.
5) select "Search" (Note that some searches may end up with a previous owner; for example, searching for "Bay Bridge" will reveal that a previous company, "Recycling Industries" was at the same address--see Bay Bridge's history.)
6) verify location of business is the same as the shipbreaking firm (see addresses at end of footnote 23).
84. Sleeth, Peter. 2006. Scrap-metal Firm Looking at Oregon Sites. Oregon Coast - Plans for Ship-scrapping Yards in Coos Bay and Newport Stir Both Hope and Worries. Jan. 6, Portland Oregonian.
85. Presentation by Alan Sprott and Alan Jones of Cascade General of Portland, Oregon to a public meeting of the MidCoast Watershed Council on 5 January 2006 at the OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center. Carole Cole and Range Bayer independently took notes; in addition, Carol Cole received a copy of their presentation.
86. Halliburton NUS Corporation. 1997. Appendix E. Survey of Ships and Materials. U. S. Maritime Administration, Office of Environmental Activities, Washington, DC. Part I (p. 1-31). Part II (p. 32-end). A link to this is also at the bottom of http://www.marad.dot.gov/Publications/environ.htm
87. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Salvage Operations Could Promote Dredging. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
88. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Bay Bridge Cited for OSHA Violations. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
89. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Inaccurate Statements about Shipbreaking Proposal are Clarified. Dec. 9, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
90. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Federal Shipbreaking Funds Inconsistent. Dec. 16, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
91. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Shipbreaking: Players Based Throughout the United States. Dec. 16, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
92. Glader, Paul. 2006. With Steel Soaring, A Ghost Fleet Is In High Demand. P. A1 and A11 in Jan. 10 Wall Street Journal. A Google cache of the article without images is at fnote-92.htm; the image of the ship is at BBE Image 1. Essentially the same article was also given in the Baltimore Sun on Jan. 16, except the Baltimore Sun edition did not include a photo of a ship at Bay Bridge Enterprises and an image of Harsh Mishra.
93. Basel Action Network. 2003. Needless Risk. Basel Action Network, an international network of activists seeking to prevent the globalization of the toxic chemical crisis.
94. Sleeth, Peter. 2006. Ship Scrapper Considers Portland. P. A1 and A11 in Jan. 26 Portland Oregonian. This is available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/374432/correction_ship_scrapper_considers_portland_ore/index.html.
95. Knickerbocker, Brad [staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor]. 2006. Plan to Scrap Old Ships Stirs Pollution Worries. This article appeared in the Jan. 17 USA Today at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2006-01-17-ghost-ships_x.htm and in the Jan. 18. Christian Science Monitor at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0118/p02s01-sten.html.
96. Paul, Alex. 2006. Port Decision May Have Cost Albany Future Jobs. Jan. 25, Albany Democrat-Herald. (Bay Bridge Enterprises had been looking at a site near Albany, where large pieces of ships from the proposed Yaquina Bay shipbreaking facility could have been broken down for shipment to processing facilities.)
97. Anonymous. 2005. Gujarat Adani Plans All-in-one yard [02/11/2005 ] by ttnet.net, Transworld Information Corp.
98. Raghuvanshi, Gaurav. 2005. Adanis Bet Big on Port and SEZ. June 20 Hindu Business Line: Internet Edition.
99. Dunavant, Mike and Marc McPherson. 2006. In My Opinion: Shipbreaking--Salvage Operations Could Fit Coast Nicely. Jan. 26, Portland Oregonian.
100. Holben, Jay. [no date]. Understanding and Utilizing the Secrets of Waves.
101. Maximum monthly wind gust in miles per hour during 1998-2005 as recorded at the Guin Library weather station at the Oregon State University Hatfield Marine Science Center and compiled from HMSC Weather Summaries at http://hmsc.oregonstate.edu/weather/summaries/index.html. This weather station wass about 0.7 mile to the westsouthwest of the proposed Bay Bridge shipbreaking site at Yaquina Bay (maps.htm#Figure 2). Like the Bay Bridge site, the HMSC is also exposed to winds.
102. The Mean Range (i.e., the mean difference between high and low tidal levels) at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on the Elizabeth River in Virginia is 2.8 ft from "Tidal Station Locations and Ranges: Chesapeake Bay," according to "Tides and Currents," National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration at http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/tides06/tab2ec2c.html.
The Mean Range at South Beach at Yaquina Bay is 6.4 ft from "Tidal Station Locations and Ranges: Oregon," according to "Tides and Currents," National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration at http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/tides06/tab2wc1b.html#132.
Mean Higher High Water at the South Beach tide station is +8.34 ft above Mean Lower Low Water (0.0 ft)
(http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/station_info.shtml?stn=9435380%20South%20Beach,%20OR), while the mean difference between high and low tidal levels during "spring tides" at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Virginia is only 3.26 ft (http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/tides05/tab2ec2c.html).
103. 2001-2006 Tide Predictions [for South Beach and the OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center] at http://hmsc.oregonstate.edu/weather/tides/tides.html
104. Sleeth, Peter. 2006. Oregon Assets Lure Shipbreakers: Cheaper Costs for Land and Labor to Scrap a California Fleet are Driving Business and the Government North. Jan. 8, Portland Oregonian. This may be available for a fee through the Archives at http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/
105. U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational and Health Administration (OSHA). 2004. Federal Registers. Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment; Final Rule - 69:55667-55708. U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational and Health Administration.
106. Gallob, Joel. 2006. Fire a Potential Problem in Ship Breaking. Jan. 20, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
107. Sleeth, Peter. 2006. No Welcome, No Shipbreaking. Ghost Fleet - Gov. Ted Kulongoski Says a Virginia Firm Cannot Scrap Old Ships in Oregon Waters, Only Dry-dock. Feb. 10, Portland Oregonian. This may be available for a fee through the Archives at http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/. Essentially the same article is given with a different title "Kulongoski Says Port Shipbreaking Operation a No Go" with Associated Press as the source by KATU-TV.
108. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Winch vs. Dry Dock for Shipbreaking's Heavy Lifting. Dec. 23, Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
109. Basel Action Network (BAN). 2001. Comments on the Draft Technical Guidelines on Environmentally Sound Management for Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships (TWG 19, Rev. 02). Basel Action Network (BAN) at http://www.ban.org/.
110. Greenpeace. [no date]. Shipbreaking: Good Scrapping, Clean Production. Greenpeace.
111. Anonymous. 2005. Metro, in Brief: Three Aging Ships to Be Dismantled. Scroll down to second article on P. B3 of Sept. 5 Washington (District of Columbia) Post.
112. Ruddiman, Pat. 2005. Letter to Editor: Best for All. Dec. 28 Newport (Oregon) News-Times. Thie text of this letters appears identical to:
Ruddiman, Pat. 2006. Letter to Editor: Wants Best for Newport. Jan. 20 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
113. Becker, Mike. 2006. Letter to Editor: How Much is Enough Insurance? Jan. 20 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
114. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2004. Final Environmental Assessment: Transfer of National Defense Reserve Fleet Vessels from the James River Reserve Fleet for Disposal at Able UK Facilities, Teesside, UK. Appendix E: Response to Comments. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Maritime Adminstration. Links to the Assessment are on top of the page at http://www.marad.dot.gov/Publications/environ.htm; the direct link to Appendix E.
115. Arc Ecology. [no date] Project: The Mothball Fleet in Suisun Bay, Toward Job Development & Preventing Future Bay Contamination. Arc Ecology.
116. Sleeth, Peter. 2005. With Scrap Ships May Come Risky Species: Vessels Anchored for Years Might be Towed to Oregon for Salvage, but No One Knows What's on the Hulls. Dec. 18 Portland Oregonian. This may be available for a fee through the Archives at http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.
117. Anonymous. 2005. Editorial: 'Ticking . . . Time Bombs' and Dangerous Cargo: Newport Needs to Know How Yaquina Bay Can be Safe from Invasive Organisms and Wastes on Mothballed Ships. December 22 Portland Oregonian.
118. Oregon Invasive Species Council. Participants: Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, Center for Lakes & Reservoirs, and Oregon Sea Grant.
119. Oregon Invasive Species Council. 2005. Oregon Invasive Species Action Plan. Oregon Invasive Species Council.
120. The Aquatic Bioinvasion Research and Policy Institute (ABRPI), a joint initiative between Portland State University (PSU) and the Smithsonian Environmental Research Center (SERC)..
121. Davidson, Ian. [no date] Assessing Hull Fouling as a Vector of Invasive Species: A Case Study in the Lower Columbia River. Portland State University, Center for Lakes and Reservoirs.
122. deRivera et al., C. E. Broad-Scale Nonindigenous Species Monitoring along the West Coast in National Marine Sanctuaries and National Estuarine Research Reserves. Report to National Fish & Wildlife Foundation. [This would be very relevant to the South Slough National Estuarine Research Reserve at Coos Bay.)
123. Publications: SFEI's (San Francisco Estuary Institute) Internet Guides to Biological Invaders.
124. Sylwester, Eva. 2006. Boat-breaking May Threaten Marine Life: A UO-affiliated Research Institute Is Wary of Possible Pollution from Salvaging. Jan. 31 Oregon Daily Emerald (University of Oregon).
125. Denina, Chris G. 2003. Will Mare Island Sink or Swim? Before the Military Closed the Base in 1996, the Navy Was Responsible for Dredging the Mare Island Strait. July 5, The Reporter.Com; Denina is listed as from the Vallejo (California) Times-Herald. This appears to be same article by same author with different title ("Dredging Up New Business," Article ID: 103D63AC93758712) that is available for a fee at the Times-Herald's Archives at http://timesheraldonline.com/fastsearchresults?vertical=archive.
126. Friedman, Gabe. 2004. WW II ship waits in limbo at Mare Island. May 8, Napa Valley (California) Register.
127. Denina, Chris G. 2004. Company Pins Its Hopes on Dredging M.I. Strait. July 24 Vallejo (California) Times-Herald. This Article ID: 2291930 is available for a fee at the Times-Herald's Archives at http://timesheraldonline.com/fastsearchresults?vertical=archive
128. Denina, Chris G. 2005. New Venture Would Restore M.I. Shipyard. July 14 Vallejo (California) Times-Herald. If this article no longer available at the link given, then it may be available for a fee at the Times-Herald's Archives at http://timesheraldonline.com/fastsearchresults?vertical=archive
129. Schleck, Dave. 2004. Ship Breakers Dismantle Obsolete Vessels at Chesapeake, Va., Shipyard. May 16 Daily Press (Newport News, Virginia).
130. Schleck, Dave. 2005. Deal Would Export 'Ghost Fleet' at Reduced Cost. July 19, Daily Express (Newport News, Virginia). (Google search the title to also find reprints of this as an Associated Press article.) (Link updated on 4-21-2006.)
131. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Issues Generate Waves of Interest. Feb. 17, Coos Bay (Oregon) World. This is available for a fee. (Also see 163 for a Port of Coos Bay news release that was given at the Port of Coos Bay meeting that this article is about.)
132. Anonymous. 2005. Ship Scrapping Company Seeks to Build Yard in Newport. Dec. 5 Daily Astorian. [Available for fee or can search for title in NewsBank archives at http://www.dailyastorian.com/SearchForm_Advanced.asp]
133. Anonymous. 2006. Ship Salvage Firms Wants to Talk to Port. Jan. 26 Aberdeen (Washington) The Daily World.
134. Anderson, Julia. 2006. Marketplace: Thanks But No Thanks [scroll down the page]. Feb. 5 Vancouver (Washington) The Columbian.
135. Sleeth, Peter. 2006. State Job Chase Hit Unseen Rocks. In Their Zeal to Recruit a Ship-breaking Firm, Oregon Officials Failed to Anticipate a Public Environmental Outcry. Jan. 29 Portland Oregonian. [This may be available for a fee through the Archives at http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.]
136. Anonymous. 2006. Editorial: Ship-Scrappers Still Face Tough Sailing. Jan. 28 Portland Oregonian. [This may be available for a fee through the Archives at http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.]
137. Redden, Jim. 2006. TribTown: Salvage Talks Anger Linnton. Residents Feel Blindsided by PDC's Negotiations with Ship Dismantler. Jan. 31 Portland Tribune.
138. Gallob, Joel. 2006. Developer May Lure Bay Bridge to Coos Bay. Jan. 11 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
139. Gallob, Joel. 2006. Bay Bridge Says No One Talked to Coos Bay Landowner. Jan. 18 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
140. Anonymous. 2005. Editorial: Old Military Ships Are Time Bombs. Dec. 22 Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
141. Mickelson, Carl. 2006. Sitka Report Debunked. Jan. 11 Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee.
142. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Coos Bay Was Not a 'Viable Site' Without Railroad Access. Jan. 11 Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
143. Anonymous. 2006. Editorial. Only in Dry Dock: The Governor Gets It Right. Feb. 11 Portland Oregonian. [This may be available for a fee through the Archives at http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.]
144. Anonymous. 2006. Editorial: Best Government Is an Open One. Feb. 11 Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
145. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Why Not Break the Ships in the Bay Area? Dec. 28 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
146. Anonymous. 1999. Crowley Marine Services Completes 15,000-Mile Tow of USS Oriskany. Sept. 15, Crowley Liner Shipping Services.
147. U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1998. Federal Surplus Ships: Government Efforts To Address the Growing Backlog of Ships Awaiting Disposal. Letter Report, 10/22/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-18. This is also at http://fas.org/man/gao/nsiad-99-018.htm
148. Baxter, Kevin. 1999. DRMS Aircraft Carrier Offer Gets Scrapped - Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service Has Hard Time Finding Anyone Willing to Bid on Scrap Purchase of USS Oriskany. April 19, American Metal Market.
149. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2005. Report to Congress on the Progress of the Vessel Disposal Program. October 2005. U. S. Dept. of Transportation, Maritime Administration. (This version is almost exactly the same as the April 2005 version.)
150. Gallob, Joel. 2006. New Companies Face Complex Mix of Taxes. Jan. 18 Newport (Oregon) News-Times.
151. Englund, Will and Gary Cohn. 1997. 'You're going to die anyway.' Brownsville: In This U.S. Shipbreaking Capital on the Mexican Border, where Labor and Life Are Cheap, Scrapping Thrives Amid Official Indifference. Dec. 7, Baltimore Sun. This is part of a series on shipbreaking that earned the 1998 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting (http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1998/investigative-reporting/works/). See 33 for more information.
152. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2005. Report to Congress on the Progress of the Vessel Disposal Program. April 2005. U. S. Dept. of Transportation, Maritime Administration. (This version is almost exactly the same as the October 2005 version.)
153. Grossman, Elizabeth. 2006. 'Ghost Fleet' in Search of a Final Resting Place. Feb. 20, High Country News (Paonia, Colorado). This is available from High Country News for a fee at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=16114 and on 10 March 2006 was available for free at the Pagosa Daily Post's http://pagosa.com/0206/Essays/20GhostFleet.htm
154. Kowerduck, Scott. 2004. Photo entitled " USS England (DLG-CG-22) Undergoing Dismantlement at International Shipbreaking Limited on 15 January 2004. The caption is on a thumbnail with a link near the bottom of http://www.navsource.org/archives/04/1122/040122.htm.
155. Stewart, Christopher S. 2004. Ship Breaking: an Upstart Is Revolutionizing the Arcane, Dangerous Business of Boat Recycling. Oct. 1, Fortune Small Business (Vol. 14[8]:71-77). Photos by Nathaniel Welch. Text is at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2004/10/01/8187304/index.htm (index is at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2004/10/01/toc.html). Text and images are also at http://www.usshorne.net/horne/breaking.htm; that web site says the article is from Forbes Magazine, but the page images indicate it is from "FSB," which suggests Fortune Small Business, and some of the page numbers are visible.
156. U. S. Congress. 1998. 47-309CC. Ship Scrapping Activities of the United States Government. 105-59. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress. Second Session, March 18 and June 4, 1998. [Alse see Hearing in 2000 (210).]
157. Cohn, Gary. 1998. Agency Scraps Plan for Old Ships: U.S. Suspends Overseas Disposal of Cargo Vessels. Jan. 29, Baltimore Sun. This is part of a series on shipbreaking that earned the 1998 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting (http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1998/investigative-reporting/works/). See 33 for more information about this series.
158. Langewiesche, William. 2000. The Shipbreakers. The Atlantic Monthly; August 2000, Volume 286, No. 2; page 31-49. (This article is no longer available at The Atlantic Monthly web page, but several text versions are available online. A text version with photos in 4 parts is at http://www.uss-bennington.org/shipbreakers/shipbreakers-1.html; Part 2 is about shipbreaking in America and the 1998 Pulitzer Prize investigative report series [see 33].)
159. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2006. Sale_11_22_05, IX-509 (EX UEB1). U.S. Maritime Administration. Sale Solicitation SDPEXC-05001 - Bid Abstract for the Bid Opening for the Sale of the Obsolete Vessel(s). Print Date: January 11, 2006.
160. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2006. Sale_11_23_05, BEAUJOLAIS , PVT FRED C. MURPHY. U.S. Maritime Administration. Sale Solicitation SDPEXC-05001 - Bid Abstract for the Bid Opening for the Sale of the Obsolete Vessel(s). Print Date: February 1, 2006.
161. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Expert: Exotic Marine Organisms Move with Ships. March 13, Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/. (According to James Carlton, whose March 9 lecture is the subject of this article, this article had originally been published on March 10 and was on the front-page with the headline "Species Invasion Natural" [165]. Carlton objected to the original title because he thought it had the "unintended implication that invasions of exotic species caused by human action are OK"; so "I'm hoping that there might be another opportunity to clarify this for the World's readership." [165]. Apparently, the title was changed in the March 13 online version of the original article. I do not know if any of the text was also changed.)
162. Oregon Invasive Species Council. [no date] Frequently Asked Questions. Oregon Invasive Species Council.
163. Bishop, Jeff. 2006. Proposal on Public Forums to Study the Pros and Cons of Ship Recycling. Statement at February 16, 2006 Meeting of Port's Board of Commissioners by Jeff Bishop, Executive Director, Oregon International Port of Coos Bay. (See 131 for a news article about this meeting.)
164. Anonymous. 2006. Port Seeking Ship Recycling Input. March 13 Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/. (This reports a March 8 Port of Coos Bay press release.)
165. Carlton, James T. 2006. Letter To The Editor: Invasions Plentiful But Are Not Natural. March 18 Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/. (Carlton objected to the headline of 161.)
166. U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD). [no date] Ship Disposal Program Library. Virtual Office of Acquisition, U.S. Maritime Administration.
167. Results of my 12 January 2006 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) for MARAD's inspections of Bay Bridge Enterprises in 2005. I compiled them into marad-06-020-foia-c.pdf). P. 1 is the response by MARAD FOIA Office Information Management Specialist Jeannette Riddick, with a due date for my request of Feb. 13, but that Bay Bridge Enterprises could delay or object to disclosing information. On March 14, Riddick forwarded Joel Richard's (Acting Freedom of Information Act Officer for MARAD) letter indicating that they had found two documents to fulfill my FOIA request (see p. 2). The documents (13 Sept. 2005 and 3 Nov. 2005 memos from Willie Barnes, SAR Environmental Specialist) are given on p. 3-6. For the sake of a reader's convenience, I added page numbers and removed black space from the bottom of images of the documents.
168. Goodman, Lisa. 2006. In Our Hands. P. 169-173 in April Readers Digest.
169. Riskedahl, Mark. 2006. Essay. Oregon's Environment: No Ship-scrapping with Weakened DEQ. Jan. 27, Portland Oregonian. (Riskedahl is executive director of Northwest Environmental Defense Center, http://www.nedc.org/)
170. Duin, Steve. 2005. DEQ Is No Advocate for Environment. Nov. 1, Portland Oregonian. Article may be available for a fee by searching Oregonian Archives, http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.
171. Milstein, Michael. 2005. Murkier Waters to Flow With New Rules. The DEQ Says Effects Will Not Be Noticeable, While Critics Decry the Use of Industry Money to Pay Costs. October 31, Portland Oregonian.
172. Garnett, Ley. 2005. Funding Muddies The Waters Of DEQ Standards Proposal. November 30, Oregon Public Broadcasting News.
173. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2005. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program Review. January 12, 2005. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10, Office of Water and Watersheds, Office of Compliance and Enforcement. This is at http://www.lclark.edu/org/nedc/objects/NPDES_program_review.pdf.
174. Rojas-Burke, Joe. 2005. EPA Chides Oregon's Handling of Polluters. Jan. 14, Portland Oregonian. Article may be available for a fee by searching Oregonian Archives, http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.
175. Herzog, Boaz. 2006. Riverkeepers Sue Over Storm-water Permits. Jan. 31, Portland Oregonian.
176. Jacklet, Ben. 2004. Watchdog Barks, Firms Listen: Environmental Group Goes after Business to Keep Runoff Clear. April 13, Portland Tribune.
177. Rojas-Burke, Joe. 2005. Safe Water at Stake in Saga of Two Shipyards. March 5, Portland Oregonian. The article is given in its entirety and may be available for a fee by searching Oregonian Archives, http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.
178. Hunsberger, Brent. 2000. Cleanup of Abandoned Shipyard Nears Finish. Feb. 5, Portland Oregonian. The article is given in its entirety in hoy.htm and may be available for a fee by searching Oregonian Archives, http://www.oregonlive.com/search/oregonian/.
179. Milstein, Michael. 2005. Kayak Crusaders Persuade Polluters to Come Clean. Armed with Plastic Bottles and the Law, a Nonprofit Group Wins More in Penalties than the State DEQ. Nov. 13, Portland Oregonian. This is also at http://www.lclark.edu/org/nedc/objects/Sunday_Oregonain_Text.pdf
180. Campbell, Polly. 2006. Volunteers Give River a Checkup. Water Quality - Each River Guardian Tests the Willamette and Records Monthly Trends at One Site. Feb. 23, Portland Oregonian.
181. Wegener, Brian. 2005. DEQ's Not Doing Its Job on Water Pollution. Nov. 10, Portland Oregonian.
182. Fuller, Brian. 2006. Fact Sheet: Ship Breaking Project Proposal for Coos Bay. April 3, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality--Eugene, Regional Environmental Solutions, Western Region. DEQ 06-WR-006. (Fuller emailed this as a DOC file. In transforming this into a smaller PDF file that can be quickly downloaded, the quality of the DEQ logo has diminished.)
183. Anonymous. 2006. Ship Dismantling to Be Considered at Meeting. April 4, Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
184. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Forum: State Laws Murky on Ship Recycling. April 7, Coos Bay World. This is available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
185. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Ship 'Recycling' Getting a Look. April 8, Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
186. Boerstling, Robyn. 2004. Transportation Secretary Mineta Announces Baltimore Ship Scrapping Contracts, Says Work Will "Set Stage for a Revival" of Local Transportation Economy. Sept. 13, DOT 170-04. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Public Affairs.
187. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2001. Report to Congress on the Progress of the Vessel Scrapping Program. April 2001. U. S. Dept. of Transportation, Maritime Administration. This does not appear to be available at MARAD's web site but is at http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/bigbreak/2001report.pdf
188. U.S. Maritime Administration. 2002. Report to Congress on the Progress of the Vessel Scrapping Program. June 2002. U. S. Dept. of Transportation, Maritime Administration. This does not appear to be available at MARAD's web site but is at http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/evidence/report_congress_vessel_scrap_2002.pdf
189. Baxter, Kevin. 2000. Dismissal of Ship Repair Company's Plea Lets Warship Scrapping Get Under Way. March 1, American Metal Market.
190. Macaluso, Nora. 2003. U.K. Shipbreaking Contract Questioned. With the U.S. Maritime Industry Ailing, Some Are Asking Why a British Scrapyard Was Chosen to Dismantle 13 Aging Vessels. Sept. 8, Special to SunSpot, Baltimore Sun (Maryland).
191. Sentementes, Gus G. 2000. Sparrows Point Yard Gets Navy Ship-Scrapping Job. Dec. 8, Baltimore Sun (Maryland).
192. VSE Corporation. 2004. Securities and Exchange Commission: Form 10-K Annual Report on 11-March-2004. (VSE also discusses its discontinuance of its subsidiary SRR's ship dismantling in: VSE Corporation. 2002. Securities and Exchange Commission: Form 10-Q Quarterly Report on 30 June 2002.)
193. Salinas, Gilberto. 2004. Port Busy Dismantling 10 Ships from Ghost Fleet. Oct. 15, Brownsville Herald (Brownsville, Texas).
194. Tiron, Roxana. 2001. U.S. Ship-Scrapping Program Scraping By Maritime Administration. October, National Defense Magazine. This is now at http://www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/816879-1.html
195. Interagency Panel on Ship Scrapping. 1998. Report of the Interagency Panel on Ship Scrapping. April 1998. Panel included representatives from the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of State, the Department of the Navy, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Department of Justice, the US Department of Labor (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), the Department of Transportation (both the US Maritime Administration and the US Coast Guard), and the US Environmental Protection Agency.
196. International Shipbreaking Limited, LLC. 1998. An Industry Perspective. March 3 Letter addressed to the U.S. Interagency Ship Scrapping Review Panel, which was officially known as Interagency Panel on Ship Scrapping.
197. U. S. Dept. of Transportation. 2000. Audit Report: Report on the Program for Scrapping Obsolete Vessels, Maritime Administration. Report No. MA-2000-067. Office of Inspector General, U. S. Dept. of Transportation. This is also at http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/evidence/audit_scrapping_vessels.pdf
198. Cisneros, Oscar. 1996. Company Has Contract to Dismantle Naval Vessels. June 9, Brownsville Herald (Texas).
199. Vidal, John. 2006. Ghost Ships May Leave Limbo. March 31, The Guardian (England).
200. Hess, Ron, Denis Rushworth, Michael V. Hynes, and John E. Peters. 2001. Disposal Options for Ships. RAND Corporation, Document Number: MR-1377-NAVY. ("This research was conducted for the U.S. Navy within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, and the defense agencies.")
201. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Toxins Slow U.S. Effort to Recycle Ships Effort in U.S. April 13, Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
202. Gallob, Joel. 2006. Port Says No. Jan. 25, Newport News-Times.
203. Casper, Beth. 2006. Newport Halts Plan for Ship Cutting. Commissioners Not Willing to Invest to Support the Business. Jan. 26, Salem Statesman Journal.
204. Gallob, Joel. 2005. Shipbreaking Economics - Labor, Towing, and Markets. Dec. 23, Newport News-Times.
205. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Political Red Tape Big Reason Ships Leave California. April 27, Coos Bay World. This may be available for a fee by doing an Advance Search for the article title enclosed by quotation marks at http://www.theworldlink.com/archives/.
206. Hartnett, Dwayne. 2001. Legislation Could Sink 1,200 Local Jobs: Ship Builders Council Measure Threatens Port of Brownsville Companies. Sept. 1, Brownsville (Texas) Herald.
207. Vindell, Tony. 1997. Old Ships Prove to Be Boon for Local Economy. Sept. 15, Brownsville Herald (Texas).
208. Garfield, Geoff. 2005. Green Yard in Netherlands Gets Funding. June 10, TradeWinds (Norway)(an international shipping newspaper, http://www.tradewinds.no/subscribe/). This is at http://www.ecodock.info/uk/infobase_show.php?id=160.
209. Garside, Ben. 2005. Shipbreaking Yard Eyed in Northeast England. Aug. 17, American Metal Market.
210. U. S. Congress. 2000. Hearing Segment 2. Disposal of Maritime Administration Vessels. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. House of Representatives, May 24, 2000. [Alse see Hearing in 1998 (156).]
211. Foti, Frank J. 2000. Statement of Frank J. Foti, President and Chief Executive Officer, Cascade General, Inc., 5555 North Channel Avenue, Portland, Oregon 97217 before the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. May, 2000.
212. Holcomb, Henry J. 2006. Shipyard to Close Facilities in Phila. The City Is Seeking Another Ship-repair Company to Lease Metro Machine Corp.'s Dry Docks at the Old Navy Yard. May 8, Philadelphia Inquirer.
213. Peele, Thomas. 2006. Few Options for Scrapping Obsolete Ships. May 14, Contra Costa Times (California).
214. Peele, Thomas. 2006. Suisun Bay Fleet Hardly Shipshape. May 14, Contra Costa Times (California). [Included 11 photographs of Suisun Bay fleet that are no longer available.]
215. U. S. House. 2005. Committee Report 4 of 298 - House Report 108-671 - Departments of Transportation and Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2005. Ship Disposal.
216. U. S. House. 2006. House Report 109-153 - Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2006. Ship Disposal.
217. U.S. Senate. 2006. Senate Report 109-109 - Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2006. Ship Disposal.
218. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Company Considers Coos Bay Option. May 20, Coos Bay World.
219. Hamner, Elise. 2006. Ship Recycling Sailing South. May 25, Coos Bay World.
220. Anonymous. 2006. Retired Navy Fleet Contains 67 More Ships. May 25, Coos Bay World.
221. Anonymous. 2006. Mexico Firm Eyes U.S. Fleet. May 25, Coos Bay World.
222. Denina, Chris G. 2006. No More Mothball Fleet? June 1, Vallejo (California) Times-Herald. If this article no longer available at the link given, then it may be available for a fee at the Times-Herald's Archives at http://timesheraldonline.com/fastsearchresults?vertical=archive
223. Anonymous. 2006. MARAD Signs Four More Ship Dismantling Contracts. June 15, Recycling Today Magazine.
The following references need to be added to text.
224. Peele, Thomas. 2006. Pollution Monitoring Surfaces with Cleaning of Obsolete Ships. Water Board Official Concerned Toxic Material Could be Left in Bay. Aug. 11, Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, Ca.). See http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_km4465/is_200608/ai_n16626500 or search Archives at http://www.contracostatimes.com/archivesearch to see article for a fee.
225. Peele, Thomas. 2006. Clean Ships, Toxic Bay. Sept. 15, Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, Ca.). This is at http://www.savesfbay.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=dgKLLSOwEnH&b=1533211&ct=2939945.
226. Anonymous. 2006. Editorial: End Ship-scraping Rule. Nov. 29, Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, Ca.). Search Archives at http://www.contracostatimes.com/archivesearch to see article for a fee.
227. Peele, Thomas. 2007. Cleaning of Vessels Causes Pollution, Prompts Review. Feb. 17, Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, Ca.). Search Archives at http://www.contracostatimes.com/archivesearch to see article for a fee.
228. Anonymous. 2007. Editorial: Ship Disposal Dilemma. Feb. 21, Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, Ca.). Search Archives at http://www.contracostatimes.com/archivesearch to see article for a fee.
229. Sleeth, Peter. 2006. Outcry Spurs U.S. to Swab Fleet. Shipbreaking - Officials Begin Testing Hulls for Invasive Species after Protests against Scrapping Ships in Yaquina Bay. P. A1 and A4 in July 11, Portland Oregonian. It is available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/568222/outcry_spurs_us_to_swab_fleet/index.html.
230. Peele, Thomas. 2006. State Could Require Permits for Suisun Bay Ship Cleaning: Federal Agency Also May Be Required to Monitor for Pollution. Nov. 27, Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, Ca.).
231. Barnard, Jeff. 2007. Worried about Environment, Ore. Considers Rules on Shipbreaking. Feb. 11, Associated Press. (This was included by OregonLive, Contra Costa Times, Salem Statesman-Journal, Coos Bay World and on p. B6 of the Feb. 12 Oregonian ["Bill Pushes 'Dry' Shipbreaking to Protect Coast Environment."] This link to that of OregonLive.)
232. Clayton, Cindy. 2006. Ship Fire at Portlock Traced to Insulation. October 28, The Virginian-Pilot.
On Dec. 5, I was requested to provide my background for the Yaquina Bay shipbreaking issue. I have lived in the Newport area for over 31 years. I am an independent, part-time biologist/researcher with a Master of Science degree from OSU (1976) and have had 30+ papers related to biology published in refereed, scientific journals (see Bayer Research). However, I earn a living by working full-time at a job unrelated to biology. I am not a consultant, and I am not receiving any compensation to work on this issue.
I am involved as a concerned citizen who would like to see steady, long-term family wage jobs with full benefits and no environmental contamination come to Newport. I would like to see the Port of Newport flourish.
I attended the first, Dec. 1 meeting of Friends of Yaquina Bay and have had email contact with some of its members since then. I had no part in the writing or publication of the unsigned "The Ghost Fleet: Newport's Toxic Tide" that has parts with which I strongly disagree. On Jan. 6, I read in the Jan. 6 News-Times (79) that the brochure's purpose is "to polarize and energize the community," that the Save Our Bay group was an offshoot group from Friends of Yaquina Bay, that Save Our Bay had formed to publish that brochure because there was dissension within the Friends of Yaquina Bay group about the content of the brochure, that the leadership is the same between groups, and that there is overlapping membership. Based on all of this, I have chosen on Jan. 6 to make it clear that I was never a member of Save Our Bay. I do not believe the solution to this issue is to create even more polarization. I believe that it is essential for proponents and opponents to work together through the issues and concerns in a civil, reasonable, and candid manner. It may be challenging to do so, but it is possible and desirable for the future of Newport. In my opinion, Newport does not need more polarization.
I have researched Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC and the shipbreaking industry to see if it would be a good industry for Newport, and this web page is the result.
I am grateful to having received links to material or tips, in alphabetical order, two anonymous people, Tim Bellmore, Mark Camara, Carol Cole, Harry Crow, Elise Hamner, Jeanne Hendrickson, David Jincks, Beth Ann Lawrence, Jay Moeller, and perhaps others that I have forgotten to document.
Please read through the questions and footnotes and reach your own conclusion. Please note that there is a sea of information available on the Internet (e.g., search for "Bay Bridge Enterprises," "shipbreaking," "ship salvage" etc.).
Email comments to Range (Richard) Bayer, Bayer Research, P. O. Box 1467, Newport, Oregon 97365 USA.[Return to Table of Contents]