24 January 2005
To: Newport Development Commissioners Roger Snelling, Rob Thompson, Patrick Hannan, Mary Lou Yeck, and Peter Noah
Newport City Hall
169 SW Coast HWY
Newport, OR 97365
Dear Commissioners:
Re: use of urban renewal funds to build the Newport Event Center at the South Beach Marina.
If you approve funding the proposed Event Center, I hope you will do so only after adding requirements for the City of Newport to build the Event Center to resist tsunamis and to better mitigate other earthquake and tsunami risks to human safety. The City plans to try to reduce some of the risk of earthquake damage and loss of life by following site preparation and building design regulations in Oregon Building Codes (section C-2). But the City has chosen to ignore national site preparation and building design recommendations to reduce the risk from tsunamis because the City is not yet legally required to do so (section C-2). Further, there are other ways to reduce the risk to human life at the proposed Event Center from earthquakes that the City is not including because it is not yet legally required (sections C-3 through C-6 and section D). Given the earthquake and tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean on December 26 that claimed over 150,000 lives, spending urban renewal money to build this Center without including known and reasonable ways to reduce the risks to public safety seems questionable.
In the following sections, I discuss whether it is prudent to spend urban renewal funds for the Event Center as currently proposed (section A), the earthquake and tsunami hazards at the proposed Event Center site (section B), the City's incomplete mitigation for earthquake and tsunami hazards (sections C and D), point out that pre-existing public buildings in South Beach do not excuse the lack of earthquake and tsunami mitigation by the City of Newport (section E), give concluding remarks (section F), and include references. For your convenience in looking up Internet references, I will also make this letter available at http://www.orednet.org/~rbayer/lincoln/ec-urbanrenewal.htm [all lower case letters]
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely yours,
Range (Richard) Bayer --------------------------------- Public Safety Should Come First
cc: Steve Card, Newport News-Times
Using public funds to build a public assembly building in a known earthquake and tsunami hazardous area (section B) without doing what is known to reduce the risks (sections C and D) is questionable. For instance, the Oregon's Coastal Natural Hazards Policy Working Group (1994:66) suggested:
"Recommendation 10-4. Prohibit direct public development, grants, loans, or loan guarantees for essential facilities, hazardous facilities, major structures, and special occupancy structures (as defined by ORS 455.477; see Issue 3) in high-hazard areas. Exceptions would be situations where such hazards are fully mitigated by structural or nonstructural means or when the facility cannot be feasibly located outside high-hazard areas (for example, port facilities, marinas, other water-dependent facilities, water and waste treatment facilities, and similar uses). Public subsidies of other types of development in high-hazard areas should generally be discouraged."
One of their exceptions to public funding of building in a hazardous site is if it cannot be located elsewhere, but there are alternate, safer locations for the Event Center--it is not water-dependent. Their other exception is if the hazard can be fully mitigated by structural or nonstructural methods. As currently proposed, the City of Newport is not voluntarily using several known, prudent ways to mitigate the Center for earthquake and tsunami hazards but is only doing what is legally required (see section C).
One source of funding of the proposed Event Center is urban renewal funds that the Newport Development Commission administers (Card 2004a). Chapter 457 of the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) is about Urban Renewal, and ORS 457.020 indicates that, among other duties, urban renewal is to be used to improve or remove "blighted areas." "Blighted areas" in ORS 457.010(1) includes areas:
"that by reason of deterioration, faulty planning, inadequate or improper facilities, deleterious land use or the existence of unsafe structures, or any combination of these factors, are detrimental to safety, health or welfare of the community. ..."
One example of a "blighted area" in ORS 457.010(1)(f) is:
"The existence of property or lots or other areas that are subject to inundation by water."
If the Newport Development Commission approves urban renewal funds to be used to finance the Event Center as it is currently planned, it will be creating a "blighted area" because the Event Center would attract many people into a tsunami inundation zone (which is an area "subject to inundation by water") for which the City has not fully mitigated the hazards (see section C). Doing so will be a consequence of "faulty planning," since revised Statewide Planning Goal 7 and its amendments became effective on 1 June 2002. Among other things, the amended Goal 7 ("Update on Statewide Planning Goal 7 -Natural Hazards" in the spring 2002 "Natural Hazards Planner" at the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development web site, http://www.lcd.state.or.us/hazapdfs/Spring2002.PDF)[boldface added]:
"Requires local governments to evaluate the risk to people and property from developing in hazard areas and to provide the opportunity for citizens to become involved in the evaluation of risk. Local governments then incorporate the new hazard inventory information into their comprehensive plans as necessary. The amended Goal 7 language states that new hazard policies and implementing ordinances should be consistent with the following principles:
1) avoid development in high hazard areas where risk cannot be mitigated; ..."
[The State of Oregon has re-organized its web pages, State Goal 7 is at http://egov.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal7.pdf]
Goal 7 indicates that there would be public review of the risk for development in hazardous areas, but there has been no such public review in Newport or South Beach. The earthquake hazards were not mentioned in the City's Conditional Use Permit for the Event Center, and the City Planner James Bassingthwaite announced at the start of the Oct. 25 Newport Planning Commission Public Hearing that earthquake and tsunami hazards would not be considered in granting the Conditional Use Permit. At that Hearing, the City's agent Dennis Bartoldus stated that the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development had not requested the City of Newport to revise its Comprehensive Plan to include earthquake and tsunami hazards, so the City has not done so (see p. 5 of the City of Newport's "Minutes" for this hearing). I emailed Christine Valentine (Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development Floodplain/Natural Hazards Coordinator) about the proposed Event Center in relation to amended Goal 7. On 27 October 2004, she replied in an email:
"You raised some concerns about Goal 7. The city's [Newport's] comprehensive plan was reviewed against goal 7 in the past and found to comply. This would have been before goal 7 was amended. To my knowledge, the Department has not required local government review of new hazard info. per Section B. of Goal 7 since the goal was revised. This is partially because other state and federal agencies have not requested that DLCD take action in response to new hazard information. The Department does not really have any programs that would generate new hazard information directly. Another factor is that there is no state funding for goal 7 work by local governments. In terms of all the statewide planning goals, goal 7 is not one that the Legislature has been emphasizing in recent sessions. They have instead directed DLCD to focus its planning work and limited grant $s on other issues."
The City has been very careful to technically follow the laws, and the siting of the Event Center in a hazardous area is not specifically prohibited in the ORS Chapter 457 on Urban Renewal. However, doing so without at least using known, prudent ways to reduce the risks (see section C) violate the spirit of urban renewal and amended Goal 7 by knowingly creating a risk to public safety that is not mitigated.
Roddey (2004) writes:
Could a natural disaster like the tsunami that hit the countries around the Indian Ocean happen here in Oregon? "In a word, yes," says James Roddey, Community Education Coordinator with the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI). "We have a similar active fault offshore, so we will someday experience an earthquake and tsunami similar to the one that just hit Southeast Asia. We can expect a magnitude 9 earthquake and resulting tsunami that would devastate the Pacific Northwest coast from Cape Mendocino to British Columbia. The bad news is that it would be a horrible event. The good news for Oregon and the Pacific Northwest is that we are much better prepared than the countries around the Indian Ocean to respond to an event like this."
In Oregon, Wang (1999) roughly estimated that 5,100 lives would be lost and there would be $12 billion of damage from a Cascadia subduction zone 8.5 magnitude earthquake and consequent tsunami. That is far fewer lives than for the recent Indian Ocean disaster, but that is of no comfort to those losing loved ones that could have been saved if earthquake and tsunami hazards had been better mitigated with techniques that are currently available.
The proposed Event Center site at the South Beach Marina is in DOGAMI's highest risk category for "relative earthquake hazard" (Appendix A) and earthquake "amplification" hazard (Madin and Wang 1999). The high "amplification" hazard at the Event Center site was confirmed by the City's 8 March 2004 geotechnical report for the Event Center (Nickels et al. 2004:6). Madin and Wang (1999) also indicated that the South Beach area was in the highest hazard class for earthquake liquefaction, though Nickels et al. (2004:7) concluded: "it is our professional opinion that a cyclically induced liquefaction hazard is negligible" at the Event Center site. This site is also in a DOGAMI tsunami evacuation zone (Appendix B). The reasons for these high hazards at this site are that it rests on sand dredge spoils with underlying sand and that it is low-lying.
Another hazard pertinent to the proposed Event Center is that the Yaquina Bay Bridge is vulnerable to a "moderate" earthquake, is part of a "lifeline route," and is the highest priority bridge in Oregon for earthquake preparation (Anonymous 2001c). If this Bridge becomes inoperational, it would cut-off emergency responders and supplies from the Newport side of the Bridge going to the Event Center in South Beach. Don Mann, manager of the Port of Newport, said in a 7 October 2004 conversation that he was at a meeting where one scenario in a major earthquake is that the Bridge will collapse.
C-1. INTRODUCTION. Small earthquakes and tsunamis would probably not have a significant impact on the proposed Event Center. However, a Cascadia subduction zone earthquake of magnitude 8.0 or greater (i.e., the "Big One") and the subsequent tsunami are of concern. With such an earthquake, extensive damage is predicted to occur from British Columbia to northern California (see quote from Roddey [2004] at start of section B), so getting help will be difficult and slow in coming. Such a large earthquake would be the only warning for people in tsunami inundation zones to evacuate, since the first wave of the subsequent tsunami is predicted to arrive at Newport about 20 minutes later and elsewhere along the Oregon Coast 10-30 minutes after the earthquake (Anonymous 2003b, Roddey 2004, Gallob 2005a).
Building in an area vulnerable to earthquake and tsunamis can not be fully mitigated by building construction and design. For example, the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (2001:15) noted [boldface added]:
"Principle 2: Avoid Development in Tsunami Run-up Areas to Minimize Future Tsunami Losses. Tsunami risk can be mitigated most effectively by avoiding or minimizing the exposure of people and property through land use planning. Development should be prevented in high-hazard areas wherever possible. Where development cannot be prevented, land use intensity, building value, and occupancy should be kept to a minimum."
And Federal Emergency Management Agency (2000:Fig. 8-15) writes in its guidelines for siting buildings in coastal areas:
"2. DON'T assume engineering and architectural practices can mitigate poor lot layout or poor building siting."
C-2. EVENT CENTER CONSTRUCTION TO RESIST EARTHQUAKES BUT NOT TSUNAMIS. The City of Newport is supposed to follow Oregon Building Codes because this is a requirement of the Event Center Conditional Use Permit. Oregon Building Codes (which were based on the Uniform Building Code until October 2004 and are now based on the International Building Code) include provisions to construct buildings to resist earthquake hazards. At the Oct. 25 Public Hearing, Tricia Berg, who works for the City's architecture firm for the Event Center, indicated that the Event Center would be built to Seismic Zone 4 (the most hazardous earthquake zone) standards. City Planner James Bassingthwaite and the City's agent Dennis Bartoldus stated at the Hearing that earthquake and tsunami issues would be addressed through the building permit process (Card 2004b and p. 2 and 4-5 of the City's "Minutes" of the Hearing). In reporting the Hearing, Card (2004b) wrote:
"During its deliberation on this issue, members of the planning commission felt the request did meet the four criteria needed for approval. While all agreed the tsunami and earthquake hazards needed to be addressed as well, they were comfortable that would happen during the building permit process."
However, City Planner James Bassingthwaite and the City's agent Dennis Bartoldus did not inform the Planning Commission that Oregon Building Codes do not have any provisions for site preparation or building design for constructing buildings to resist tsunamis. Thus, it is not possible to adequately address tsunami concerns through the building permit process. As the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (2001:30) states:
"Most local building codes used in the Pacific states are based on the Uniform Building Code (UBC) prepared by the International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO). In California, Oregon, and Washington, the state governments mandate code adoption and enforcement at the local level. ... The UBC includes design requirements and standards for fire, wind, floods, and earthquakes, but it does not contain requirements for tsunami-resistant design [boldface added]. While a few communities have adopted tsunami-resistant building design standards, the vast majority of coastal communities have not. The City and County of Honolulu has adopted special requirements for floods and tsunamis as part of its Revised Ordinances. With appropriate modifications to reflect local conditions, these could serve as a general model for other states and municipalities. Guidance for architects and engineers in the design for tsunami forces is included in FEMA's Coastal Construction Manual, also known as FEMA 55 [see Federal Emergency Management Agency 2000]. The manual deals with tsunamis in a manner similar to the Honolulu ordinance but uses more current information."
At the Oct. 25 Conditional Use Permit Public Hearing by the City of Newport's Planning Commission, the City Planner James Bassingthwaite stated that tsunamis are included in the Oregon Building Code. That is technically correct. The Oregon Structural Specialty Building Code does have Section 1802.1.1 that incorporates ORS 455.446 and 455.447; these prohibit (with exceptions) some structures (but not the Event Center) from being built in a tsunami inundation zone. This building code does require consultation with DOGAMI for construction of other structures (including the proposed Event Center) in a tsunami inundation zone (Oregon Structural Specialty Building Code Table 1802.1); however, such "consultation" is not very meaningful as it is "nonbinding" (Oregon Administrative Rule 632-005-0060). The City via the Event Center architect has consulted DOGAMI as required (Appendix C).
The absence of specifications for site preparation and building construction to resist tsunamis in the Oregon Building Code does not mean that are no guidelines for doing so. Federal Emergency Management Agency (2000) includes building design recommendations to resist tsunamis, and an excerpt from National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (2001:31) ("Principle 4: Design and Construct New Buildings to Minimize Tsunami Damage") states:
"Where a tsunami hazard study has been prepared to inform local design decisions, the information can be used to decide whether to permit construction at a given site. If construction is to be permitted, the building design must address tsunami-related forces, including water pressure, buoyancy, currents and waves, debris impact, scour, and fire. The analyses will vary depending on location, building size, and type of construction, such as reinforced concrete, wood, light metal, and others."
An excerpt from National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (2001:32) in "Principle 4: Design and Construct New Buildings to Minimize Tsunami Damage" continues:
"There are four performance levels that can be considered for buildings: minimum, safety, reoccupancy, and operational levels. ... Buildings constructed to perform at a safety level should withstand water forces, debris and wave-break impacts, earthquake shaking, ground failure, and fire without significant structural damage."
In my written testimony for the Oct. 25 Conditional Use Permit Public Hearing for the Event Center, I recommended including conditions to construct the Event Center to resist tsunamis as suggested in Federal Emergency Management Agency (2000) and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (2001). But the City's representative Dennis Bartoldus stated during the Hearing that the City was not required to do so.
C-3. EVENT CENTER AREA IS NOT PROPOSED TO BE TsunamiReady. Several communities along the Oregon coast have areas in tsunami inundation zones. Some of these communities (Cannon Beach, Manzanita, Wheeler, and Nehalem) have voluntarily become NOAA TsunamiReady (see http://wcatwc.gov/tsunamiready/tready.htm) to mitigate tsunami risks for their citizens and visitors. If the Event Center is to be funded with urban renewal funds, the Newport Development Commission could help prevent loss of lives by requiring the City of Newport to make the Event Center area TsunamiReady.
C-4. INADEQUATE TSUNAMI WARNING SIGNAGE IN SOUTH BEACH. Earthquake and tsunami risks at the Event Center potentially could also be partially mitigated through signage and other warnings, but the City of Newport is not required to do so. Education and drills are useful for resident staff, but would not help nonresidents to the Event Center. For Center visitors, signage is critical to alert them what to do in case of an earthquake or tsunami. On p. 7 of the City's Conditional Use Permit application for the Event Center, it is stated:
"The applicant notes that Oregon Emergency Management has mapped the subject area and [tsunami] evacuation routes and locations of high ground have been identified for the area. Existing evacuation route signage already exists in the South Beach area and DOGAMI staff confirmed that no additional site specific signage, horns or sirens are required."
Again, the City stresses doing only what is "required."
In my written testimony at the Oct. 25 Public Hearing, I pointed out that although Oregon Emergency Management has mapped evacuation routes and assembly points that information is not widely available, particularly to nonresidents. In the event of a major local earthquake, the tsunami is predicted to arrive at Newport 20 minutes later (Anonymous 2003b, Gallob 2005a), so people would not have time to look up these maps on the Internet or to request brochures with the maps, even if power was still available after the earthquake.
The City is only technically correct in stating that evacuation route signage exists in South Beach. The only such signage I have found is at the OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center, which is not along the route to the proposed Event Center. The City and Port have chosen to not put evacuation route signage around the Marina to the Evacuation Assembly Point at the south end of the Yaquina Bay Bridge, so the Hatfield Marine Science Center evacuation route signage ends at the edge of their campus.
There are only two vague tsunami warning signs along routes to and near the Event Center. Incredibly, for northbound Highway 101 traffic turning to go towards the proposed Event Center just before the Yaquina Bay Bridge, a "Leaving Tsunami Hazard Zone" is visible about 0.1 mile just before they turn, so travelers are misled to believe that they leaving a tsunami hazard rather than entering one as they approach the proposed Event Center location. For southbound Highway 101 traffic, there is an "Entering Tsunami Hazard Zone" sign along Highway 101 just after crossing the Yaquina Bay Bridge and turning right to go to the Marina. An "Entering Tsunami Hazard Zone" is vague--it does not give any clues to visitors about what they should do. "Tsunami Evacuation Route" with an arrow pointing the direction of the route or "Tsunami Hazard Zone: In Case of Earthquake, Go to High Ground or Inland" signs give not only a warning but also give visitors an idea about what they should do and when they should do it.
DOGAMI has suggested that the City of Newport do more education and work on tsunami evacuation issues for the Event Center (Appendix C). It is unknown if the City will follow these suggestions that are not required. The best guide to future actions is past actions, and, in the past, the City has done only what is required, not what has been recommended.
C-5. THE CITY IS NOT PLANNING TO PROVIDE AN EMERGENCY SUPPLY DEPOT FOR EVENT CENTER EVACUEES. People, who may be lucky to escape from the Event Center after a major earthquake and the resulting tsunami with the clothes on their backs, may then find themselves without emergency medical care and supplies, drinking water, blankets, etc. and may die later because the City of Newport has not been required to provide such a depot.
Emergency supply depots at Oregon coast tsunami evacuation assembly centers have been recommended. For example, another Oregon coastal community, Rockaway Beach, has voluntarily set up a tsunami evacuation site with a sea cargo container with emergency supplies that are renewed and replenished (State of Oregon 2002:T-11). At the Embarcadero in Newport in February and May 2001, local governmental representatives, business owners, and emergency managers met to discuss Yaquina Bay earthquake and tsunami preparation (Anonymous 2001a, 2001b). Recommendations included (Anonymous 2001b):
For land evacuation, this group [the Waterfront Users and Industry group] urged "hardened storage and assembly areas" and provisioning of "'durable containers" for equipment and nonperishable food "in safe uplands." Businesses and homes should prepare and exercise evacuation plans as a drill, they urged. Port of Newport General Manager Don Mann said he hopes to relocate the port office away from its Bayfront site. Other public facilities, from schools to medical offices, should be relocated, if possible, from inundation zones, the group said.
Since the Port of Newport would like to move its Newport Bayfront office because of the tsunami risk, why put the Event Center in a riskier location that is likely to be isolated from emergency help after a major earthquake?
Lincoln County will not be able to help Event Center evacuees because the County expects individuals and businesses to be prepared. For example, Gallob (2004a) reports:
But, [County Commissioner] Cowan said, "we can't do everything for everybody. That is why people, families, businesses, should have plans in place. People need to be able to take care of themselves for 24 or 48 hours with water and food [boldface added], and have emergency contacts known," so they can contact one family member to get word to others without tying up the phone lines."
In January 2005, Gallob (2005a) reported that Newport Fire Chief Rick Crook (who is in charge of City of Newport disaster preparedness) is concerned that there are no supplies for South Beach people who evacuate to the south end of the Yaquina Bay Bridge (which is where Event Center evacuees would go) or the Newport Airport.
Yet, in my written testimony to the Oct. 25 Newport Planning Commission Public Hearing, I suggested a condition requiring an emergency depot of emergency supplies at the south end of Yaquina Bay Bridge evacuation assembly area for Event Center evacuees. However, City agent Dennis Bartoldus rejected the idea and made it sound ludicrous.
The second page of DOGAMI's consultation with the City of Newport includes some suggestions that may broach the emergency depot issue (Appendix C). But the suggestions are nonbinding (Oregon Administrative Rule 632-005-0060) and too vague to be useful (Appendix C).
Visitors to the Event Center won't know that they need to carry emergency supplies for 1-2 days while evacuating, and the City of Newport's has not made a commitment to take care of the visitors or to set up emergency depots of supplies in preparation for a major earthquake or tsunami.
Emergency supplies may also not arrive by boat after a major earthquake because boats in Yaquina Bay would not have had time to go to sea before the first tsunami wave arrives 20 minutes after the earthquake and renders boats inoperational (Anonymous 2003b, Gallob 2005a). Boats that were already at sea may not be able to bring supplies into the harbor because the Yaquina Bay Bridge may collapse and block entry (Don Mann, Port of Newport Manager, 7 Oct. 2004 conversation). Boats may only be useful for rescue and bringing emergency supplies with tsunamis with an hour or more of warning so the boats can put to sea before the tsunami arrives (Anonymous 2003b, Gallob 2004b, 2005a).
Emergency shelter may also be critical during inclement weather after a major earthquake because an emergency depot may not be large enough to provide emergency shelter to thousands of evacuees from the Event Center. Nearby buildings may have collapsed or be unsafe because they were not built to Seismic Zone 4 standards, and the City of Newport is choosing to not design the Event Center to resist a tsunami (section C-2), so it may have survived the earthquake but not tsunami waves.
C-6. EVENT CENTER EVACUEES MAY NOT KNOW WHEN IT IS SAFE TO LEAVE THEIR TSUNAMI EVACUATION ASSEMBLY AREA. A major earthquake is the signal that a subsequent tsunami may arrive in 20 minutes at Newport (Anonymous 2003b, Gallob 2005a), so that people at the Event Center would need to evacuate immediately. However, the tsunami is often not a single wave, but can be several waves over several hours. For example, there were five big tsunami waves (with four about 10 ft tall) over a two hour period in Yaquina Bay after the 1964 Alaskan earthquake, with the fifth wave being the largest (Schatz et al. 1964, Anonymous 2003a). Of nine Oregon coast river mouths and bays studied after the 1964 earthquake, Yaquina Bay had the most tall tsunami waves, though large tsunami waves continued to arrive 3-4 hours after the first wave at the Nehalem and Siuslaw estuaries (Schatz et al. 1964, Anonymous 2003a). Yaquina Bay may be more vulnerable because waves may wrap around Stonewall Banks and come together in Newport and Waldport (Anonymous 2003a). In Crescent City, people were evacuated in preparation of the tsunami from the 1964 Alaskan earthquake, but some returned after the first three waves, so that most were killed by the fourth wave, which was the largest (see Lander et al. quote in section D). So it is important that people do not go back into a tsunami inundation zone until it is safe to do so.
Event Center evacuees could be isolated from emergency warnings because the City of Newport has not made a commitment to establish and maintain an emergency supply depot for Event Center evacuees (section C-5), so there may be no battery-powered radio, other emergency communications, or emergency instructions to warn people of the danger of additional tsunami waves at the Event Center evacuation assembly area. While hurrying to evacuate the Event Center, people may not have picked up a battery-powered radio to listen to local radio stations to find out when it is safe to leave the assembly point (Gallob 2004a, 2005b), and their cell phones may not be operational because of collapse of cell phone towers. Although Lincoln County has an Internet web site with emergency information and an emergency telephone number, these may not be accessible after a major earthquake because of power failures and breaks in landline telephone service or, if operational, the telephone number may be jammed as after a recent local minor earthquake (Gallob 2004a). Since the Yaquina Bay Bridge many not be passable after a major earthquake (section B), emergency responders may be unable to arrive by land to tell evacuees when it is safe to leave evacuation areas. Emergency responders may also not be able to arrive by boat because the 20 minute interval between the time of the major earthquake and the arrival of the first tsunami wave at Yaquina Bay would not have been enough time for boats to go to sea to safety before the tsunamis hit, so they may be destroyed inside Yaquina Bay from the tsunami (Anonymous 2003b).
Without warning communication that should be the responsibility of the City of Newport to provide, Event Center evacuees after a major earthquake can be expected to be anxious to return to the Event Center to search for missing friends or family or to recover property they abandoned in their haste to evacuate. They may return to the Event Center before it is safe to do so and be killed or injured by subsequent tsunami waves.
Distant tsunamis will arrive several hours after a distant earthquake (Roddey 2004), so there will be enough time to warn and evacuate people from the Event Center over the Yaquina Bay Bridge. Since the only areas that will be affected are those in tsunami inundation zones, help and supplies after the tsunami waves will be readily available locally. Boats in Yaquina Bay will also have time to go to sea to safety and come back later and help with supplies and rescue efforts (Anonymous 2003b, Gallob 2004b, 2005a).
But the City of Newport could do more at the proposed Event Center to reduce losses from a distant tsunami. For example, the City of Newport is not planning to build the Event Center to resist tsunamis, so it may be severely damaged (section C-2). South Beach is also not TsunamiReady and has inadequate tsunami warning signage (sections C-3 and C-4). Further, it is easier to broadcast the initial tsunami warning that it is to keep people out of tsunami inundation zones. Event Center evacuees may want to return to the Event Center to retrieve belongings or just out of curiosity, and not realize that tsunami waves may arrive for several hours and that the first wave may not be the largest (section C-6). Sightseers can be expected to come to see the tsunami as they have done in the past (Anonymous 2003a); for example, when news of the impending tsunami from the 1964 Alaskan earthquake arrived locally, some people from Toledo "went down to the beach with their surfboards" (Gallob 2005b). For the 1964 Alaskan earthquake, the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey's Seismic Sea Wave Warning System issued a tsunami advisory bulletin and a tsunami warning for the West Coast (Schatz 1965:20, Lander et al. 1993:102). Lander et al. (1993:103-104) write:
"Low-lying areas [in Crescent City] were being warned when the first wave arrived at 11:39 P.M., just after high tide. The first rise exceeded the gage limit but was estimated to have been 14 feet above mean lower low water (MLLW)(Kent, 1964), or about nine feet above the tide level. ... The second wave was smaller, at six feet above tide beginning about 12:10 A.M. Believing the worst was over as had always been the case in the past, many merchants and sightseers converged on the area having been alerted by television, radio, and friends. Officials attempted to limit access to the area by sightseers to prevent looters, but businessmen and residents were allowed to pass. The third wave also exceeded the limits of the gage which failed altogether at this time. It was estimated to have been sixteen feet above MLLW (Kent, 1964). ... Most of the damage and fatalities were caused by the fourth and largest wave beginning about 1:40 A.M. and peaking about 2:00 A. M. It reached a height of 20.78 feet above MLLW (Magoon, 1965) or about 15.7 feet above the expected tide."
At the Oct. 25 Public Hearing, Planning Commissioner Larry Henson pointed out that the Oregon Coast Aquarium and the OSU Hatfield Marine Science Center are also in the South Beach earthquake and tsunami zones. Yes, but they were built before the earthquake and tsunami hazards were mapped. If they were to be built today, there would also be questions about the wisdom of attracting so many people to the area, and there would also be suggestions, like in this letter, to at least reduce the risk by site preparation and building construction to not only resist earthquakes but also tsunamis. The Hatfield Marine Science Center has also voluntarily put up tsunami warning signage, had educational programs, and conducted an evacuation drill, so it recognizes the risks and is voluntarily trying to reduce them.
The proposed Event Center at the South Beach Marina would be built on dredge spoils overlaying sand in a low-lying area. The hazards of building on sand have been known for thousands of years; for example, the Bible says:
"The foolish man builds his house upon the sand" (Matthew 7:26).
To build the Event Center without using the technology available to make it safer seems foolhardy as well as negligent [especially after the recent disastrous earthquake and tsunami in southeast Asia]. As a condition for using urban renewal funds for the Event Center, the Newport Development Commission should require the City of Newport to better reduce earthquake and tsunami hazards (see sections C-2 through C-6).
Anonymous. 2001a. Quake disrupts tsunami conference. In March 3 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/03/03/general/news.txt
Anonymous. 2001b. Elements identified for quake, tsunami response in Newport. In June 6 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/06/06/general/news-21.txt
Anonymous. 2001c. Local bridge top priority for seismic repairs. In June 22 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/06/22/general/news-01.txt
Anonymous. 2003a. Offshore quake could spawn several tidal waves. April 9 newspaper article in Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2003/04/09/general/news-01.txt
Anonymous. 2003b. Tsunami coming: what's a boat owner to do? April 16 newspaper article in Newport News-Times. This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2003/04/16/general/news-24.txt
Card, S. 2004a. Newport Event Center project hits a snag. P. A1 and A2 of Dec. 24 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2004/12/24/news/news05.txt
Card, S. 2004b. Convention center clears conditional use hurdle. P. A1 and A2 of Oct. 29 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2004/10/29/news/news02.txt
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2000. Coastal construction manual, FEMA 55. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (See contents at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/hazards/nhp_fema55.pdf; free paper or CD-ROM copies of this are still available as of November 2004 by calling 1-800-480-2520.)
Gallob, J. 2004a. County discusses quake, tsunami preparedness and response capabilities. July 16 newspaper article in Newport News-Times. This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2004/07/16/news/news04.txt
Gallob, J. 2004b. Fishing fleet could aid in tsunami response. P. A4 in December 31 newspaper article in Newport News-Times. This is at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2004/12/31/news/news14.txt
Gallob, J. 2005a. Hooley gathers ideas for federal tsunami response. P. A2 in January 19 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/01/19/news/news09.txt
Gallob, J. 2005b. Tsunami 101: What we need to know. P. A4 in January 7 Newport News-Times. This is at: http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2005/01/07/news/news14.txt
Lander, J. F., P. A. Lockridge, and M. J. Kozuch. 1993. Tsunamis affecting the West Coast of the United States, 1806-1992. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service, National Geophysical Data Center. Boulder, Colorado. NGDC Key to Geophysical Records Documentation No. 29. [This is GC222.U6 L36 1993 at OSU Libraries.]
Madin, I. P. and Z. Wang. 1999. Relative earthquake hazard maps for selected urban areas in western Oregon: Newport. Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) Interpretive Map Series No. 10 (IMS-10). The "relative earthquake" hazard map is in Appendix A; the whole maps and explanatory text for the maps are at http://nwdata.geol.pdx.edu/DOGAMI/IMS-10; the entire 1999 report is described in a DOGAMI press release "Earthquake Hazard Maps Released for Coastal Oregon" at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news&events/archives/18-cstlmaps.htm
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. 2001. Designing for tsunamis: seven principles for planning and designing for tsunami hazards. National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Survey, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Science Foundation, State of Alaska, State of California, State of Hawaii, State of Oregon, and State of Washington.) This is at "[Tsunami] Preparedness" (http://www.prh.noaa.gov/itic/library/pubs/preparedness/preparedness.html) by International Tsunami Information Center, National Weather Service, NOAA.
Nickels, W. L., J. K. Maitland, and B. K. Fiedorowicz. 2004. Geotechnical investigation and seismic hazard study: Newport Exposition Center. 8 March 2004. Prepared for City of Newport, Newport, Oregon by Foundation Engineering, Inc., 820 NW Cornell Avenue, Corvallis, OR 97330-4517.
Oregon's Coastal Natural Hazards Policy Working Group (OCNHPWG). 1994. Improving natural hazards management on the Oregon Coast. Recommendations of the Coastal Natural Hazards Policy Working Group. Oregon Sea Grant, Oregon State University, ORESU-T-94-002. (This is at Oregon Sea Grant's web site: http://seagrant.oregonstate.edu/sgpubs/onlinepubs/t94002.html)
Roddey, J. 2004. December 29: DOGAMI news release for immediate release: could a large tsunami strike the Oregon Coast? Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries. This is at http://sarvis.dogami.state.or.us/news%26events/TsunamiPR.pdf
Schatz, C. E. 1965. Source and characteristics of the tsunami observed along the coast of the Pacific Northwest on March 28, 1964. Master of Science thesis, Oregon State University.
Schatz, C. E., H. Curl, Jr., and W. V. Burt. 1964. Tsunamis on the Oregon coast. OreBin 26:231-232.
State of Oregon. 2002. Tsunami chapter. P. T1-T19 in Part III of State of Oregon Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan, Emergency Management Plan. See "Tsunami" chapter at http://csc.uoregon.edu/pdr_website/projects/state/snhmp_web/part-3/part3_fullpage.htm; in the original letter, the link was more cumbersome to use to find the "Tsunami" chapter.
Wang, Y. 1999. The First Statewide Earthquake Risk Assessment Using HAZUS - Estimated Losses in Oregon. Western States Seismic Policy Council Earthquake Quarterly--Summer 1999. This is one of articles at: http://www.wsspc.org/pubs/news/eq9907.htm
Link to South Beach map portion (ec-newport_relhaz-c.jpg, 613K)
Link to Evacuation Map only for South Beach map portion (ec-ap-b.jpg, 213K)
[transcription of letter, a photocopy of which was in the original letter]
[State of Oregon letterhead, John A. Kitzhaber, M.F., Governor. "Received NOV 19 2004 DOGAMI" Stamp."
Department of Geology & Mineral Industries
Administrative Office
800 NE Oregon Street #28, Suite 965
Portland, OR 97232
(503) 731-4100
FAX (503) 731-4066
November 18, 2004
Bill Seider
WBGS Architecture & Planning, PC
72 West Broadway
Eugene, OR 97401
Re: ORS 455.446 and 455.447 consultation, Newport Expo & Event Center
Dear Bill:
Thank you for the excellent summary of our October 28, 2004 Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 455.446 and 455.447 consultation on the Newport Expo & Event Center. Owing to the occupancy of the structure (covered structure for public assembly of over 300 persons) and location in the official tsunami inundation zone, a formal consultation with Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) is required prior to issuance of a building permit. The October 28, 2004 meeting satisfies part of this requirement. A formal field consultation and approval of your mitigation plan will complete requirements.
You summarized the following mitigation actions that will be needed by the City of Newport to satisfy the requirements of the statutes:
The following specific issues should be addressed in order to carry out these actions:
[start of page 2 of letter]
Thank you for your prompt and complete follow up on our initial consultation. WBGS and the City of Newport are to be commended on their proactive stance in ensuring that this new facility meets the highest public safety standards. We look forward to the field review of your mitigation plan.
Sincerely.
[signature of George R. Priest]
George R. Priest, Ph.D., CEG
Geologist
C Vicki McConnell, State Geologist
Don Lewis, Deputy State Geologist
Sam Sasaki, City Manager, City of Newport